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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECT OF SPECIALTY TIER PLACEMENT  
ON ENROLLMENT AND UTILIZATION IN MEDICARE PART D 
Erin Audrey Taylor 
Patricia M. Danzon 
 Health insurance design has distinct and well-documented effects on choice of 
insurance plan and health care utilization and expenditures. The question of how to 
design benefits for newer technologies such as specialty drugs presents new challenges 
in balancing adverse selection and moral hazard concerns with beneficiary coverage. 
The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program adds complexity via additional 
governmental regulation of the market and coverage design for specialty drugs. This 
dissertation presents a conceptual model of the supply-side tier placement decision on 
the part of Part D plans, and uses Part D formulary and claims data to estimate the 
demand-side response by Medicare beneficiaries. An instrumental variables approach is 
employed to address the endogeneity present in the specialty tier placement (supply-
side) and enrollment, utilization, and spending (demand-side) decisions. Results are 
mixed when applying the instrumental variable, showing that a $100 increase in the out-
of-pocket costs imposed on beneficiaries results in a significant increase in the likelihood 
of utilization for those beneficiaries with rheumatoid arthritis or multiple sclerosis, but a 
significant reduction of 16.2% (2007) and 35.1% (2008) for beneficiaries diagnosed with 
one of four types of cancer. Results suggest that beneficiaries do respond to higher cost 
sharing, raising questions about the imposition of higher cost sharing amounts for such 
expensive drugs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Health Insurance Design 
 The design of health insurance benefits has distinct and well-documented effects 
on health care utilization and expenditures, as well as choice of health plan. In broad 
terms, optimal insurance design seeks to balance the existence of moral hazard with the 
appropriate level of coverage for a given technology. In addition, in competitive markets 
the design of insurance benefits can lead to adverse selection, as patients may be able 
to change insurance plans in order to obtain more generous benefits. Insurers therefore 
face significantly different incentives when designing benefits than do those who receive 
the benefits; the design of insurance must balance these two competing interests. 
 As a significant player in the insurance market, the federal government regulates 
the design of benefits associated with the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program 
(Part D). For Part D benefits, which are provided by private insurers, the federal 
government established specific regulations in order to achieve certain goals related to 
beneficiary protection and, in the early years of the benefit, the limitation of financial risk 
for private insurers providing the benefits in order to encourage insurer participation in 
the new program. These regulations carry significant implications for the manner by 
which insurers design the Part D benefits offered to beneficiaries. 
The question of how to best design benefits for older technologies, such as 
pharmaceuticals with relatively low prices, has been addressed with previous research 
(see for example: Gibson, Ozminkowski & Goetzel, 2005). However, there is still ample 
space to examine the effects of government policies and regulations designed to affect 
coverage of newer technologies, such as specialty drugs. This dissertation examines the 
effects of coverage rules established for specialty drugs by the Medicare Prescription 
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Drug Benefit Program, or Part D, from both the supply side and demand side 
perspectives. The supply side considers how and why Part D plans choose to cover 
specialty drugs, and the demand side considers beneficiary responses to such 
coverage, in terms of enrollment in plans and utilization and expenditures on specialty 
drugs. 
1.2 Specialty Drugs 
 Specialty drugs represent a relatively new technology in the pharmaceutical 
marketplace, with pharmaceutical companies increasingly focusing on the development 
of these drugs over the past 15-20 years. Specialty drugs have very high prices, which 
can reach $40,000 or more per year, and are most often prescribed by specialists. The 
Part D Program has defined specialty drugs as those having a negotiated monthly price 
exceeding a defined dollar threshold (currently $600). For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the term “specialty drug” refers to the Medicare Program definition. 
Specialty drugs present a new challenge to insurers, as they imply significantly higher 
unit prices and per patient annual cost than most small molecule entities.  
Insurers initially managed utilization of specialty drugs via tools such as prior 
authorization and step therapy restrictions (see for example, Mullins, Lavallee, Pradel, 
DeVries, and Caputo, 2006). However, in addition to applying utilization management 
tools, insurers have more recently shifted specialty drugs to “specialty tiers,” which 
typically impose coinsurance of around 30%, as opposed to a fixed copayment, in an 
attempt to reduce the potential for both moral hazard and adverse selection, whereby 
beneficiaries of higher risk switch to plans offering more generous benefits. These high 
cost-sharing amounts raise questions as to how they affect utilization, enrollment, and 
spending by beneficiaries diagnosed with conditions for which the treatment may include 
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one of these drugs. Further discussion of the rationale behind plans placing these 
drugs on higher cost sharing tiers is presented in Section 1.6. 
 Since the extent of the high cost specialty drug market is a relatively new 
phenomenon, very little research has been conducted on the effect of these high 
coinsurance amounts on patient utilization, enrollment, and expenditures. The majority of 
the research conducted on specialty drugs has used older data from the early 2000s 
(see for example: Goldman, Lakdawalla, Malin, Malkin & Sun, 2010; Goldman, Joyce, 
Lawless, Crown & Willey, 2006). The number of drugs in the more general category of 
specialty drugs (not applying the Part D price definition) has significantly increased over 
time, from fewer than 30 drugs on the market in the mid-1990s to more than 200 in 
2006. By 2014, projections indicate that about 400 drugs will have been released that fall 
into this category (Kober, 2008). Spending for these drugs has grown by more than 10% 
every year, compared to growth rates of about 2-6% for small-molecule entities (Kober, 
2008). Given these trends, there is a need to examine how patients respond to different 
levels of cost sharing for these drugs. Specialty tiers thus arise as an important issue in 
seeking to understand how patients’ decisions are affected by the insurers’ benefit 
design. 
1.3 The Effect of Tiered Formularies 
 Health insurers have used tiered formularies, in which an insurer places different 
drugs on different cost-sharing tiers, for many years. The traditional 3-tier formularies 
typically have fixed copayment amounts that are much lower than the coinsurance 
amounts more recently imposed on specialty tiers. For example, a common tiered 
formulary structure is to offer generic drugs on the lowest cost-sharing tier (average cost 
share of, for example, $0-10), then preferred brand drugs on the second tier with slightly 
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higher cost sharing ($25-40), and non-preferred brand drugs on the third tier ($50-70). 
The basic purpose of these traditional tiered formularies is to use differential copayments 
to shift utilization to drugs on the lower tiers (including generic versions of the same 
drug). This enables health insurers to leverage tier placement in manufacturer discount 
negotiations, whereby the insurer offers to place a given drug on a lower tier in 
exchange for rebates or discounts from the manufacturer, conditional on increases in 
utilization. 
 More generally, insurers use various forms of patient cost sharing to constrain 
utilization whose marginal benefit is less than its cost. This implies two potential effects: 
first, the one addressed above, where utilization shifts to less-expensive medications 
(substitutes) on the formulary; and second, where no utilization occurs at all. This 
dissertation addresses the potential for both of these effects by examining whether or 
not beneficiaries use any specialty drugs in response to higher cost sharing for those 
drugs, and also by examining the utilization of less-expensive substitutes for those 
specialty drugs. 
Optimal design of cost-sharing, balancing constraints on moral hazard with 
appropriate financial protection for patients, is an important issue in insurance design in 
general and Part D in particular. Under certain assumptions related to the availability of 
information on value and price, theory suggests that optimal coverage should reflect the 
overall elasticity of demand for a drug, implying that drugs with very inelastic demand 
should have lower cost sharing than drugs with more elastic demand, and that drugs 
associated with greater financial risk should also have lower cost sharing (Pauly and 
Blavin, 2008). This dissertation examines what is observed in practice and compares the 
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results to the predictions seen in theory, in terms of the effects of specialty tier 
placement on utilization, enrollment, and expenditures for these specialty drugs. 
1.4 The Impact of Specialty Drugs on Insurance Coverage 
 The advent of specialty tiers has implications across the entire spectrum of 
insurance coverage in the United States. As discussed above, Part D allows the private 
insurers that manage the coverage to place drugs that cost more than $600 per month 
(2008 - present; $500 in 2007) on a specialty tier. The Part D specialty tier policy allows 
Part D plans to charge coinsurance higher than the 25% rate established by the 
standard benefit for drugs on the specialty tier, in exchange for reducing or eliminating 
the deductible for all beneficiaries. In practice, this results in coinsurance rates as high 
as 33%, which is $200 on a $600 drug. The trade-off of higher coinsurance in exchange 
for reducing the deductible shifts the direct cost of specialty drugs from the plan’s 
general enrollment to those beneficiaries who have been prescribed the specialty drugs.  
In addition, private employer-sponsored plans are shifting the coverage of 
specialty drugs to these higher tiers, although they are doing so at a slower rate than 
plans providing coverage for Part D (Walsh, 2009). Finally, Medicare Part B, which 
provides coverage for medications administered in physician offices, may be affected by 
such changes because outpatient specialty drugs may be used as substitutes for drugs 
originally covered under Part B. This dissertation presents the results of an analysis that 
examined the likelihood of using Part B substitutes due to higher cost sharing for Part D 
specialty drugs. 
 Medicare Part D provides an opportunity to assess the extent to which specialty 
tier placement can affect utilization and costs in a market in which plans compete for 
enrollees. Medicare beneficiaries as a population have higher spending on health care 
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as a percent of overall spending (nearly 15%) compared to non-Medicare households 
(4.8% of spending) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011), suggesting that health care 
spending is a significant concern for Medicare beneficiaries. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) (2010) found that specialty drugs eligible for the specialty 
tier in 2007 accounted for 10% of Part D spending, of $5.6 billion, and that more than 
75% of the prescriptions filled for specialty tier drugs were for beneficiaries eligible for 
the low-income subsidy (LIS), who are not subject to full cost sharing for their 
medications.1  
Thus, specialty drug spending is a relatively high proportion of Part D spending, 
considering the small number of drugs in this category. In addition, there are potentially 
interesting effects in the Part D coverage design for specialty drugs, in that beneficiaries 
not eligible for the LIS may be deterred from filling prescriptions for these drugs due to 
high coinsurance levels. While deterring moral hazard is an objective of cost sharing 
design, 33% coinsurance on specialty drugs with a price of at least $600 per month may 
be an excessive amount, and a lower coinsurance amount for high-priced drugs may be 
optimal.   
1.5 Literature Review 
 This section presents a review of the literature related to the effects of tiered 
formularies on the demand for prescription drugs. Previous research breaks down into 
three general categories: the use of tiered formularies in prescription drug insurance 
programs, the elasticity of demand for various classes and categories of prescription 
drugs, and findings related to the use of specialty tiers in employer-sponsored plans. In 
general, prior research results have supposed the hypothesis that the use of tiered 
                                               
1 Beneficiaries are generally eligible for the LIS if they have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty 
level, and meet an asset requirement. 
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formularies is associated with reduced utilization of those drugs placed on higher cost-
sharing tiers, and that patients do respond to incentives inherent in cost sharing that 
varies across different types of pharmaceuticals. Of note, a review of the literature 
related to the demand-related effects of cost-sharing tiers found that the majority of 
studies confirmed the hypothesis that increased cost sharing resulted in a reduction in 
both utilization and total expenditures, as well as lower levels of adherence to 
medications (Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel, 2005). 
The Effect of Tiered Formularies 
 The mid-1990s and early 2000s saw the initiation and expansion of tiered 
formularies as a key design aspect of the outpatient pharmaceutical benefit. Studies 
released during this time fall into two specific categories: first, studies that made us of a 
differences-in-differences approach to examine the effect of a plan’s implementation of 
additional formulary tiers, in comparison to the previous policy of fewer (usually two) 
tiers; and second, studies that estimate the effect of formulary tiers on utilization and 
costs using cross-sectional estimation techniques. The majority of these studies focus 
on specific categories or classes of drugs, most of which fall into the category of 
“maintenance medications,” or medications that are used for an extended period of time 
in order to control a chronic condition. Examples of conditions requiring maintenance 
medications are high cholesterol and hypertension. In addition, most studies use data 
from employer-sponsored plans in order to estimate these effects.  
 Rector, Finch, Danzon, Pauly, and Bharati (2003) examined the effect of tiered 
copayments on switching between non-preferred (i.e., higher tier) and preferred (lower 
tier) drugs. The results indicated that the presence of tiered copayments induced 
significant switching away from non-preferred branded medications towards the 
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preferred drugs, providing evidence that the objective of tiered formularies, which was 
to shift market share to preferred drugs, was effective. 
 Fairman, Motheral, and Henderson (2003), and Huskamp, Frank, McGuigan, and 
Zhang (2005) estimated the effect on utilization and costs of having three copayment 
tiers instead of two. Both projects used a differences-in-differences approach to examine 
the effect of an insurer’s switch from a two-tier to a three-tier formulary. Results indicate 
that the presence of three tiers reduced utilization of drugs that were placed on the third 
tier, and the addition of the third tier also reduced net drug cost growth for the insurer 
over the study period. 
 Briesacher, Kamal-Bahl, Hochberg, Orwig, and Kahler (2004) conducted an 
analysis designed to estimate the effect of three-tier formularies on medication utilization 
for patients diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis and enrolled in insurance plans covering 
45 large employers. Results indicated that even in cases where use of more expensive 
drugs on a higher tier might have been appropriate, more tiers resulted in lower odds of 
use, with the likelihood for use half that of patients enrolled in a one tier plan. Another 
study by Gibson, McGuigan, Axelsen, and Wang (2006) used cross-sectional data to 
examine the effect of different cost-sharing tiers on adherence to drugs used to treat 
high cholesterol (statins). Results indicated differential effects for new and continuing 
users; new users were less likely to adhere the higher the copayment, but continuing 
users did not change adherence in response to higher cost sharing. Finally, Kamal-Bahl 
and Briesacher (2004) focused on hypertension in examining the effects of cost sharing 
on the specific drug selected for treatment, as well as overall spending. While the 
authors do find that higher cost-sharing tiers reduce the likelihood of use of drugs placed 
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on those higher tiers, their findings support those of Huskamp et al. (2005), that overall 
likelihood of utilization for drugs in that category is unchanged. 
Elasticity of Demand for Prescription Drugs 
 A number of papers have presented the results of studies designed to estimate 
patients’ demand response to changes in insurance coverage for prescription drugs. 
Perhaps the most famous study of the effect of varying coinsurance on utilization of 
health care services is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Liebowitz, 
Manning, and Newhouse (1985) used data from the RAND HIE to estimate the demand 
for prescription drugs as a result of randomized assignment into different levels of cost 
sharing. Results that the elasticity of demand for prescription drugs was similar to the 
elasticity of demand for all outpatient services; however, coinsurance also varied for the 
medical benefit as well, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the effect of cost 
sharing on the drug portion alone. In addition, while the results provide helpful insight 
into the general demand reaction to cost-sharing variations, the results are now relatively 
out-of-date. More recent papers have also calculated the demand response to changes 
in benefit design while taking into account the non-linear nature of prescription drug 
benefits. 
 Contoyannis, Hurley, Grootendorst, Jeon, and Tamblyn (2005) employ an 
instrumental variables approach to estimate patient demand response to an increase in 
the coinsurance rate charged by the PharmaCare program for elderly enrollees in 
Quebec, Canada. Using individual claims data, the authors calculated a “synthetic” price 
for the prescription drugs used in the post-implementation period, based on utilization for 
that drug in the period before the coinsurance increase. Results indicate that the 
correction for endogeneity of price yields elasticity of expenditure estimates that are 
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lower than they would otherwise be (for example, -0.124 compared to -0.47 for the 
second period of interest in the data), both of which are statistically significant.2 While 
these results suggest a relatively low elasticity of expenditure for prescription drugs in 
light of increases in the coinsurance rate, the authors were unable to verify their 
instrumental variable, thus calling into question the validity of the results. 
 Gilman and Kautter (2007 and 2008) also estimated the effects of tiered 
formularies on utilization of generic drugs, and the elasticity of demand associated with 
tiered formularies. Their first paper (Gilman and Kautter, 2007) used employer-
sponsored retiree data for Medicare beneficiaries. The authors found that higher risk 
patients were more likely to be enrolled in plans with more tiers (three as opposed to 
one), and that larger differences in copayments across tiers within a given plan resulted 
in increased use of generic drugs and lower total prescriptions filled. This suggests not 
only that additional tiers may be important, but also that the difference in cost sharing 
between tiers within a plan may have important impacts on utilization levels and cost for 
beneficiaries. Gilman and Kautter (2008) also used these data to estimate the elasticity 
of demand for prescriptions drugs, with findings the same as those of other papers, 
namely that plans with more differences in cost sharing experienced lower prescription 
utilization. Their calculated price elasticity of demand was -0.23, suggesting a relatively 
inelastic response to changes in the out-of-pocket price. In addition, the authors 
separated out drugs used as maintenance medications, and found a lower elasticity of 
demand in response to tier changes for these types of medications than for others. 
 
 
                                               
2 N.B.: The elasticity of expenditure estimates presented here are for the change in the copayment rate on 
all drugs, not relative to one drug. 
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Effects of Specialty Drug Tier Placement 
 Although the above studies examined the effects of tier placement in the area of 
pharmaceuticals more generally, none of them specifically focused on the impacts of 
specialty drug cost sharing on patient utilization, enrollment, and expenditures. Specialty 
drugs may give rise to very different demand responses from less expensive small-
molecule drugs, as their associated out-of-pocket costs for patients can vary much more 
significantly. The following studies focused specifically on the effects of specialty drug 
coverage. 
 A study conducted relatively soon after specialty drugs entered the market 
examined expenditures by patients diagnosed with one of four conditions for which 
treatment is usually a specialty drug (Goldman, Joyce, Lawless, Crown, and Willey, 
2006). Using claims data from 2003-2004 from 55 private health plans, the authors 
focused on patients diagnosed with cancer, kidney disease, rheumatoid arthritis (RA), or 
multiple sclerosis (MS). The authors calculated total expenditures on drugs used to treat 
these conditions, and compared those expenditures across plans with different levels of 
generosity of benefits. This latter point is particularly important, as the authors claimed 
that determination of plan generosity cannot solely be based on the tier placement of the 
drug, but instead must take into account the structure of the deductible and other 
coverage design aspects. This is a similar argument to that presented by Contoyannis et 
al. (2005) in that benefits that are non-linear in nature have differential effects on overall 
plan generosity and patient utilization decisions. The authors of this paper elected to 
handle the non-linear design by calculating an index of the generosity of plan benefits. 
The index was calculated as the ratio of patients’ total out-of-pocket payments to the 
total payments on those particular drugs. 
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 After controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for 
patients in the sample, as well as for any common comorbid conditions, the authors 
implemented a two-part model to first estimate the likelihood of any use of the specialty 
drugs and, given any utilization, to estimate expenditures. Based on these results the 
authors estimated price elasticities of use and spending. Results indicate that demand 
for these specialty drugs is inelastic, with elasticity of spending estimates ranging from -
0.07 for MS drugs to -0.21 for RA drugs. 
 Another study by Goldman, Jena, Lakdawalla, Malin, Malkin, and Sun (2010) 
estimated the elasticity of demand associated with five specific specialty drugs used to 
treat cancer. Using similar claims data from private health plans from 1997 to 2005, the 
authors exploited the differences in generosity across plans in order to determine 
whether utilization varied with associated out-of-pocket costs. Of note, for this particular 
study the focus was not only on outpatient prescriptions but also on drugs administered 
in the physician’s office, which in the context of Medicare would be covered under the 
Part B benefit. Given that many of these specialty outpatient pharmacy drugs can be 
substituted for drugs administered in a physician’s office, it is important to control for 
potential substitution effects across the different medical settings. As with the previous 
paper by Goldman et al. (2006), the authors estimated demand using a two-part model, 
and used those results in order to calculate arc elasticities for out-of-pocket costs and 
income. 
 The results were presented in two phases. The first phase focused solely on 
whether or not a patient initiated therapy. Results indicated that the association between 
coinsurance and initiation of therapy was significant for only one medication; in that 
case, a decrease of 25% in the coinsurance charge resulted in a significant increase in 
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the likelihood of initiating therapy. The income elasticities for initiation of therapy, 
however, were not statistically significant. For the case of therapy continuation, in which 
the authors estimated the likelihood of continuing to fill prescriptions for the given 
medication, the authors did find statistically significant demand elasticities. These 
elasticities fell within a range of -0.037 to -0.108. The authors conclude that low elasticity 
of demand for anti-cancer agents suggests that the potential effects of moral hazard may 
be low to anti-cancer drugs.  
 More recent studies have examined the effects of cost sharing on utilization and 
abandonment rates for RA, MS, and cancer drugs. Curkendall, Patel, Gleeson, 
Campbell, Zagari, and Dubois (2008) focused on RA biologics in order to estimate the 
effects of out-of-pocket costs on persistence and adherence. The authors used claims 
data from a sample of self-insured employer plans, for which out-of-pockets were 
generally pretty low (less than $20 per week). Results indicated that higher out-of-pocket 
costs (greater than $50 per week) were associated with a significantly lower likelihood of 
utilization after one year. The results were limited, however, by very few observations of 
high out-of-pocket costs. 
Streeter, Schwartzberg, Husain, and Johnsrud (2011) estimated the 
abandonment rate of oral cancer drugs as a function of the cost sharing for those drugs. 
They used pharmacy claims to estimate whether or not a pharmacy claim was 
adjudicated after 90 days in order to determine whether the cost share associated with 
the drug was likely to result in the patient not picking up the prescription. They estimated 
that cost sharing above $500 resulted in a 4-fold greater likelihood of prescription 
abandonment (4.46 odds ratio), compared to cost sharing less than or equal to $100. 
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This suggests that high cost sharing does lead to lack of utilization, relative to low cost 
sharing. 
 Engel-Nitz, Satram-Hoang, Cao, and Reyes (2012) also examined the use of 
cancer drugs in association with cost sharing. The authors focused on the use of 
erlotinib, which is used to treat lung cancer, after a change in the formulary by a large 
U.S. health care plan. In this case, the formulary change was “positive” for patients, in 
that erlotinib was moved from tier 3 to tier 2 in the formulary. The authors found that 
more prescriptions for erlotinib were filled after the tier change, and that the likelihood of 
discontinuing treatment was lower after the formulary change. 
 Romley, Goldman, Eber, Dastani, Kim, and Raparla (2012) examined the 
likelihood of initiating therapy for MS patients, using claims data from employer-
sponsored plans. They found that the likelihood of initiating therapy within two years of 
diagnosis of MS was significantly lower the higher the coinsurance. More specifically, an 
increase of 17.8% in the coinsurance rate resulted in a 2.9% lower rate of initiation. 
Palmer, Abouzaid, Shi, Fowler, Lenhart, Dastani, and Kim (2012) also examined the 
effect of cost sharing on utilization of MS drugs. They separated patients in the data into 
two cohorts based on whether they had low or high cost sharing. Results indicated that 
those with high cost sharing were much less likely (0.79 odds ratio) to receive MS drug 
treatment, compared to those with lower cost sharing.  
Conclusions 
 A review of the relevant literature related to the effects of tier placement on 
varying aspects of patient demand suggests that the empirical results support the theory 
behind the effects of cost-sharing, in that the more tiers a plan offers, the less likely 
patients are to use medications placed on those higher cost sharing tiers. However, 
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results from calculations of the elasticity of demand associated with prescription drugs 
shows a wide range of estimates, with most estimates indicating somewhat inelastic 
demand for medications, which is likely not due to catastrophic protections or other 
subsidies (that are present in Part D). While the previous literature provides a helpful 
foundation for understanding the empirical approach to estimating the effects of tier 
structures on patient demand, this dissertation adds to the current research by focusing 
not only on the beneficiary decisions associated with tier placement, but also on Part D 
plans’ decisions in light of the presence of competition in the Part D market. 
 Another important aspect of the literature related to the impact of cost sharing on 
utilization and other outcomes is the fact that previous empirical analyses tended not to 
control for utilization management tools such as prior authorization and step therapy.3 
This may affect the results, as coverage levels are not dependent solely on cost-sharing 
levels but also on the additional restrictions a plan may place on access to the drug. 
While the data used in the empirical analyses do contain information on utilization 
managements tools, limitations in the data result in a potential biased measure of prior 
authorization; therefore, the market share and utilization analyses did not incorporate 
utilization management tools as an additional control. 
 In addition, while some of the studies presented here have acknowledged the 
difficulty inherent in estimating the demand effect in the presence of benefit structures 
that vary over the course of the year, this paper not only attempts to address those 
issues but also takes into account the potential endogeneity of tier placement. This 
endogeneity lies in the fact that the Part D plan makes its tier placement decision given 
certain expectations of the demand of its potential enrollees, and that enrollees will in 
                                               
3 One paper, by Fairman and Motheral (2001) used control and treatment groups that had similar prior 
authorization requirements in place. 
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turn select a plan given the placement of their drugs on specific tiers. Therefore, the 
results of any analyses that do not address these issues may be biased. This 
dissertation uses an instrumental variable for the tier placement decision that is 
designed to resolve this endogeneity problem. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
 The preceding background and rationale illustrate the anticipated effects of a 
Part D plan’s tier placement decision on beneficiary switching, utilization, and spending 
behavior in Medicare Part D. A conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 describes the 
complex nature of the Part D plan’s tier placement decision for specialty drugs. From the 
supply side perspective, Part D plans weigh numerous factors in making this decision, 
each of which involves trade-offs that affect other factors in complex and varying ways. 
The Part D plan has certain incentives, given the structure and competitive nature of the 
Part D benefit, to place these drugs on the specialty tier and charge a higher cost share, 
but those incentives work in conjunction with the other aspects of the Part D benefit (see 
Table 4.1 for illustration as to how the different aspects of the benefit move). 
Incentive 1: Avoiding Adverse Selection 
 The first incentive the plan faces for specialty tier placement is associated with 
the potential for enrolling high-risk beneficiaries in the Part D plan (adverse selection). 
Given that beneficiaries can change plans each year, the Part D plan may not want to be 
the sole plan in an area offering the lowest cost-sharing rate for specialty drugs, thereby 
potentially inducing enrollment shifts to the plan.  
The enrollment effect, however, is tempered by two aspects of the Part D benefit. 
First, the portion of the premium paid for by the government is adjusted based on the 
expected risk of spending for each individual beneficiary. This risk adjuster is calculated 
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based on the previous year’s claims data for each beneficiary, and provides an 
additional payment to each plan for higher risk beneficiaries. The accuracy of the Part D 
risk adjustment model plays an important role, however. If the risk adjuster is an 
accurate predictor of beneficiary risk, the plan will be indifferent to the enrollment of 
higher risk beneficiaries because the adjusted premium will be sufficient to account for 
the additional risk of enrolling those beneficiaries. If the risk adjuster is not accurate, the 
plan will be more likely to increase the cost share for specialty drugs, so as to deter 
higher risks from enrolling in the benefit. 
The second aspect that tempers the Part D plan’s specialty tier placement 
decision in relation to the adverse selection problem is the fact that beneficiaries 
notoriously make bad decisions in selecting the plan in which to enroll. Abaluck and 
Gruber (2011) found that Medicare beneficiaries who enrolled in Part D made their 
enrollment decision largely based on the premium charged by the plan, and not by 
weighing their own expected out-of-pocket costs. This suggests that the results for this 
dissertation may show beneficiaries do not respond to cost sharing in making their 
enrollment decision, and in fact this is the case. 
 Turning to the demand side in order to test the above incentive, this dissertation 
uses Part D plan-level formulary and market share data to first examine the overall effect 
of specialty tier placement on market share for Part D plans in a given region. This initial 
analysis uses the percent of drugs placed on the specialty tier by a Part D plan as the 
independent variable of interest in estimating the effect of Part D plan benefit design and 
competitor effects on market share. The hypothesis for this analysis is that specialty tier 
placement does not significantly affect the market share for Part D plans, due to the 
small percentage of patients who are prescribed medications that would be eligible for 
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placement on the specialty tier, and also due to the trade-off allowed by Part D, in that 
higher cost sharing for specialty tier drugs can only be imposed in exchange for reducing 
or eliminating the deductible, as described above. This policy results in shifting the costs 
of drugs placed on the specialty tier specifically to those higher-income beneficiaries 
who are prescribed those drugs, as well as to the Medicare Program, which pays for the 
deductible on behalf of those eligible for the low-income subsidy (LIS). This shift occurs 
while reducing or eliminating the deductible for the general population enrolled in the 
plan. The results for the market share analysis support the hypothesis, in that the effects 
of specialty tier placement on general enrollment are not significant.4 
Incentive 2: Avoiding Moral Hazard 
 Part D plans also face an incentive, due to the accuracy of the risk adjustment 
model described above, to deter moral hazard. That is, Part D plans want to set the cost 
sharing for drugs such that the lower observed price by beneficiaries does not induce 
additional utilization. The supply-side conceptual model illustrates that Part D plans set 
the cost share for specialty drugs in conjunction with the cost sharing for substitutes, so 
as to encourage utilization of lower-priced substitutes. Part D plans also may set the cost 
share so as to deter utilization within the Part D benefit altogether; this may result in 
shifting utilization over to other Parts of Medicare, like Part B (which covers medications 
administered in the physician’s office). 
 The second part of the dissertation uses Part D claims data to examine the 
demand-side effects of specialty tier placement on beneficiary switching, utilization, and 
spending behavior. This group of analyses focuses on a subset of Part D beneficiaries 
diagnosed with one of six conditions (RA, MS, or one of four types of cancer) who are 
                                               
4 The effects on high-risk patients cannot be examined using these data. 
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therefore more likely to be prescribed a specialty tier-eligible drug. The hypotheses for 
these analyses are that higher out-of-pocket cost sharing imposed by the Part D plan will 
reduce beneficiary utilization of the specialty tier-eligible drugs for patients not eligible for 
the LIS; that higher cost sharing will increase the likelihood of switching out of that plan, 
in order to find a plan with lower cost sharing; and higher cost sharing will increase 
beneficiary total spending. In addition, an analysis looking at plan spending expected to 
find that the higher the cost sharing imposed for specialty tier-eligible drugs, the lower 
the plan portion of the total costs. These analyses do not address the effect of specialty 
tier placement on total costs. 
 A significant challenge in estimating the effects of specialty tier placement on 
utilization, enrollment, and expenditures lies in the endogeneity present in both the 
plan’s tier placement decision and the beneficiary’s enrollment and utilization decisions. 
A plan’s decision to place a drug on the specialty tier, as opposed to a lower tier, may be 
influenced by its expectation of beneficiaries’ decisions, first to enroll in the plan, and 
then whether or not to utilize the drug. Therefore, an instrumental variables approach is 
used in the claims data analyses,5 which uses the average out-of-pocket spending for 
other conditions to instrument for the cost sharing for the condition of interest. This 
approach is explained in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 The results of the claims data analyses show somewhat mixed results, in that 
beneficiaries diagnosed with RA and MS have a significant positive response to cost 
sharing. This may be the result of data limitations, as well as the fact that the deductible 
(normalized by region) is highly correlated with the specialty tier cost share. However, for 
                                               
5 An instrumental variables approach would also be appropriate for the market share analysis, but in the 
absence of an instrumental variable, an alternative approach is used, which lags the independent variables 
by one year to account for beneficiary stickiness in enrollment. 
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beneficiaries with cancer, the hypotheses generally hold, in that higher out-of-pocket 
costs for specialty tier-eligible drugs reduces the likelihood of any utilization of those 
drugs, relative to no utilization of those drugs at all. For all analyses, however, the 
magnitude of the results is very small.  
Two analyses designed to test the validity of the models resulted in somewhat 
mixed results. The first analysis measured the response of low-income subsidy 
beneficiaries to cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs. This analysis should have 
shown no significant response to cost sharing for LIS beneficiaries, as they are not 
subject to the same cost share amounts as non-LIS beneficiaries. This was not always 
the case, suggesting that LIS beneficiaries do respond to the small, nominal cost shares 
imposed by the Part D benefit. The second sensitivity analysis examined the effect of a 
broader definition of specialty tier eligibility, which included all drugs for which at least 
one plan had a negotiated total monthly cost above the threshold for eligibility. This 
analysis was designed to show how sensitive the results are to the definition of specialty 
tier eligibility. The results show that the definition of specialty tier eligibility for drugs does 
affect the results, but that the results are still mixed. 
The welfare implications of tier placement for specialty drugs are complex. In a 
perfectly competitive market, with perfect information and either the ability to risk rate 
premiums or some risk adjustment process, theory suggests that cost sharing for 
specialty drugs should be based on the value of those drugs (Pauly and Blavin, 2008). 
Given the Part D market, which does risk adjust premiums, but for which risk adjustment 
may not be accurate, the possibility of adverse selection and moral hazard implies that 
plans will respond by increasing the cost sharing for these drugs. In addition, while a 
higher premium would enable plans to lower the cost sharing for specialty drugs, the 
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presence of moral hazard means that plans are unwilling to eliminate the cost share. 
Given the fact that plans are likely competing on premium and not on other aspects of 
the benefit (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011), the incentives are such that plans increase the 
cost share for expensive specialty drugs, potentially reducing welfare compared to 
alternative market structures. It is important to note, however, that the purpose of this 
dissertation is not to estimate welfare gain or loss associated with specialty tier 
placement, but instead to assess the effects of such tier placement specifically on 
enrollment, utilization, and spending. Future work may address the welfare implications. 
1.7 Outline 
 This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 consists of background on 
the Medicare Part D Program, specifically focusing on the effect of the government-
imposed requirements on the Part D plans’ ability to vary their benefit designs. Chapter 3 
presents the conceptual model underlying the empirical analyses. This conceptual model 
takes as given previous theoretical work on beneficiary demand for health care, and 
presents a new conceptual model designed to explain the plans’ tier placement decision 
for specialty drugs. This conceptual model yields two testable predictions, which flow 
through to the empirical sections of the project.  
 Chapter 4 describes the market share analysis, which focuses on estimating the 
overall impact of specialty tier placement on plan market share at a plan and regional 
level. Chapters 5 through 7 discuss the analyses related to the impact of specialty tier 
placement on beneficiaries, which use claims data to estimate the beneficiary response 
to tier placement in terms of switching, utilization, and expenditures. Chapter 8 presents 
conclusions based on the analyses, discusses the limitations associated with the 
empirical work, and addresses potential areas for future work.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 The Medicare Program 
 The Medicare Program provides health insurance coverage for those either over 
age 65, are disabled, or have end-stage renal disease (ESRD). People over age 65 are 
eligible for Medicare if they have worked and paid into the Medicare system for at least 
10 years. Beneficiaries receive their coverage from different “Parts” of Medicare. Part A 
provides coverage for inpatient hospital stays, Part B for outpatient health care services, 
and Part D provides voluntary outpatient prescription drug coverage. Parts A and B are 
provided and paid for by the federal government. Medicare Part C, also called Medicare 
Advantage, combines Parts A and B into one coverage option that is provided by private 
insurance companies. This dissertation focuses on Medicare Part D. 
The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program, or Part D, provides voluntary 
outpatient prescription drug coverage to all Medicare beneficiaries. Part D was created 
by Congress as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (also referred to as the Medicare Modernization Act), and 
insurance companies began providing coverage in January 2006. While Part D is 
administered and funded by the federal government, private insurance companies 
contract with the government to provide this coverage to Medicare beneficiaries. As a 
result, these private insurers offer a variety of drug insurance packages from which 
beneficiaries select the plan in which to enroll for a given year. Beneficiaries are able to 
change plans every year if they so choose.6 
 Part D allows beneficiaries to choose the plan they believe will best meet their 
needs for a given year. As a result, insurers compete for enrollees. Within federal 
                                               
6 Medicare beneficiaries who are also eligible for Medicaid, the “dual eligibles,” are allowed to change plans 
every month if they choose. 
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guidelines, Part D plans are allowed to vary their benefit designs in order to try to 
encourage enrollment by beneficiaries. This chapter presents further background on the 
benefit and formulary design requirements for Part D, as well as a description regarding 
Part D plan payments and the policies associated with risk management. 
2.2 Benefit Design 
 The requirements related to the design of the Part D benefit play an important 
role in a Part D plan’s tier placement decision for specialty drugs, primarily due to the 
manner by which the design itself affects the plan’s expected costs over the benefit year. 
 The standard benefit designed by Congress in 2003 includes a deductible, initial 
coverage of 75% of drug costs, a gap in coverage where the beneficiary is responsible 
for 100% of the negotiated price, and a catastrophic period during which the beneficiary 
is responsible for the greater of 5% of the drug cost or small copayments. As an 
example, in 2010 the standard benefit design incorporated a $310 deductible, 25% cost-
sharing for beneficiaries up to $2,830 in total spending (i.e., spending by both the plan 
and the beneficiary), a gap in coverage until the beneficiary had spent a total of $4,550 
out-of-pocket, and beyond that catastrophic coverage for the rest of the year. (See 
Figure 1.1 below for illustration). Beneficiaries on average pay 25.5% of the total 
premium for coverage; the government pays the remaining 74.5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24
Figure 1.1 Medicare Part D Standard Benefit, 2010. 
 
 For a Part D plan, the most important aspects of the benefit design are the initial 
coverage period and the catastrophic period. In the initial coverage period (post-
deductible and prior to the beneficiary reaching the gap, represented by the lower 
orange block in Figure 1.1), the plan is responsible for 75% of the cost of medications 
filled by its enrollees. This means that, to the extent a plan receives enrollment of 
beneficiaries who fill prescriptions for expensive specialty drugs, the plan may be 
responsible for the full 75% difference between the initial coverage limit ($2,830 in 2010) 
and the deductible ($310), as beneficiaries taking these medications are very likely to 
$310 Deductible 
$2,830 in  
Total Drug Costs 
($940 out of pocket) 
$3,610 Coverage Gap 
(“Doughnut Hole”) 
Plan Pays 75% 
Plan Pays 15%;  
Medicare Pays 80% 
Enrollee Pays  
100%  
minus $250  
rebate 
Enrollee Pays  
5% 
Enrollee Pays  
25% 
$6,440 in  
Total Drug Costs 
($4,550 out of pocket) 
SOURCE: Kaiser Family Foundation illustration of standard Medicare drug 
benefit for 2010 (standard benefit parameter update from CMS, April 2009). 
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enter the coverage gap and even catastrophic coverage.7 Table 2.1 presents the 
deductible, initial coverage limit, and catastrophic threshold values for the years 2006-
2010. The data used to estimate beneficiary utilization and enrollment effects are for the 
years 2007 through 2008. 
Table 2.1. Part D Standard Benefit Design Threshold s, 2006-2010.1 
 Deductible  
(Beneficiary) 
Initial Coverage 
Limit 
(Plan + Beneficiary) 
Catastrophic 
Coverage Threshold 
(Beneficiary) 
2006 $250 $2250 $3600 
2007 $265 $2400 $3850 
2008 $275 $2510 $4050 
2009 $295 $2700 $4350 
2010 $310 $2830 $4550 
1 Sources: Medicare Part D Benefit Parameters for Standard Benefit, CMS, 2007-2008; CMS 
2009 & 2010. 
 
 In addition, the plan’s expectation of the number of beneficiaries who will enter 
the catastrophic period will play an important role in tier placement. This is due to the 
fact that the plan is still responsible for 15% of the cost of all medications in the 
catastrophic phase. Thus, the plan will take into consideration expected costs in the 
catastrophic phase when determining tier placement for specialty drugs, which are much 
more likely to cause beneficiaries to enter the catastrophic period than other, less 
expensive medications. 
2.3 Formulary Design 
 Formulary design is another important aspect of the Part D benefit design. 
Formularies in general allow insurance plans the ability to encourage enrollees to use 
lower-priced medications, such as generics and lower-priced therapeutic alternatives, 
and also give plans the flexibility to negotiate discounts with manufacturers in exchange 
                                               
7 The 75% difference assumes a standard benefit design. The specialty tier only appears in non-standard 
designs. If the Part D plan chooses to have a specialty tier, the plan may increase the cost sharing for that 
tier to 33%. This means that the plan’s share for the specialty drug in the initial coverage period would be 
67%, not 75%. 
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for lower (or preferred) tier placement. The Part D formulary requirements place some 
important limits on the ability of plans to accomplish these objectives, particularly in 
relation to specialty drugs prescribed for cancer patients. 
 The first important formulary requirement states that plans must cover at least 
two drugs in each category or class of medication. This policy allows Part D plans to 
establish differentiated and restricted formularies that may appeal to potential enrollees, 
while ensuring that beneficiaries receive coverage of at least two drugs for each possible 
category or class of disease. This policy may also help to reduce Part D plan costs to the 
extent that plans can negotiate discounts with manufacturers in exchange for lower tier 
placement. Clearly, the extent to which these discounts may apply is a function of the 
depth and breadth of a given category or class of medication, as more drugs in a 
category or class gives the plan more flexibility to restrict the overall number of drugs 
covered, as well as to negotiate deeper discounts for those drugs selected for the 
formulary.  
 However, there are six categories and classes of medications for which Part D 
plans are required to cover all or substantially all drugs. These classes, which are the 
following: immunosuppressant, antidepressant, antiretroviral, anticonvulsant, 
antipsychotic, and antineoplastic (CMS Part D Manual, 2007), have been deemed by 
CMS to contain drugs for which access to all potential treatments in these classes is 
very important for beneficiaries. As such, all Part D plans must include all or substantially 
all of these drugs on their formularies, although individual plans are still able to place 
these drugs on different cost-sharing tiers. This policy creates interesting incentive 
structures for plans and manufacturers, as it appears that plans are not able to negotiate 
significant discounts on drugs in these protected classes because coverage is 
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essentially guaranteed (Office of Inspector General, 2011). The effects of this policy 
will be important when it comes to examining the effect of tier placement on cancer drug 
utilization and enrollment by Medicare beneficiaries with cancer, as all therapeutic 
substitutes will be included on the Part D formulary. The six classes, however, do not 
include drugs used to treat rheumatoid arthritis (RA) or multiple sclerosis (MS), therefore 
the effects would be expected to differ for these conditions. 
2.4 The Specialty Tier Option 
CMS allows Part D plans offering non-standard benefit designs to add a specialty 
tier to the formulary. In order to be placed on the specialty tier, drugs must have a 
monthly price of at least $600 ($500 in 2007). Plans are generally restricted to 25% 
coinsurance for drugs placed on the specialty tier, but they may increase the 
coinsurance in exchange for reducing or eliminating the deductible, which in practice 
results in a maximum coinsurance amount of 33% for the specialty tier. The specialty tier 
policy also shields plans from requests for cost sharing exemptions from beneficiaries 
who cannot take substitutes that carry lower cost sharing and who wish to pay that lower 
cost share amount. If plans do not place a specialty drug on the specialty tier, they may 
impose any level of cost sharing they choose (even exceeding 33%), so long as the 
actuarial equivalence requirement of 25% coinsurance is met across all covered drugs.8 
However, in practice plans tend not to increase the cost sharing above 33% if the drug is 
not placed on the specialty tier; as a result, the cost share for the specialty tier is usually 
the highest cost share imposed by a given plan. 
                                               
8 The 25% actuarial equivalence rate is most likely calculated as a weighted average using expected 
utilization within the plan. 
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2.5 Utilization Management Tools 
 Part D plans also have the ability to impose utilization management (UM) tools, 
such as prior authorization, step therapy, and quantity limits, on specific medications 
placed on the formulary. Prior authorization requires coverage approval by the plan prior 
to the beneficiary filling the prescription, as an additional check on the appropriate use of 
a given drug. Step therapy restrictions require patients to try lower-priced covered 
substitutes before having their coverage approved for the more expensive medication. 
Finally, quantity limits are as the name implies; the plan has imposed a limit on either the 
number of fills of a medication it will cover, the number of pills in a given month it will 
cover, etc. The use of these tools places additional restrictions on access to these 
medications for Medicare beneficiaries; their use in the case of specialty drugs may 
affect utilization, enrollment, and expenditures to an even greater extent than high cost 
sharing alone. 
 However, in order to ensure that utilization management tools do not place overly 
restrictive requirements on access, CMS has stated in formulary guidance that it expects 
utilization management tools to reflect practice consistent with “existing formulary 
systems” (Medicare Part D Manual Chapter 6, 2010, Rev. 10). CMS also conducts 
comparisons across plans to identify outliers in terms of the utilization of such tools. If a 
Part D plan is identified as an outlier, the plan must justify the use of the UM tool in order 
to be able to incorporate it in the benefit design (Medicare Part D Manual Chapter 6, 
2010). These restrictions suggest that Part D plans may not vary significantly, both 
across plans and outside the Part D benefit, in terms of the use of such tools. 
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2.6 Actuarial Equivalence 
 When Congress designed the Part D benefit in 2003, it provided options for plans 
to structure their benefits in a manner different from the standard benefit described 
above. In order to offer such alternative benefits, however, the Part D plans must be able 
to show that the new design is at least “actuarially equivalent” in value to the standard 
plan design. This actuarial equivalence requirement is extremely important when 
considering how plans design these alternative benefits. 
 There are four potential benefit design alternatives for Part D. The first is the 
standard benefit as designed by Congress (and described in the first section, above). 
The second option is Actuarially Equivalent plans; the only difference when compared to 
the standard defined benefit is that these plans are allowed to vary the cost-sharing 
requirements imposed on beneficiaries via the creation of tiered formularies or via 
establishment of preferred pharmacy networks. These cost sharing requirements are 
allowed to vary not only in the initial coverage period, but also in the catastrophic period. 
For Actuarially Equivalent plans, CMS requires two tests of actuarial equivalence (CMS, 
Actuarial Bid Training, 2010): the first test shows that the expected average cost sharing 
below the initial coverage limit is equal to the 25% cost sharing required by standard 
coverage; and second, a test that shows that the expected cost sharing in the 
catastrophic period is actuarially equivalent to the cost-sharing under the defined 
standard benefit (American Academy of Actuaries Work Note, 2008; Medicare 
Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, CMS, 2009). 
 The third and fourth plan types expand even further on the plans’ ability to modify 
the benefit design. These types of plans are called Basic Alternative and Enhanced 
Alternative. In addition to the ability to alter the cost sharing requirements, both types are 
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allowed to reduce the deductible and increase the initial coverage limit (the dollar 
threshold beyond which a beneficiary enters the coverage gap). These types of plans 
must pass give different actuarial equivalence tests (Actuarial Bid Training, 2010). 
Enhanced Alternative plans are also allowed to provide additional coverage beyond what 
the standard Part D benefit offers. This additional coverage includes coverage in the gap 
and coverage of drugs that are otherwise excluded from the Part D benefit by law. 
Beneficiaries enrolling in Enhanced Alternative plans are required to pay a supplemental 
premium for those benefits that are above and beyond what Medicare will pay for the 
standard value of the benefit. 
 For these final two plan options, actuarial equivalence is demonstrated via five 
specific tests. The first test is for the initial coverage period, and ensures that the “plan 
coverage for [enrollees] who have claims greater than the initial coverage limit would 
need to be great or equal” to 75% of the difference between the initial coverage limit and 
the deductible. For catastrophic coverage, the average cost sharing percentage has to 
be no greater than the cost sharing imposed by the standard plan (American Academy 
of Actuaries Work Note, 2008; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual, CMS, 2009). 
 The third test ensures actuarial equivalence of the final benefit design aspect that 
plans are able to alter. Thus, the deductible must be no greater than the deductible for 
the standard plan. The fourth and fifth tests examine the overall value of the benefit: the 
fourth ensures that “the total covered costs of the proposed plan… equal or exceed the 
total covered costs of standard coverage;” and the second ensure that “the unsubsidized 
value of the proposed plan…equal[s] or exceed[s] that of the standard coverage” 
(American Academy of Actuaries Work Note, 2008). 
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 Finally, all Part D plan designs are reviewed in order to ensure that they will 
not discriminate against any type of Part D beneficiary. According to Medicare actuaries, 
statistical methods are used in order to determine the “acceptable cost-sharing 
thresholds” for plans in light of attempts to avoid discrimination (Sue Todhunter, 
Personal Communication, 27 June 2011). 
2.7 Risk Sharing 
 Private insurance companies that elect to participate in the Part D program 
receive monthly payments from the federal government for coverage provided to 
beneficiaries enrolled in their plan. If the plan does not receive any enrollees, the plan 
receives no payments. These monthly payments are equivalent to, on average, 
approximately 74.5% of the premium for Part D coverage, plus additional payments for 
risk adjustment, low-income subsidies, and estimated catastrophic assistance. At the 
end of the plan year, the government conducts a reconciliation process to ensure that all 
payments were appropriate, and to calculate the risk corridors. 
 All of the additional payments, including risk adjustment, catastrophic assistance, 
and the risk corridors, are designed to mitigate the Part D plan’s risk of providing 
insurance to Medicare beneficiaries. These mechanisms were built in to the Part D 
benefit in order to ensure that private insurers would choose to participate in the new 
program, by providing financial protection to plans under three different circumstances. 
This section describes these payment mechanisms in more detail, as all of these 
payments provide significant protection against the risk of high plan spending.  
Catastrophic Cost Subsidization 
 The first type of payment designed to reduce the Part D plan’s risk of significant 
financial losses is via the government’s subsidization of costs incurred by beneficiaries 
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who enter the catastrophic portion of the benefit. During this phase, beneficiaries pay 
the greater of 5% of the medication price or low copayments for their medications. The 
Part D plan, however, only pays 15% of the total cost of the drugs; the federal 
government pays 80%.  
 The sharing of catastrophic costs on the part of the government reduces Part D 
plans’ exposure to high costs in the event that an enrollee will incur significantly high 
prescription drug spending, and may alter the Part D plan’s decision-making when 
establishing the tiered formulary structure for the initial coverage phase of the benefit. 
This latter effect may increase the likelihood that Part D plans will place specialty drugs 
on a lower cost-sharing tier, as the plan would not be responsible for all spending in the 
event that enrollees enter the catastrophic phase of the benefit. However, the plan may 
be concerned that lower tier placement may increase the number of beneficiaries who 
use specialty drugs who choose to enroll in the plan. This would increase overall plan 
costs even in the catastrophic period; as a result, the plan may still prefer to place the 
drug on the specialty tier. 
Risk Adjustment 
 The second type of government risk sharing assistance is via risk adjustment 
payments. Under this policy, every beneficiary enrolled in Part D has an associated risk 
score, which is an estimate of every Medicare beneficiary’s risk of incurring prescription 
drug spending in a given year. This score is based on the beneficiary’s age, previous 
diagnoses in the Medicare Program, and whether the beneficiary is eligible for the low-
income subsidy and/or institutionalized. The risk score is used to adjust the federal 
government’s portion of the premium paid to the Part D plan, in an attempt to control for 
the foreseeable risk associated with beneficiaries enrolling in the plan. It is important to 
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note that this risk is based on lagged data on an individual beneficiary; as such, the 
plan may be susceptible to some unforeseen costs due to any new diagnoses for that 
beneficiary in a given year. 
 Analysis of the early risk adjustment model (2006) for Part D has found that it 
under-predicted spending for beneficiaries with high costs (Hsu, Huang, Fung et al., 
2009). This suggests that plans are in fact at higher financial risk if they enroll high-risk 
Part D beneficiaries, as the payments made under risk adjustment will not be sufficient 
to offset the higher costs associated with those beneficiaries. This provides further 
incentive to plans to deter enrollment and utilization of specialty drugs by beneficiaries of 
high risk. However, these early risk adjustment models have been replaced with newer, 
more robust models that more accurately predict the risk of spending for sub-groups, 
mostly by using actual Part D claims data to construct the model (Kautter, Ingber, Pope, 
and Freeman, 2012). 
Risk Corridors 
 The final risk mitigation policy for Part D is the risk corridors. The risk corridors 
were designed to allow the federal government to share in either the losses or profits 
that the Part D plan incurred in a given year. At the end of the year, CMS calculates the 
target amount for a Part D plan, which is equal to expected costs incurred by the plan on 
behalf of all of their beneficiaries. These are equal to total revenues for the plan, which in 
this case are the total premiums received by the plan from the government and 
beneficiaries. This target amount is then compared to the total amount the plan paid out 
in benefits over the course of the year, net or any discounts received from 
manufacturers. To the extent the two totals differ (within and beyond specific thresholds 
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around the target amount), the federal government either pays the Part D plan a 
portion of the losses, or recoups a portion of the profits. 
 Of note, the thresholds around the target amount were smaller in the early years 
of Part D, so as to expose Part D plans to smaller levels of risk given the uncertainty of 
starting up the new program. The thresholds have expanded over time, and the amount 
of profit/loss shared by the government has also been reduced. This means that Part D 
plans have been exposed to increasing risk of overall profits and losses in more recent 
years, although the catastrophic spending protections and risk adjustment payments 
continue. 
2.8 Low Income Subsidy 
 The final Part D policy that may affect a Part D plan’s tier placement decision for 
specialty drugs is the low-income subsidy (LIS). This subsidy exists for beneficiaries who 
are either eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (dual eligibles), or who meet income and 
asset requirements as established by the MMA. Beneficiaries who receive the low-
income subsidy pay no or very reduced premiums for Part D, and pay very low fixed 
copayments for all of their medications. For example, dual eligibles with incomes below 
or equal to 100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) paid $1.00 cost sharing for generic 
or preferred drugs in 2006 and 2007, and $3.00/$3.10 for other medications in 
2006/2007, while dual eligibles with incomes above 100% FPL paid $2.00/$2.15 or 
$5.00/$5.35 in 2006/2007, respectively (Medicare Part D Benefit Parameters for 
Standard Benefit, CMS, 2006). In addition, they do not face the coverage gap, and many 
low-income beneficiaries do not pay any cost sharing in the catastrophic phase of the 
benefit. 
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 The low-income subsidy may affect a Part D plan’s tier placement decision 
due to the fact that LIS beneficiaries who enroll in the plan are not subject to the tiered 
formulary, and therefore will likely have different utilization patterns compared to those 
beneficiaries who are not eligible for the LIS. The federal government subsidizes all 
differences in actual costs between the standard benefit and the plan payment amount 
for LIS beneficiaries, and as a result the plan may not have significant incentive to try to 
alter utilization patterns with the use of tiered formularies. However, Part D plans are still 
required to pay 15% of the cost of LIS beneficiaries’ medications in the catastrophic 
phase, which provides some incentive to affect utilization patterns. 
 Only non-enhanced plan types are eligible for full subsidization of the premium, 
and only a subset of those plans are eligible each year for enrollment by LIS 
beneficiaries at the $0 premium level. The determination as to which plans are eligible 
for these enrollments is made every year based on the premium offered by plans in a 
given region; the number of eligible plans changes significantly by year and region. 
Thus, Part D plans seeking to enroll large numbers of LIS beneficiaries must take their 
premium into account when establishing the benefit structure for Part D. 
2.9 The Interaction Between Parts B and D 
There is an important overlap between Part B and Part D coverage that gives 
rise to some coordination of benefit issues within the Medicare Program itself. In 
general, while Part D provides coverage for pharmaceuticals filled in an outpatient 
pharmacy, Medicare Part B covers pharmaceuticals administered in a physician’s office. 
Part B drugs carry a 20% coinsurance rate, which for drugs with monthly prices above 
$600 can represent a substantial difference from the minimum 25% coinsurance in Part 
D ($120 copayment in Part B compared to $165 for Part D, for a $600 drug). Therefore, 
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for specialty drugs which may have substitutes covered under an alternative benefit 
(in this case, Part B being the alternative), Medicare beneficiaries may elect to receive 
their medications in a physician office setting in order to pay a lower absolute 
copayment. In addition, while additional cost-sharing assistance is generally prohibited in 
Part D, the copayment for Part B medications can be bought down by alternative 
coverage sources, such as Medigap, further creating an incentive for Medicare 
beneficiaries to use Part B substitutes as opposed to specialty drugs covered under Part 
D. 
2.10 Conclusions 
 The Part D Program has enabled Medicare beneficiaries to access outpatient 
pharmacy benefits via a melding of private plans and government regulation. The Part D 
Program has a number of objectives, including: to offer beneficiaries a variety of plan 
options, to encourage plans to be at least somewhat innovative in their plan benefit 
designs, to protect beneficiaries from plan offerings that may not provide sufficient 
coverage, and to protect plans from unexpectedly high costs / financial risk. The results 
of all of these objectives is an extensive array of regulations and guidance governing the 
ability of Part D plans to vary their offerings from the standard benefit as defined by 
Congress.  
 The key ways in which Part D plans can vary their offerings are as follows: first, 
they are able to vary the drugs covered on formulary and tier placement (for those drugs 
in classes with therapeutic substitutes and generics), the creation of tiered formularies 
and the establishment of preferred pharmacy networks, alteration of the deductible and 
the initial coverage limit, and provision of enhanced benefits. All of these factors can and 
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likely are taken into consideration when a plan designs its benefits; of particular 
interest for this dissertation is the tier placement determination for specialty drugs. 
 Part D plans do retain some ability to vary benefits within the CMS actuarial 
equivalence parameters. This suggests that the identification strategy of this 
dissertation, which assumes that beneficiaries may alter their enrollment and utilization 
patterns in response to their Part D plans’ tier placement strategy for specialty drugs, 
holds true because Part D plans are able to vary offerings across a variety of factors. 
 One manner by which Part D plans can vary such offerings is by electing to place 
specialty tier drugs on a higher cost-sharing tier, with coinsurance of 25% to 33%. Since 
the actuarial equivalence tests, which solely require equivalence to the standard 
coinsurance of 25%, are conducted across all drugs included in the formulary, plans are 
able to design benefits that (for example) incorporate flat copayments on lower tiers and 
coinsurance on higher tiers. This may result in plan designs that trade off lower 
copayments for lower tier (i.e., generic) drugs, with coinsurance (and therefore higher 
out-of-pocket costs) for specialty tier drugs. As a result, beneficiaries who take generic 
medications may end up paying less than 25% out-of-pocket for their medications, while 
those taking specialty drugs placed on the specialty tier may pay 25% (or more). 
 The tier placement decision is thus affected by the extent to which Part D plans 
are able to vary their offerings within the actuarial equivalence requirements; their ability 
to determine their own drug listings, specifically the restrictions on their ability to limit the 
number of drugs offered in each category and class; the extent to which Part D plans 
expect to incur costs within the initial coverage period, and the plan’s projections of the 
number of enrollees who will enter the catastrophic phase; and the risk protections 
present in Part D, and the extent to which they reduce the plan’s overall and unexpected 
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costs. The offsetting requirements associated with tier placement therefore complicate 
the measurement of the effects stemming from tier placement, as beneficiaries may be 
responding to other aspects of the benefit design other than tier placement in making 
their decisions. The next chapter presents a theoretical model of the Part D plan’s tier 
placement decision for specialty drugs, which takes these government requirements into 
account. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The conceptual approach for this dissertation incorporates two perspectives: the 
insurer, which determines whether to place the specialty drug on the specialty tier, and 
the beneficiary, who decides whether to utilize a given specialty drug and/or whether to 
maintain enrollment in a given plan. Following previous theory (Grossman, 1972), the 
model begins with the assumption that beneficiaries have some demand for medical 
care as a function of prices for that care, their insurance coverage, and their individual 
income level. They will demand specialty drugs based on these three factors.  
 The insurance factor is also of interest in this dissertation, because insurance 
reduces drug prices for beneficiaries below their full price, potentially increasing 
beneficiary demand for covered services and/or drugs. Previous literature, as described 
in the introduction, has discussed beneficiary responses to cost sharing. The conceptual 
model described below draws on this literature in order to establish a foundation for the 
empirical analyses, but does not add new theory from the viewpoint of the beneficiary’s 
decision. The extent to which insurers design coverage so as to vary the cost share 
levels for different types of drugs, and the demand response by beneficiaries to these 
out-of-pocket costs, is the focus of this dissertation.  
It is important to note that this conceptual model is not an equilibrium model for 
the insurance industry, as the implications presented below suggest that all Part D 
insurers will want to avoid high-risk beneficiaries. Clearly it is not possible for all insurers 
to avoid high risks, and in fact this is impossible in the Part D market, whereby all Part D 
plans must accept all eligible enrollees. 
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3.2 The Competitive Nature of Part D 
 The Medicare Part D Program, as described in Chapter 2, was designed to 
encourage competition among private insurers for enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries. 
This competition, however, is certainly not perfect in the economic sense of the term. 
Part D plans (PDPs) provide differentiated products (within specified parameters) to 
Medicare beneficiaries, who have the option to select plans with or without a deductible, 
with tiered cost sharing or a flat 25% coinsurance, with coverage in the coverage gap, 
and with more or less coverage of certain types of drugs. Entry into the Part D market is 
regulated; insurers must meet financial requirements, be licensed in the state(s) in which 
they choose to operate, and must put significant effort into designing the benefits they 
will offer. The last of these also involves establishing contracts with pharmacies in order 
to meet access requirements, and negotiating any discounts with manufacturers in 
exchange for meeting utilization thresholds. 
 Unlike commercial insurance markets, Part D plans are also prohibited from 
underwriting their offerings. In addition, Part D plans do not establish a premium based 
on risk; the premium is calculated as two parts: the beneficiary portion of the premium, 
which does not vary by beneficiary within a given plan, and the government’s portion of 
the premium, which is adjusted based on the expected risk for each beneficiary. 
 The Part D market is also one that lacks perfect information. Part D plans have 
significant information regarding the cost sharing and prices for the medications they will 
cover and the structure of the benefit. Consumers, in this case Medicare beneficiaries, 
may have access to much of this information, but it is generally understood that they 
tend not to access it when making decisions, and research has found that when they do 
choose a plan, they often choose poorly (Abaluck & Gruber, 2011). Thus, information is 
 
 
 
41
asymmetric in the Part D market, affecting the nature of competition between and 
among plans.  
Finally, the nature of the insurance market is such that Part D plans are insuring 
against the risk of future costs of pharmaceuticals. Some enrollees in the Part D plan 
may already be using one or more specialty drugs; others may receive a diagnosis 
during the year and begin to use one. Part D plans must anticipate the mix of risk 
profiles they will receive in their plan when designing their benefits. The accuracy of the 
risk adjustment model therefore gives rise to one reason for increasing the cost sharing 
associated with specialty drugs (see Chapter 2). 
 The nature of competition within Part D has implications for the tier placement 
decision on the part of a plan. The plan must consider the actions taken by other plans 
within the area when designing benefits, and take into account the effect other plan 
decisions regarding expensive specialty drugs will have on the plan’s own enrollment 
mix. However, information is not perfect, and plans are operating in a differentiated-
product environment, allowing plans some freedom to design benefits they feel will 
attract enrollment. This chapter presents a conceptual model that gives rise to 
predictions regarding a plan’s tier placement decision for specialty drugs.  
3.3 The Profit Model 
 The model presented in this section illustrates the complexity associated with the 
Part D plan’s tier placement decision for specialty drugs. This model assumes that Part 
D plans are profit-maximizers that have been exposed to financial risk via the design of 
the Part D benefit (during the initial coverage period and catastrophic phase, 
specifically), but also takes into account the fact that each plan is subject to regulations 
that are designed to protect Medicare beneficiaries from plan designs intended to select 
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certain types of beneficiaries and deter the utilization of certain types of 
pharmaceuticals. There are numerous complicated trade-off regulations associated with 
Part D, for example the ability of the Part D plan to increase coinsurance for the 
specialty tier in exchange for reducing or eliminating the deductible. These result in a 
complicated benefit design that is difficult to represent in a model. Therefore, this model 
takes a simplified approach by looking at the breakeven constraint, assuming that the 
primary goal of plans is to at least break even at the end of the year. 
 Net revenue for plan j, with n beneficiaries enrolled, is the difference between the 
total premiums collected by the plan and the costs incurred by the plan for each 
beneficiary i: 
Equation 3.1: 
   ∑ 
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  ∑    
where  is the risk score assigned to each individual beneficiary,  is the portion of the 
premium paid for by the government, and  is the portion of the premium paid by 
beneficiaries (which is the same for all beneficiaries in that plan). The expenditure term 
 represents the plan’s portion of expenditures for all beneficiaries who incurred some 
spending during the year. Not all beneficiaries will incur spending, although this model 
assumes all beneficiaries in the plan will have at least some utilization.  
 Assume that the plan anticipates receiving two types of beneficiaries as 
enrollees: beneficiaries of high risk (h) and those of low risk (l), where h + l = n. Further, 
there are two types of drugs the plan will cover: specialty drug (s) and non-specialty drug 
(o). The plan assumes that only the high-risk enrollees h will use the specialty drug and 
that all enrollees (n) will use the non-specialty drug. 
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 The plan’s decision is whether or not to place some or all specialty drugs on 
the specialty tier. Placement on the specialty tier eliminates the ability of beneficiaries to 
request a cost sharing exemption, but also restricts the plan to charging 33% 
coinsurance and provides opportunities to reduce or eliminate the deductible.9 While in 
some (rare) cases plans do charge a higher coinsurance rate than 33% for specialty 
drugs not placed on the specialty tier, for the purposes of this model assume that 33% 
represents the maximum beneficiary coinsurance that can be charged, and therefore 
specialty tier placement has a direct, positive relationship with higher cost-sharing. 
 The Part D plan must determine the cost-sharing amount to impose on 
beneficiaries in the initial coverage period of the benefit. For the sake of simplicity, this 
model focuses on the tier placement decision within the initial coverage period, as the 
majority of plan spending that might affect beneficiary utilization and enrollment 
decisions occurs in this portion of the benefit. The plan therefore establishes the 
percentage coinsurance () that beneficiaries will be required to pay for specialty 
drugs. The plan’s cost sharing decision in the initial coverage period will also depend on 
the presence (or lack thereof) of a deductible, which will determine whether the 
beneficiary receives coverage with the first prescription, or after spending a certain 
amount. 
 Given these assumptions, the plan profit equation can be re-written as follows: 
Equation 3.2: 
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9 As opposed to freely establishing the coinsurance in balance with all other covered drugs, so that the 
actuarial value of the plan’s coverage in the initial coverage period is equal to 75% (100% - the beneficiary’s 
share of 25%). 
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where spending for the plan is now broken down into two types: specialty and non-
specialty. The second term in the equation represents the plan’s spending on non-
specialty drugs, assuming utilization by all enrollees. This is calculated as the difference 
between the total spending on the non-specialty drug, and the portion of the price of the 
drug paid for by the beneficiary via cost sharing. The third term is plan spending for 
specialty drugs. Spending for specialty drugs is calculated the same as that for the non-
specialty drug utilization, but utilization is only by the high risks the plan expects to 
enroll. The final term in the equation is the deductible,  , which is set by the plan as well 
and paid for by all beneficiaries with utilization. It is important to note that this equation 
does not account for the catastrophic portion of the benefit, during which plans pay 15% 
of the cost of drugs filled by their enrollees. 
 Plans are also able to negotiate discounts from manufacturers in exchange for 
preferred tier placement for the drugs. Usually these discounts also depend on the ability 
of the plan to move market share. Therefore, the plan’s net revenue also depends on the 
discounts it is able to receive from manufacturers, which are based on the level of 
utilization for each drug. Discounts are considered to be negligible in the case of the 
specialty tier, and are therefore ignored for the purposes of this model. This model also 
assumes that discounts related to preferred tier placement for substitutes does not 
influence the plan’s tier placement decision for specialty drugs. 
 Given the above equation (3.2), it can be observed that the plan’s net revenue is 
dependent on the total premium it collects, the price and number of prescriptions filled 
for the lower-cost (non-specialty) and specialty drugs, and the deductible it sets for all 
beneficiaries. The portion of the premium that the plan receives from the government will 
vary depending on the risk score for each beneficiary. Assume that the risk score for 
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low-risk beneficiaries is equal to 1. Also, since the model assumes that all 
beneficiaries use the non-specialty drug, and all high-risk beneficiaries use the specialty 
drug, the equation becomes: 
Equation 3.3: 
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Next, assuming a breakeven constraint, set profit equal to zero in order to solve for the 
plan’s contribution to the specialty drug price (): 
Equation 3.4: 
 
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There are a number of factors that play a role in the plan’s tier placement decision for 
specialty drugs. All of the above components can move simultaneously and separately in 
order to affect the coinsurance decision for specialty drugs, so it is not possible to extract 
specific comparative statics from this equation. However, a few components of the 
equation are note-worthy. 
Take first the expected payment by the government for high-risk beneficiaries 
(the first term on the right-hand side of the equation). This portion of the equation 
illustrates the effect of the level of accuracy of the risk score on the plan’s tier 
placement/contribution decision. If the risk adjuster and the government premium 
together accurately estimate the costs to be incurred by the high-risk beneficiaries, this 
portion of the equation will not play a significant role in the plan’s decision. If it is an 
underestimate, plans will increase the cost share for the specialty drug, shifting more 
costs to beneficiaries to avoid high-risk beneficiaries and reduce the h in the bottom part 
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of the equation (adverse selection), as well as try to reduce the number of enrollees 
who actually use the drugs during the year (moral hazard).  
 Next consider the premium paid by the government to the plans. Since this 
premium is risk-adjusted, the plan would expect to receive higher payments for higher 
risk beneficiaries. If the risk adjustment model is not accurate, however, the plan might 
see higher costs for higher risk beneficiaries that are not covered by the premium 
payment. As a result, the proportion of beneficiaries enrolled in the plan who are of high 
risk is a factor in determining the cost sharing for the specialty drug. In addition, it is 
important to note that in a dynamic environment, where beneficiaries can change 
enrollment every year, the plan might expect to receive more enrollment of high-risk 
beneficiaries in response to the imposition of lower coinsurance for specialty drugs, 
compared to other plans. Therefore, if risk adjustment is not perfect, plans seeking to 
avoid selection of high risks would be more likely to increase the beneficiary 
coinsurance.  
 The next portion of the equation, the beneficiary contribution to the premium, 
illustrates how overall enrollment affects a plan’s decision. The law of large numbers 
means that for Part D plans, higher levels of enrollment will allow the plan to spread risk 
across more beneficiaries; however, the equation above does not fully capture the 
variation in costs across these different types of beneficiaries. Higher revenues spread 
across more beneficiaries therefore plays a role in the plan’s determination of the 
specialty drug cost share. However, a lower coinsurance for specialty drugs may 
increase enrollment of beneficiaries more likely to use specialty drugs. Therefore, a 
lower coinsurance will have a limit, similar to the effect seen above with the 
government’s contribution for low-risk beneficiaries. 
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  Now turn to the effect of the plan’s choice of tier placement for the non-
specialty drugs (the fourth term in equation 3.4) on the cost sharing decision for the 
specialty drug. The choice represented here is really a joint choice across both types of 
drugs, because the overall average cost sharing, across both of these types of drugs, 
must be 25% (weighted by expected utilization). This piece of the equation suggests a 
negative association; i.e., the higher the contribution for the non-specialty drug, the lower 
the contribution for the specialty drug. 
 Finally, the deductible the plan sets for all beneficiaries enrolled in the plan also 
plays a role in the determination of cost sharing. The last term in the equation shows that 
the cost sharing for the specialty drug is negatively associated with the deductible for the 
plan, which makes sense given the trade-off between the deductible and cost sharing 
(plans are able to buy down the deductible via higher premiums, higher cost sharing, 
etc., and given the CMS policy relating the increase of specialty tier coinsurance in 
exchange for reducing or eliminating the deductible.  
3.4 Hypotheses 
 The above model presents a simplified way to consider the Part D plan’s tier 
placement decision for specialty drugs. The model illustrates the complexities inherent in 
the decision, as the plan must take into account the premium it wishes to charge, the 
accuracy of the risk score in predicting beneficiary costs, the anticipated enrollment of 
high-risk versus low-risk beneficiaries, and the effect of tier placement of other, non-
specialty drugs on that enrollment mix. Each factor has a distinct effect on the decision, 
but taken together they result in a series of predictions. The above model explores the 
effects of factors on the tier placement decision; this section builds on that model to 
establish predictions stemming from the specific choice made by the plan. 
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Hypothesis 1: Part D plans will seek to limit the enrollment of high-risk beneficiaries 
in order to reduce their financial risk over the course of the benefit period. 
 This hypothesis is derived from the sections of the equation, above, that deal 
with the risk score for high-risk beneficiaries and the effect of utilization of specialty 
drugs on the plan’s overall revenue. To the extent that the risk adjustment model is 
imperfect in predicting beneficiary pharmaceutical costs, the plan will want to limit 
enrollment of high-risk beneficiaries in order to reduce its costs for high-risk 
beneficiaries. If the risk adjustment model does not accurately capture the expected 
costs for high-risk beneficiaries, the plan will also seek to reduce the number of high-risk 
beneficiaries, as the costs associated with their treatment will not be fully captured by 
the plans’ revenues from premiums. 
Hypothesis 2: Plans will seek to limit utilization of specialty drugs in order to decrease 
their expenditures (moral hazard). 
 While this hypothesis is not directly observable in the model, it can be assumed 
that plans will seek to reduce the additional utilization that will result from a lower 
observed price on specialty drugs. By increasing the cost sharing for specialty drugs, 
plans can reduce the additional utilization induced via the insurance coverage for the 
drugs. This can be observed in the data via a reduction in utilization in association with 
higher cost sharing by beneficiaries diagnosed with conditions often requiring the 
utilization of specialty drugs. 
 These two hypotheses are directly related to the concepts of adverse selection 
(Hypothesis 1) and moral hazard (Hypothesis 2). In the first case, plans operating in a 
competitive environment and offering differentiated products would be concerned that 
offering high-risk beneficiaries lower cost sharing on very expensive drugs would lead to 
 
 
 
49
more beneficiaries enrolling in their plan. Therefore, over time one would expect to 
see Part D plans converge towards offering more and more of these drugs on the 
specialty tier. Chapter 4 explores whether or not this is actually the case. 
 The second hypothesis deals with moral hazard, in the sense that plans seek to 
restrict additional utilization of specialty drugs that results from the price of the specialty 
drug being reduced below 100%. Plans will set their contribution so as to reduce as 
much as possible the presence of moral hazard. However, in the case of inelastic 
demand, changing the coinsurance charged to beneficiaries will not alter the overall 
utilization patterns. Chapters 5 and 6 address the question of elasticity of demand for 
specialty drugs.  
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CHAPTER 4: PART D PLAN MARKET SHARES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter addresses the impact of specialty tier placement on Part D plan 
market shares. Given the conceptual model described in Chapter 3, Part D plans would 
be expected to impose a higher cost sharing amount for specialty drugs if they 
anticipated other plans in their region would do the same; if they expected to receive 
additional enrollment from high-risk beneficiaries if they were to impose a lower cost 
share; and if they expected to see an increase in utilization of specialty drugs as a 
response to lower tier placement / lower cost share. It is important, therefore, to estimate 
the effects of Part D plan tier placement decisions on the resulting enrollment they 
receive, as a percent of total Part D enrollment in the region.  
 While the results would be expected to show lower market share for plans that 
have placed more drugs on the specialty tier, the likelihood of finding significant results 
is tempered by three factors. First, to the extent that plans increasingly move towards 
placing drugs on the specialty tier, in order to reduce the likelihood of adverse selection, 
the variation across plans may be less significant, therefore reducing the likelihood of 
finding an effect. Second, the percent of beneficiaries who are high risk, and therefore 
more likely to be prescribed a specialty drug, may be relatively small. These 
beneficiaries would be most likely to respond to tier placement decisions for specialty 
drugs; as a result, finding no effect of specialty tier placement on market share for the 
general population (i.e., all enrollees) of Part D would not be a surprising result. And 
third, the fact that plans can offset higher cost sharing for specialty drugs via a lower 
deductible and lower premium affects more beneficiaries; therefore those aspects of 
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plan design may prove to be more significant in predicting market share for all Part D 
enrollees. 
 This chapter first describes the data sources used for the analysis. Then, the 
empirical approach is presented, followed by the results and conclusions.  
4.2 Data Sources 
 Data on Part D plan formularies are publicly available files provided by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). These data provide information on tier 
level, days’ supply, cost sharing, and any utilization management tools imposed by the 
plan for all prescription drugs covered by the plan for a given year. These data are 
provided at the National Drug Code (NDC) level. The NDC is a code that provides 
information on the name of the drug, its formulation, manufacturer, and strength. The 
data are available for each month of the year, as the plan has some limited ability to 
change the formulary over the course of the year. The dataset also contains information 
on the plan’s benefit design, including premium, deductible, whether the plan provides 
any coverage in the gap, whether the plan falls below the benchmark premium and is 
therefore eligible for low-income subsidy enrollment, etc. 
The formulary and plan benefit design data used for this analysis are for the 
month of June for the years 2007-2010, the second through fifth years of the benefit. 
The first year of the benefit, 2006, is not included in the analysis for two reasons. First, 
the enrollment period for 2006 went through May 15th of that year, which introduces 
questions about adverse selection in enrollments during that first year. In turn, adverse 
selection effects might affect the results for that first year. Second, and more important, 
while plans were allowed to establish a specialty tier in 2006, CMS had not yet imposed 
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a threshold dollar restriction for placement on the specialty tier. As a result, there may 
be significant changes in the specialty tier design from 2006 to 2007 and other years. 
 With some exceptions for plans that have elected to not have their data made 
publicly available, these data incorporate all formularies offered by all plans in the 50 
U.S. states (excluding territories) for 2007-2010. As a result, the data represent nearly 
the entire universe of stand-alone Part D plans (PDPs) offered under Part D during that 
time frame. While the dataset does include formulary information for Medicare 
Advantage Part D plans (MA-PDs, which are Part D plans provided by private insurers 
that also cover Parts A and B benefits), this analysis focuses solely on market share 
effects for stand-alone Part D plans. 
 The enrollment data for the Part D market share analysis come from publicly 
reported enrollment figures, by plan, as posted by CMS on its web site.10 These data are 
available for every month of the year, but the data selected are for June of each year, so 
as to match the formulary data described above.11 Due to CMS requirements related to 
limiting the ability to identify individual beneficiaries via aggregate data, those plans with 
enrollments of less than 10 beneficiaries had their enrollment numbers suppressed from 
the data. For the purposes of this analysis, plans with fewer than 10 enrolled 
beneficiaries were recorded as having no enrollment in that month (and therefore had 
zero market share for that region).  
 The region-level demographic data, for Medicare beneficiaries specifically and 
reflecting the regional per capita income more generally, come from two sources. 
Medicare aggregate regional data are available from CMS as a publicly available 
                                               
10 Data downloaded from CMS at: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Monthly-PDP-Enrollment-by-State-County-Contract.html 
11 The only differences in enrollment across months of the year would be for dually eligible beneficiaries who 
are able to change plans during the year. However, in order to be consistent with the formulary data, the 
same month was used. 
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dataset,12 with the percent of beneficiaries who were Medicaid eligible in a given year. 
These data are provided at the state level; a weighted average (based on state-level 
Medicare eligibility) was calculated in order to achieve a region-level variable (for the 34 
Part D regions). The per capita income data were from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, and were also publicly available.13 These data were available at the state level; 
a weighted average based on state population was calculated to estimate the regional 
per capita income for the analysis.14 
 A measure of risk for Medicare beneficiaries in a given region was also sought, 
so as to control for variation across regions in the risk of spending for the population that 
could enroll in a Part D plan. Unfortunately, CMS had suppressed the average state-
level risk score calculation due to mistakes in previous calculations (as stated in the 
methodology section of the downloaded data); as such, risk could not be used as a 
control in the market share analysis. 
4.3 Empirical Approach 
 The primary analysis for this section is designed to estimate the relationship 
between plan market share and the percent of eligible drugs placed on the specialty tier, 
controlling for other covariates. The empirical analysis is a fixed effects ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression of the panel data, with the following equation: 
&'() *#')+  %*)'!-+.  /+0 .  1+0 .  !'"  2)'  3+ 
where the plan’s market share is calculated as the enrollment for plan j in region s for 
year t, divided by the total enrollment in Part D in that region for that year. The 
                                               
12 Data downloaded from CMS at: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Geographic-Variation/GV_PUF.html 
13 Data were downloaded from the BEA web site at: 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1&acrdn=4#reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1 
14 State population estimates were downloaded from the Census Bureau web site at: 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/state/state2010.html 
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independent variable of interest is the percent of drugs the plan has placed on the 
specialty tier. This variable is calculated with the denominator as the total number of 
drugs placed on the specialty tier by at least one plan in the year, and the numerator 
being the number of those drugs placed by the specific plan on the specialty tier. Recall 
that drugs are only eligible for the specialty tier if they have a negotiated monthly price of 
at least $600 ($500 in 2007). 
 The other variables in the above equation represent controls for both plan-level 
and individual-specific factors that contribute to plan market share. The first, /+0 ., is a 
vector of plan-level variables including the plan’s premium and deductible normalized by 
the regional premium and deductible, gap coverage, whether the plan is available 
nationwide, and whether the plan is eligible for auto-enrollment of dual eligible 
beneficiaries. The second term, 1+0 ., is a vector of individual-level aggregate region-
level characteristics that vary with time. These characteristics are percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries also eligible for Medicaid and region-level per-capita income, and enable 
testing the effect of tier placement for specialty drugs based on enrollment by non-
Medicaid beneficiaries via an interaction with the variable for percent of drugs on the 
specialty tier. The last term in the equation is an error term reflecting the plan-specific 
and individual-level error. 
 This equation was run using OLS on a cross-sectional, individual-year basis, and 
then as a fixed-effects regression exploiting the panel nature of the data. However, 
unlike with the claims data analysis, described in the next chapters, these data do not 
provide an easy instrumental variable to address the issue of endogeneity in the plan’s 
specialty tier placement decision and the beneficiary’s enrollment decision. In order to 
account for the fact that beneficiaries are likely making their enrollment choices based 
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on their previous plan’s benefit design, a separate analysis lags by one year the 
percent of drugs placed on the specialty tier, as well as the plan, competitor, and 
aggregate beneficiary controls. This allows for the possibility that beneficiaries react to 
the design of their plan in the previous year when deciding whether to switch, as 
opposed to responding to the design of the new plan in the upcoming year. 
 Part D insurers are able to offer plans nationally, or even in multiple regions; as a 
result, they often use the same formulary design for different plans in different regions. 
Since the independent variable of interest focuses on the formulary design aspects of 
the plan, standard errors for the cross-sectional analyses are clustered at the formulary 
level. Standard errors for the panel analyses are clustered at the plan level. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 presents plan-level descriptive statistics for all Part D plans 
participating in each year (2007-2010) of the program, for all drugs covered by the plans. 
The total number of plans declines somewhat over the course of the benefit; this is likely 
due to CMS’ increasing restrictions on insurers’ ability to offer multiple products in a 
given region.15 Of note, not all plans are offered in a given region; from 2007 through 
2009, anywhere from 42 to 66 plans were offered in each region. For 2010, between 34 
and 43 plans were offered in each region, reflecting a decrease in the overall number of 
plans.  
The vast majority of Part D plans did offer a specialty tier (more than 84% in each 
year), and on average plans with a specialty tier had a higher total premium than those 
not offering a specialty tier. As expected, far more plans that had a specialty tier also 
                                               
15 CMS has established a policy for later years of the benefit that requires insurers to show substantial 
differences between multiple plan offerings in a given region. This policy was designed to reduce confusion 
for beneficiaries, who were trying to distinguish between different plans. 
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offered gap coverage (one feature of enhanced plans), compared to those plans with 
no specialty tier. Finally, the difference in premium is likely due to the fact that plans 
must trade-off a higher coinsurance on the specialty tier with a lower deductible, not a 
lower premium. As expected, the average deductible offered by plans with a specialty 
tier is much lower than the deductible offered by plans with no specialty tier ($63.13 
compared to $258.18 in 2007). While this difference may seem large, the deductible 
buy-down does not correlate completely with the higher specialty tier cost-sharing 
amount; other offsets enable plans to reduce or eliminate the deductible. The lower 
deductible amount for specialty tier plans is true for all four years, though the difference 
in the average deductibles does decrease over time. 
Table 4.1 Plan-Level Data Descriptive Statistics 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
n 1866  1824  1601  1356  
% Plans with Specialty Tier 84.14  85.20  87.13  84.29  
Premium* 
         Specialty Tier 37.89  41.57  47.32  48.48  
(15.64) (20.22) (21.18) (20.41) 
         No Specialty Tier 31.10  31.11  36.28  33.51  
(10.35) (15.60) (13.55) (10.49) 
Deductible*  
         Specialty Tier 63.13  76.55  85.59  118.56  
(106.31) (117.37) (126.18) (131.56) 
         No Specialty Tier 258.18  268.98  292.14  294.32  
(41.38) (38.60) (29.00) (52.08) 
% Plans with Gap Coverage 
         Specialty Tier 33.95  33.85  29.03  22.75  
         No Specialty Tier 1.69  1.11  0.49  0.47  
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics on the plans’ market share for each year, 
with plans still separated into groups depending on whether or not they have a specialty 
tier. The average market share for all plans is relatively low, with the average share for 
specialty tier plans lower than the average share for plans with no specialty tier. This 
suggests higher enrollment in plans with no specialty tier, suggesting support of the 
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hypothesis that beneficiaries of high risk will choose to enroll in plans that do not place 
their drugs on the specialty tier.16 However, it is important to note that the maximum 
market share for specialty tier plans is much higher than for non-specialty tier plans 
(ranging from 20.7% to 38.6% compared to 17.7% to 20.7% across all years). Thus, 
while the spread for specialty tier market share is greater, more plans with no specialty 
tier are seeing higher enrollment on average. 
Table 4.2 Average Market Share for Part D Plans, 20 07-2010 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
n 1866  1824  1601  1356  
Market Share (%)* 
         Specialty Tier 1.62  1.65  1.97  2.40  
(3.68) (3.43) (3.96) (4.33) 
         No Specialty Tier 2.89  3.11  3.14  3.08  
  (4.92) (4.22) (3.89) (4.10) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics on the plans’ tier placement and utilization 
management decisions for specialty tier-eligible drugs. Plans offering a specialty tier 
placed an increasingly large percentage of eligible drugs on the specialty tier, starting 
with 36% on average in 2007, and increasing to 56% on average in 2010. This suggests 
that plans are observing the actions of other plans, and are moving an increasing share 
of drugs to these tiers in order to avoid enrollment of beneficiaries with conditions 
requiring specialty drugs. 
Part D plans also used prior authorization as their primary utilization 
management tool for drugs eligible for the specialty tier. On average, 33-37% of drugs 
eligible for the specialty tier (across all years) had prior authorization requirements 
imposed by the Part D plan. A far lower percentage of drugs (8-12%) had quantity limit 
                                               
16 However, market share measures all beneficiaries enrolled in Part D, not just those of high risk, for whom 
the data at the aggregate level are not available. Thus, these statistics are merely suggestive. 
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restrictions, and nearly none of these drugs were part of a step therapy regimen. 
Comparing utilization management tools across types of plans (specialty tier versus no 
Table 4.3: Plan Specialty Tier Placement and Utiliz ation Management Tools 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
n 1866  1824  1601  1356  
% Drugs on Specialty* 0.36  0.42  0.46  0.56  
(0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) 
% Drugs with Prior Auth.* 
         Specialty Tier 0.33  0.35  0.37  0.36  
(0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
         No Specialty Tier 0.25  0.26  0.37  0.06  
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) 
% Drugs with Quantity Limits* 
         Specialty Tier 0.08  0.10  0.12  0.11  
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
         No Specialty Tier 0.12  0.12  0.23  0.06  
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
% Drugs with Step Therapy* 
         Specialty Tier 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
         No Specialty Tier 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
specialty tier), it appears that in general plans with no specialty tier made less use of 
prior authorization requirements for these drugs (except for 2009), while slightly more 
drugs in plans with no specialty tier had quantity limits imposed. These statistics suggest 
that plans do use the specialty tier in conjunction with utilization management tools in 
order to affect beneficiary utilization of specialty drugs, and that even in cases where 
plans do not have a specialty tier, they do still make use of utilization management tools 
for these drugs. 
Table 4.4 shows average cost sharing for each tier of the benefit, separated out 
by whether the tier is a specialty tier or not. Plans did impose both coinsurance and 
copayments in designing their benefits; thus, the table presents average coinsurance 
and average copayments separately. Only one specialty tier (tier 4) had any plans offer 
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flat copayments. Very few plans (sometimes only one) offered as many as six tiers; as 
such, there is no standard deviation presented in some cases. 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for Part D Plan C ost Sharing for Plans with a 
Specialty Tier Compared to Plans with No Specialty Tier 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Coinsurance - Specialty Tier     
         Tier 3 0.27  0.28  0.31  0.26  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
         Tier 4 0.29  0.29  0.30  0.30  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
         Tier 5 0.31  0.30  0.30  0.30  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
         Tier 6 0.25  0.33  0.31  0.31  
(n/a) (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) 
Coinsurance - Non-Specialty     
         Tier 1 0.25  0.25  0.23  0.24  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
         Tier 2 0.26  0.27  0.26  0.23  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
         Tier 3 0.33  0.38  0.47  0.39  
(0.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) 
         Tier 4 0.28  0.33  0.36  0.37  
(0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) 
         Tier 5 0.25  0.25  0.25  0.34  
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) 
         Tier 6 0.25  0.25  (n/a) (n/a) 
(n/a) (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) 
Copayments - Specialty Tier**     
         Tier 4 70.00  56.25  55.00  60.00  
(34.64) (6.29) (4.08) (n/a) 
Copayments - Non-Specialty***     
         Tier 1 4.75  4.62  4.32  5.02  
(3.27) (2.71) (2.75) (2.67) 
         Tier 2 28.02  31.39  29.98  31.01  
(7.03) (7.52) (11.24) (11.71) 
         Tier 3 56.86  67.50  62.01  65.26  
(10.68) (15.85) (21.16) (23.85) 
         Tier 4 49.84  49.14  72.55  74.60  
(11.53) (9.29) (16.83) (21.75) 
         Tier 5 5.00  3.00  95.00  90.00  
  (0.00) (1.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
** No plans offered a specialty tier with copyaments for tiers 3, 5, and 6 in any year. 
*** No plans offered copayments on tier 6 in any year. 
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When comparing specialty tiers to non-specialty tiers, it is clear that the 
specialty tier policy imposed by CMS, restricting the maximum coinsurance to 33%, does 
protect beneficiaries to some extent from higher cost sharing. This can be seen in tiers 3 
and 4 of the benefit, especially, where the average coinsurance for non-specialty tier 
plans ranges from 28% to 47% (2007-2010); this compares to average coinsurance for 
specialty tiers ranging from 27 to 31%.17 The maximum coinsurance rate for specialty 
tiers is 33%, which reflects the CMS policy. Also, the non-specialty tier coinsurance 
applied for tiers 3 and 4 has very large standard deviations, suggesting that few plans do 
apply these significantly larger cost-sharing amounts.  
 Finally, Table 4.5 presents average statistics for the region-level variables used 
in the analysis. The plan statistics presented are for the previous year, presenting the 
lagged values for reference for the second analysis.  
Table 4.5: Part D Region-Level Descriptive Statisti cs. 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
n 34  34  34  34  
Plan Statistics (Previous Year)              Premium 26.29  27.72  30.19  34.76  
(2.93) (2.91) (3.52) (3.56) 
         Deductible 109.25  117.84  131.17  146.59  
(18.94) (22.31) (23.89) (29.52) 
         % Auto Enrollment 77.59  71.68  51.43  42.97  
(8.30) (10.28) (10.52) (9.43) 
% Medicaid Eligible 13.80  13.67  13.75  13.84  
(4.58) (4.46) (4.44) (4.45) 
Per Capita Income 38195.26  39752.28  37646.68  38643.64  
  (5352.27) (5503.62) (5221.56) (5484.21) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
Of note, the percent of Medicare beneficiaries who were also eligible for Medicaid 
remained about the same for the entire time period of the data. Per capita income did 
decrease somewhat on average from 2008 to 2009, which was to be expected given the 
                                               
17 Note that higher priced drugs (at least $600) are more likely to be placed on the specialty tier; therefore, 
30% of $600 is a much higher out-of-pocket cost share than 47% of $100. 
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recession. The average percent of plans eligible for auto-enrollment of dual eligible 
beneficiaries decreased over time, which is due to the manner by which CMS calculated 
the benchmark premium for auto-enrollment. 
4.5 Results 
 Table 4.6 presents results for the cross-sectional analysis of the plan-level data, 
with no lagged variables. The results for both types of regression analyses (non-lagged 
and lagged) were generally as expected, i.e., the percent of drugs placed on the 
specialty tier for a given plan was negatively associated with market share, but not 
significant. The correlations for certain variables, for example premium and deductible, 
as well as prior authorization and quantity limits, were very high; therefore, some of 
these variables were excluded from the regressions.18 As mentioned in the introduction, 
all utilization management tools were excluded from the models due to limitations in the 
data. Of note, the correlation between percent of drugs placed on the specialty tier and 
the plan’s deductible amount (not normalized by regional deductible) is negative and 
large (ranging from -0.31 to -0.43 across the years). This is expected, as plans have the 
option to place drugs on the specialty tier for the higher coinsurance in exchange for 
lowering the deductible. 
 Two other variable transformations are included in the results presented below. 
The first is the ratio of the plan’s total premium to the average regional premium. This 
measure is designed to capture the relative effect of the plan’s premium compared to the 
regional premium in gaining market share. The second is an interaction term between 
the percent of Medicare beneficiaries in the region who were not eligible for Medicaid, 
                                               
18 Correlation between premium and deductible, 2007-2010: -0.41, -0.46, -0.50, and -0.55. Correlation 
between prior authorization and quantity limits, 2007-2010: -0.02, 0.17, 0.31, and 0.45. The correlation 
between prior authorization and quantity limits for 2007 is unusual.  
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and the percent of drugs on the specialty tier. This term was included due to the 
expectation that beneficiaries not eligible for the low-income subsidy (of which Medicaid 
eligibles are a large proportion) would be more likely to choose plans with fewer drugs 
placed on the specialty tier because those not eligible for the low-income subsidy would 
be subject to any higher cost sharing imposed on the specialty tier. 
As expected, the percent of drugs placed on the specialty tier does not have a 
significant effect in any year of the analysis. For 2007 and 2010, however, the effect is 
slightly positive, which is unexpected. This result is likely due to the fact that plans were 
able to put a larger proportion of drugs on the specialty tier in 2007 (given the $500  
Table 4.6: Cross-sectional OLS Results for Plan-Lev el Market Share. 1 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
% on Specialty Tier 0.032 -0.037 -0.018 0.061 
(0.085) (0.047) (0.063) (0.055) 
% Specialty * Non-Medicaid 0.009 0.069 0.053 -0.049 
(0.102) (0.055) (0.068) (0.058) 
Regional Non-Medicaid Eligible -0.008 -0.008** -0.011*** -0.015*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Plan Premium / Region Premium -0.005 -0.007* -0.013 -0.016* 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.01) (0.009) 
Plan Deductible / Region Deductible -0.012 -0.018 -0.033 -0.033 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.026) (0.022) 
Enhanced Plan 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.03*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Auto Enrollment -0.006 -0.026 -0.005 0.07 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.037) (0.053) 
Log Regional Per Capita Income -0.008 -0.008** -0.011*** -0.015*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
_cons 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.004 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
n 1866 1824 1601 1356 
1 Coefficients presented with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 0.1 level   ** Significant at the 0.05 level   *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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threshold), and fewer plans existed in the 2010 data compared to earlier years. In 
addition, the interaction between non-Medicaid eligible beneficiaries and the percent of 
drugs on the specialty tier is not significant, suggesting that beneficiaries in general are 
not choosing plans in response to specialty tier placement or lower deductible offsets, for 
more beneficiaries. 
Plan premium (in this case, the plan’s premium relative to the average regional 
premium) is only a significant negative predictor of market share in 2008 and 2010. The 
plan’s deductible, normalized by region, is insignificant in all years. The plan’s eligibility 
for auto-enrollment was insignificant for all years. These results suggest the complexity 
inherent in the benefit design and choice of plan, as alternative specifications suggest 
that certain variables (e.g., premium) are significant when others (deductible) are not 
included. 
 Table 4.7 presents the results of the regressions with the independent variables 
lagged by one year (for example, if the market share dependent variable is for 2010, the 
independent variables are for 2009). This table also presents panel regression results for 
the lagged analyses. Similar to the results with no lagged variables, the lagged results 
show an insignificant relationship between market share and the percent of eligible 
drugs placed on the specialty tier. The results for the interaction term are still 
insignificant as well. Plan premium relative to the regional average premium is a 
significant, negative predictor of market share in the panel results, while the deductible is 
a significant positive predictor of market share in the panel results. The results for 
deductible may be due to the fact that LIS beneficiaries are included in the enrollment 
numbers; since they are auto-enrolled into more plans with a deductible, plans with 
higher deductibles may reflect higher market share. In addition, the panel results show 
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two new significant predictors, the percent of beneficiaries in the region who are not 
eligible for Medicaid, and whether or not a plan is an enhanced plan. For the first, the 
association is negative, suggesting that the more beneficiaries in a region who are not 
Medicaid-eligible, the lower the market share for the plan. For the latter, offering 
enhanced coverage increases the market share for the plan. 
Table 4.7: Market Share Regression Results, Indepen dent Variables Lagged One 
Year 
  20071 20081 20091 
Panel 
Results 2 
% on Specialty Tier -0.051 -0.04 0.025 0.000 
(0.076) (0.064) (0.066) (0.043) 
% Specialty * Non-Medicaid 0.109 0.08 0.017 0.012 
(0.093) (0.074) (0.069) (0.05) 
Regional Non-Medicaid Eligible -0.016** -0.01*** -0.014*** -0.004*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) 
Plan Premium / Region Premium -0.002 -0.008 -0.013 -0.002*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.001) 
Plan Deductible / Region Deductible -0.006 -0.019 -0.035 0.001* 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.001) 
Enhanced Plan 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.028** 0.005*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.014) (0.001) 
Auto Enrollment -0.029 -0.028 0.018 0.062 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.044) (0.103) 
Log Regional Per Capita Income 0.007 0.007 0.01 -0.008 
(0.01) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
_cons -0.019 -0.015 -0.07 0.053 
(0.111) (0.088) (0.12) (0.101) 
n 1622 1533 1207 4362 
1 Coefficients presented with robust standard errors (clustered at formulary level) in 
parentheses. 
2 Coefficients presented with robust standard errors (clustered at plan level) in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level   ** Significant at the 0.05 level   *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 The results for the market share analysis are largely as expected: the more 
specialty drugs a plan places on the specialty tier, the lower the overall market share for 
the plan (for the lagged analyses). However, the coefficients for percent of drugs placed 
on the specialty tier, and the interaction between specialty tier placement and the non-
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Medicaid population, are insignificant, illustrating that other aspects of the Part D 
benefit design, beneficiary demographics, and competitor characteristics play a role in 
plan selection. Plan premium and deductible (for the lagged panel results) appear to be 
significant predictors of market share. The premium finding supports previous theoretical 
and empirical work that has suggested that beneficiaries are most likely to choose plans 
based solely on premium and not on other aspects of the benefit (Abaluck & Gruber, 
2011). 
 These results overall suggest that the general population of beneficiaries do not 
consider the tier placement decisions taken by plans for specialty drugs. The next set of 
analyses examines how beneficiaries of higher risk, who are likely to be prescribed at 
least one specialty drug, respond to plan tier placement decisions in terms of switching, 
utilization, and spending.  
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CHAPTER 5: MEDICARE BENEFICIARY CLAIMS DATA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The empirical analyses of Medicare beneficiary response to tier placement 
decisions made by Part D plans represent the primary focus of this dissertation. These 
analyses estimate beneficiary response to Part D plans’ tier placement decision for 
drugs that are eligible for placement on the specialty tier by virtue of having a negotiated 
monthly price above the CMS-defined threshold. In order to achieve results that 
accurately reflect the response of beneficiaries, these analyses focus on a subset of 
beneficiaries who are more likely to use specialty drugs, due to being diagnosed with a 
condition that is usually treated with one of these drugs. This chapter describes the 
conditions of interest for the analysis, the sample selection strategy, the data used in the 
analysis, and the calculation of the primary variables for the analyses. 
5.2 Conditions of Interest 
 The analyses that examine beneficiary behavior in response to specialty tier 
placement focus on beneficiaries who are most likely to be directly affected by specialty 
tier placement of specialty drugs. As a result, only beneficiaries with one of six specific 
chronic conditions will be included in the sample. These conditions are rheumatoid 
arthritis (RA), multiple sclerosis (MS), and four types of cancer: colorectal, breast, lung, 
and prostate. The primary reason for selecting these conditions is the fact that RA, MS, 
and cancer are the conditions that contribute the most to increasing utilization and cost 
trends for specialty drugs dispensed at specialty pharmacies (Medco Research Institute, 
2011). This section presents a brief description of each condition. 
 RA is an auto-immune disease that causes inflammation and swelling in the 
joints (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 2008). The most common 
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treatments for RA are Disease-Modifying AntiRheumatic Drugs (DMARDs), and 
include specialty drugs such as adalimumab, anakinra, and etanercept (AHRQ, 2008). 
While a number of the drugs used to treat RA fall under the Part D umbrella, some are 
administered in physicians’ offices and are covered under Part B of Medicare. 
 MS is a disease of unknown origin that causes damage to the brain and spinal 
cord in a manner that blocks or limits the messages transmitted between the brain and 
other parts of the body (Medline Plus, 2012). MS is characterized by both long-term 
disease progression and short-term exacerbations of symptoms. Most specialty drugs 
used to treat MS focus on reducing the long-term impact of the disease, and include 
interferon beta-1a, glatiramer acetate, and mitoxantrone, among others (National 
Multiple Sclerosis Society, 2012). As an example of the costs associated with these 
particular medications, in 2007 self-injectable MS medications cost about $2,000 per 
month (Kunze, Gunderson, Gleason, Heaton, and Johnson, 2007). 
 The four types of cancer selected for inclusion in these analyses are 
characterized by malignant tumors that begin in a specific area of the body. Some 
treatments for these types of cancer include biologic therapies such as colony-
stimulating factors (for example, epoietin) and monoclonal antibodies such as rituximab 
and trastuzumab (National Cancer Institute, 2006). It is important to note, however, that 
not all cancer treatments are intended for all types of cancer; thus, the list of drugs used 
to treat the individual cancers varies somewhat across the four types. 
 These six conditions are used for this part of the dissertation because specialty 
drugs prescribed for these conditions generally cost in excess of the $500/$600 
negotiated monthly price threshold established by CMS, and therefore patients with 
these conditions have a high likelihood of initiating therapy with specialty drugs. In 
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addition, drugs used to treat these conditions may represent a high proportion of all 
specialty drugs; therefore, conclusions drawn as a result of these analyses may be 
externally valid to all conclusions requiring the use of specialty drugs.  
5.3 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 The data for the utilization and enrollment analyses come from the Medicare 5% 
sample for the years 2006 through 2008. The 5% sample incorporates all diagnoses and 
claims for a nationally representative 5% sample of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare 
beneficiaries. These files include all claims for these beneficiaries that were filed under 
Medicare Part A (hospital), B (outpatient), and D. The prescription drug claims are the 
primary file of interest, and include all claims filed with a Part D plan (stand-alone), for 
the years 2006-2008.  
The prescription drug claims data, formally referred to as “prescription drug 
event” (PDE) data, contain detailed information on all claims filed by a given beneficiary, 
including variables such as quantity dispensed, days supply, the NDC code for the drug 
dispensed, where the beneficiary was in the benefit, the beneficiary copayment, whether 
the beneficiary qualified for the low-income subsidy (LIS), and whether or not there are 
any utilization management tools applied to the particular claim. In addition, the data files 
include information on plan characteristics, including premium and deductible (more 
detail on the individual variables appears below in the empirical analysis section). 
The PDE claims data also contain information on any additional payments made 
on behalf of beneficiaries for cost sharing amounts. It is possible for non-LIS 
beneficiaries to have additional external assistance with their cost sharing, which 
reduces their total out-of-pocket payment. The Part D claim captures these payments as 
additional variables. In fact, for those beneficiaries who used at least one specialty tier-
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eligible drug, anywhere from 4.7% (RA, 2007) to 20.8% (breast cancer, 2008) of 
patients had at least some additional assistance with their cost sharing. Since any 
assistance that further reduces the price paid by the beneficiary may affect the 
beneficiary’s utilization, enrollment, and expenditures for Part D drugs, a dummy variable 
indicating whether a non-LIS beneficiary received additional assistance for cost sharing 
is used as a control in all empirical analyses. 
 Beneficiaries are included in the sample if they meet five conditions. First, 
beneficiaries must be enrolled in FFS Medicare (as opposed to Medicare Part C, the 
managed care option in Medicare, for which there are no medical claims data available), 
and must have been eligible for or enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B for the entire year 
of interest. Second, beneficiaries must be at least 65 years of age, as the vast majority 
of all Medicare beneficiaries are over age 65, and are therefore the target of Part D plan 
benefit designs. Further, beneficiaries must have been enrolled in a stand-alone Part D 
plan for all 12 months of the year, in order to ensure the ability to observe the effects of 
tier placement on beneficiary utilization and switching. Finally, beneficiaries must have at 
least one inpatient or two outpatient claims for one of the six conditions of interest, in at 
least one of the years prior to the year of interest or within the year itself. Table A.1 in 
the Appendix presents the ICD-9 codes associated with each diagnosis. Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 each present descriptive statistics for beneficiaries eligible for the sample, first for RA 
and MS, then for each of the cancers.  
 The tables, and the empirical analyses, separate out beneficiaries eligible for the 
LIS and those who were never eligible for the LIS. This is due to the fact that 
beneficiaries who are non-LIS are subject to the full cost sharing imposed by the plan 
(assuming they have no other source of funding for drug spending), while beneficiaries 
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who are recipients of the LIS face much lower, flat copayments or low coinsurance, 
and are not subject to the deductible and coverage gap. As such, behavior by LIS 
beneficiaries would be expected to be different from that of non-LIS beneficiaries, in that 
they would be less likely to respond to cost sharing for specialty drugs since they are not  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Beneficiaries  Diagnosed with RA or MS. 
  RA MS 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
n 13611 14570 1003 1081 
% Female 83.24 82.75 80.96 81.78 
Race (%)   
   
         White 81.94 81.33 91.63 89.82 
         Black 9.77 9.47 6.58 7.59 
         Other 8.29 9.20 1.79 2.59 
Age (%)      
         65-69 23.39 23.40 39.18 43.29 
         70-74 24.33 24.15 24.33 23.13 
         75-79 22.59 21.85 20.24 17.67 
         80-84 16.87 17.23 9.97 10.18 
         85 and up 12.82 13.38 6.28 5.74 
% LIS 41.08 40.35 47.46 46.62 
% Coverage Gap   
   
         Never LIS 42.21 36.35 44.21 41.59 
         LIS 64.81 63.43 69.54 68.06 
% Catastrophic    
   
         Never LIS 8.33 7.99 17.65 16.64 
         LIS 30.15 30.50 35.50 37.50 
Inpatient Visits*   
   
         Never LIS 0.33  0.33  0.41  0.31  
 
(0.82) (0.82) (0.94) (0.80) 
         LIS 0.45  0.41  0.55  0.46  
  (1.08) (1.02) (1.31) (0.99) 
Outpatient Visits*   
   
         Never LIS 32.82  33.06  32.07  30.85  
 
(31.53) (31.93) (32.75) (31.52) 
         LIS 34.88  32.47  36.33  34.69  
  (40.82) (37.37) (32.89) (31.20) 
Risk Score*   
   
         Never LIS 0.83  0.92  0.97  1.01  
 
(0.35) (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) 
         LIS 0.92  0.99  1.16  1.23  
  (0.48) (0.54) (0.46) (0.54) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. Risk scores are lagged one year; i.e., the risk 
score for 2007 is calculated from 2006 data. 
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subject to it. Thus, the LIS beneficiaries were separated from non-LIS beneficiaries for 
purposes of the empirical analyses, and used as a comparison group to test the validity 
of the models. 
Of particular note, a higher proportion of beneficiaries with MS were eligible for 
the low-income subsidy (LIS) in both years, compared to beneficiaries with RA or cancer 
(about 47% of MS beneficiaries, compared to closer to 40% for RA and even fewer 
beneficiaries with cancer). In addition, a higher proportion of MS beneficiaries who were 
not eligible for the LIS entered the catastrophic phase of the benefit (about 17% 
compared to less than 10% for RA and less than 5% for cancer), an indication that their 
Part D drug spending was much higher than spending for the other conditions. In 
addition, the effect of moral hazard can be seen in the comparison between the non-LIS 
and LIS beneficiaries who entered the coverage gap and then catastrophic phases of the 
benefit; however, LIS beneficiaries do have higher risk scores on average, suggesting 
that any conclusions that can be drawn from differences in utilization are tentative. For 
RA patients, 42.2% of those who were not eligible for the LIS entered the coverage gap, 
compared to 64.8% of LIS beneficiaries. The proportions are similar across all conditions 
in both tables and in both years, suggesting that the cost sharing imposed on non-LIS 
beneficiaries serves to reduce utilization, and by extension addresses moral hazard. 
While the data cover the years 2006-2008, the analyses focus only on the years 
2007 and 2008, for a variety of reasons. First, 2006 was the first year of the Part D 
benefit, and as such beneficiaries were allowed to enroll in a plan through May 15 of that 
year. This extended enrollment period likely presents adverse selection issues that 
would appear in the data, as those beneficiaries of higher risk may have enrolled in a 
Part D plan as soon as they were able, while those of lower risk may have waited until 
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the delayed deadline approached. Second, and more important, while the specialty 
tier existed in 2006, it did not carry a minimum negotiated monthly price threshold as a 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Beneficiaries  Diagnosed with Cancer. 
  Colorectal Lung Breast Prostate 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
n 6458 6575 4444 4580 16704 17508 17112 18220 
% Female 66.77 66.27 64.15 63.01 99.82 99.84 0.00 0.00 
Race (%)          
         White 85.93 86.15 88.47 88.93 89.17 89.38 84.03 84.61 
         Black 8.14 8.10 7.07 6.38 7.34 7.09 10.42 9.80 
         Other 5.93 5.74 4.46 4.70 3.49 3.53 5.56 5.59 
Age (%)   
       
         65-69 17.10 17.29 24.46 25.55 21.11 21.52 19.83 19.95 
         70-74 21.29 21.72 27.39 26.16 23.28 23.29 24.01 24.73 
         75-79 22.30 20.82 23.22 21.97 22.27 21.54 24.19 23.16 
         80-84 19.57 20.26 16.09 16.55 18.67 18.64 18.03 18.02 
         85 and up 19.75 19.92 8.85 9.79 14.68 15.01 13.94 14.13 
% LIS 34.64 32.43 34.70 34.21 27.00 25.73 22.80 21.55 
% Coverage Gap   
       
         Never LIS 29.83 25.50 45.59 39.56 44.85 39.82 33.10 27.19 
         LIS 54.31 53.24 59.92 61.71 67.61 65.90 53.49 54.30 
% Catastrophic    
       
         Never LIS 3.29 3.24 9.03 7.83 5.92 6.35 4.35 4.21 
         LIS 18.42 20.12 24.84 26.29 27.21 27.95 23.19 23.18 
Inpatient Visits*   
       
         Never LIS 0.42  0.43  0.44  0.42  0.23  0.22  0.28  0.25  
 
(0.90) (0.94) (1.01) (0.89) (0.64) (0.60) (0.72) (0.71) 
         LIS 0.52  0.54  0.49  0.50  0.39  0.37  0.42  0.41  
(1.10) (1.16) (1.10) (1.09) (0.91) (0.88) (1.01) (0.99) 
Outpatient Visits*   
       
         Never LIS 32.43  32.22  36.28  36.21  33.11  32.78  30.48  30.14  
 (37.47) (36.40) (42.77) (41.74) (30.95) (30.13) (28.24) (28.64) 
         LIS 33.32  32.77  30.58  34.50  36.35  35.89  33.15  33.36  
(40.73) (39.73) (42.04) (43.79) (35.64) (36.62) (33.54) (35.09) 
Risk Score*   
       
         Never LIS 0.69  0.78  0.80  0.89  0.86  0.97  0.76  0.85  
 
(0.31) (0.38) (0.40) (0.47) (0.34) (0.40) (0.31) (0.36) 
         LIS 0.76  0.87  0.80  0.92  0.99  1.13  0.86  0.96  
  (0.40) (0.49) (0.48) (0.57) (0.42) (0.50) (0.41) (0.48) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses. Risk scores are lagged one year; i.e., the risk 
score for 2007 is calculated from 2006 data. 
 
requirement for enrollment. Finally, plans were able to designate specific drugs (NDCs) 
as being on the specialty tier, even if those NDCs themselves were on different tiers 
(Christopher Powers, personal communication, 3/19/2012). As such, it would be 
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extremely difficult to identify a specific specialty tier for 2006 using the data. By 2007, 
CMS had established more specific guidance related to the specialty tier, and the 
enrollment period was not extended as it had been in 2006. Therefore, 2007 and 2008 
are used to examine the effects of tier placement for specialty drugs on utilization and 
switching behavior by beneficiaries.  
Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics for plans included in the sample. These 
statistics show that patients with RA and MS tend to enroll in plans with lower premiums, 
on average, than do beneficiaries with cancer ($30.76 premium on average in 2007 for 
RA/MS, compared to $36.21 on average for cancers). In addition, the average 
deductible for RA and MS patients is higher, likely reflecting the fact that a higher 
percentage of plans for RA and MS patients are below the LIS benchmark in each year. 
Finally, RA and MS patients are slightly less likely to enroll in plans with a specialty tier, 
since about 75% of RA/MS plans have a specialty tier, compared to more than 80% of 
plans for beneficiaries with cancer.19 All of these characteristics clearly may be 
interrelated. 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Part D Plans Included in the Sample. 
  MS / RA All Cancers 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
n 1333  1469  1030  1108  
Total Premium 30.76  33.82  36.21  37.47  
 (16.08) (17.19) (16.10) (18.52) 
Deductible 114.49  117.49  86.45  100.88  
 (129.83) (134.29) (120.39) (129.41) 
% Below Benchmark (LIS) 60.17  41.87  33.85  28.52  
% National PDP 65.49  85.57  74.01  87.45  
Specialty Tier Plan (%) 75.54  75.63  82.04  80.14  
* Means presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
                                               
19 The fact that premiums are higher for cancer beneficiaries, and yet more plans with enrollment of cancer 
patients have a specialty tier, suggests that these plans are more likely to be enhanced plans offering extra 
benefits. 
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 Table 5.4 shows drug-level descriptive statistics for plans included in the 
sample, comparing plans with a specialty tier to those with no specialty tier. Of note, of 
those specialty tier plans for which at least one beneficiary used at least one specialty 
tier-eligible drug (the definition of which is discussed in the next section), the average 
cost sharing varies significantly across the different diseases. Average specialty drug 
cancer costs for plans range from $100.95 (prostate) to $142.41 (lung) in 2007, and  
Table 5.4: Drug-Level Descriptive Statistics for Pl ans Included in the Sample, 
Comparing Specialty Tier Plans with Non-Specialty T ier Plans 
  2007 2008 
  
n 
Out -of -
Pocket 
Costs 
Prior 
Auth. 
(%) 
Quant. 
Limits 
(%) n 
Out -of -
Pocket 
Costs 
Prior 
Auth. 
(%) 
Quant. 
Limits 
(%) 
Specialty Tier Plans 
       
      RA 514 156.41 0.04 0.02 359 434.65 0.07 0.03 
  
(149.75) (0.04) (0.03) 
 
(112.82) (0.06) (0.04) 
      MS 314 318.05 0.07 0.02 249 543.59 0.14 0.06 
  
(195.21) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
(146.62) (0.13) (0.09) 
      Colorectal 490 125.30 0.01 0.00 300 301.19 0.02 0.01 
  
(132.28) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(157.42) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Lung 517 142.41 0.01 0.00 364 331.37 0.02 0.01 
  (138.91) (0.01) (0.01)  (145.13) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Breast 506 119.67 0.01 0.00 346 358.11 0.02 0.01 
  
(123.33) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(182.80) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Prostate 462 100.95 0.01 0.00 272 283.06 0.02 0.00 
  
(108.69) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(164.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Non-Specialty Tier Plans 
       
      RA 114 171.44 0.07 0.07 52 351.45 0.11 0.09 
  
(154.64) (0.06) (0.09) 
 
(141.88) (0.06) (0.09) 
      MS 70 290.05 0.11 0.14 35 430.31 0.17 0.13 
  
(246.40) (0.14) (0.13) 
 
(187.96) (0.16) (0.16) 
      Colorectal 110 140.85 0.02 0.02 58 218.48 0.03 0.02 
  
(115.27) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(120.87) (0.02) (0.03) 
      Lung 114 153.06 0.02 0.02 63 223.87 0.03 0.02 
  
(117.74) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(124.47) (0.02) (0.03) 
      Breast 117 137.79 0.02 0.02 58 241.95 0.03 0.02 
  
(130.99) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(171.95) (0.02) (0.03) 
      Prostate 109 125.28 0.02 0.01 52 184.48 0.02 0.02 
  
(83.19) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(118.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
* Means presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
** Mean presented for plans with greater than 0% of drugs with the given tool. 
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increase to close to $300 in 2008. The average out-of-pocket costs for RA, for plans 
with a specialty tier, are much lower than the out-of-pocket costs for MS ($154.41 
compared to $318.05 in 2007). In contrast, the average out-of-pocket costs for these 
conditions imposed by plans with no specialty tier were generally higher than plans with 
a specialty tier, but only in 2007. In 2008, the reverse occurred; plans with a specialty 
tier had average cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs that was substantially higher 
than the cost sharing imposed by plans with no specialty tier. Finally, the table shows 
that the out-of-pocket costs increase substantially from 2007 to 2008, which likely 
reflects the change in CMS policy that increased the threshold for specialty tier eligibility 
from $500 to $600.  
Also of note, plans made little use of prior authorization and quantity limits in 
either year, although about 14-17% of MS drugs in both specialty tier and non-specialty 
tier plans in 2008 had prior authorization restrictions. Plans with no specialty tier 
appeared to use these tools at a slightly higher rate, especially for RA and MS. No plan 
for which there was any utilization of a specialty tier-eligible drug imposed step therapy 
restrictions in either year; therefore, step therapy is not represented in this table. 
5.4 Variable Definitions 
 The empirical analyses depend to a significant degree on the definition of the 
specific variables. First and foremost, a measure of specialty tier placement had to be 
developed in order to calculate the effect of tier placement on utilization and switching. 
First, a drug can only be eligible for placement on the specialty tier by having a monthly 
negotiated price greater than $600 ($500 in 2007). Because the project focuses on 
beneficiaries diagnosed with one of six conditions, only drugs used to treat those 
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conditions were considered as potentially eligible for the specialty tier. A three-step 
process was used to identify those drugs. 
Drugs Used to Treat Each Condition 
 First, the 2007 National Drug Database File from First Databank was used to 
identify those drugs used by patients diagnosed with one of the six conditions. These 
data contain NDC-level drug information including brand and generic name, chemical 
formulation, the class to which the drug belongs, and whether the drug is a maintenance 
drug. This database was first used to isolate all drugs used to treat the conditions via 
identification of disease descriptions matching those of the six conditions. The Lexicon 
Drug Database from Cerner Multum was also used to identify disease descriptions and 
J-Codes for the Part B substitution analysis. This database contains very similar 
information to the First Databank data, but may be considered more complete.  
Second, to ensure that all possible on-label treatments were included, the list 
was compared to treatments listed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
disease-specific organizations such as the Multiple Sclerosis Society. Drug names that 
did not appear on the original list as compiled from First Databank and (later) Lexicon 
were added to the list, and NDCs matching those drug names were pulled out of the two 
drug databases. 
 The third step in the process incorporated two additional data sources: data from 
the National Cancer Institute on drugs used by Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D 
who had been diagnosed with each type of cancer, and the drugs used by beneficiaries 
in the analysis sample. The first data were publicly available from the National Cancer 
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Institute web site,20 and used the SEER-Medicare data in order to provide a count, by 
NDC, of the number of claims filed in Part D for that particular NDC by beneficiaries 
diagnosed with each type of cancer. The second data were all NDCs used in 2006, 
2007, or 2008 by beneficiaries diagnosed with one of the six conditions, appearing in the 
Part D claims data. The new data were merged with the above list of drugs in order to 
capture all potential off-label uses of medications used to treat the six conditions. This is 
especially important in the case of cancer, as many medications for different types of 
cancer may not have an FDA-approved indication, but are still used to treat the given 
cancer. 
 In order to ensure that all appropriate drugs were captured, and that drugs used 
to treat other common chronic conditions, such as high cholesterol, were not included in 
the list, only drugs from the NCI list with more than 500 fills in a given year were included 
as potentially eligible. Then, all NDCs were merged with the data from First Databank 
and Lexicon to match them with the particular drug class to which they belong. Drugs 
were included as part of the overall list of drugs used to treat a given condition if they 
were: 1) used to treat a condition of interest, and 2) were part of a category or class of 
drug that was also used to treat the condition (i.e., antineoplastics).  
Identification of Drugs Eligible for the Specialty Tier 
 Once the list of drugs for each condition was finalized, those drugs eligible for the 
specialty tier were identified. Due to limitations with the Part D claims data, which only 
provide utilization and not the full formulary for each plan, a piecemeal approach was 
necessary for identification. In order to identify eligibility for the specialty tier, an estimate 
of the negotiated monthly price for the drug was necessary. A drug would be considered 
                                               
20 Data downloaded from: 
http://healthservices.cancer.gov/seermedicare/aboutdata/ndc_frequency_part_d.html, 26 February 2013 
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eligible (NDC-level) if the monthly price estimate was greater than $500 in 2007 and 
$600 in 2008. The First Databank and Lexicon data provided price estimates for the 
drugs, however upon comparison (NDC to NDC) they were very different. In addition, the 
price points in these databases were at the unit level, requiring an extrapolation of the 
appropriate monthly (30-day) dosage and quantity dispensed in a 30-day period in order 
to calculate an appropriate estimate of the monthly price.  
 Finally, the Part D claims data (for the entire 5% sample) were used to construct 
the subset of drugs eligible for the specialty tier. This was accomplished using the 
specialty tier identifier in the data, which provided the tier assigned as the specialty tier 
at the plan level, as well as the total cost of the drug, and the associated tier for the drug 
from the individual claims data. The total cost of the drug was normalized to a 30-day 
supply, and an average drug cost for a given NDC was calculated.21 Using these data, a 
two-phase decision process was used to determine eligibility: first, if a drug was 
assigned to the specialty tier by at least one plan in a given year (2007 or 2008), that 
drug (NDC) was considered eligible for the specialty tier; and second, if the average 
monthly cost of the drug was above the threshold for inclusion ($500 or $600), the drug 
was considered eligible for the specialty tier. The final list of drugs eligible for the 
specialty tier is presented in Appendix 1. Table 5.5 presents the number of NDCs eligible 
for the specialty tier for each year, by condition.22 
 The logic behind the selection process for specialty tier-eligible drugs is two-fold. 
First, if at least one Part D plan in fact placed the drug on the specialty tier in either year, 
                                               
21 A review of the data found that there was wide variation in the total cost of some drugs. In order to 
account for outliers, total drug costs outside of 3 standard deviations from the mean were excluded from the 
calculation of the mean for each NDC. 
22 The total number of NDCs for each year will not be equal to the sum of the columns, because there is 
significant overlap in the use of these drugs to treat multiple conditions. Please refer to the Appendix for 
further details on the number of NDCs eligible at the drug name level. 
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then it would be considered potentially eligible by any plan by virtue of price. And 
second, if the average monthly cost for the drug is above either threshold, then it can be 
considered potentially eligible. In other words, although the drug was not actually placed 
on the specialty tier by any plan in either year, it could have been by virtue of its price.  
Table 5.5: Number of NDCs Eligible for the Specialt y Tier, By Condition. 
  2007 2008 
RA 47 37 
MS 18 13 
Colorectal Cancer 209 151 
Lung Cancer 232 165 
Breast Cancer 225 159 
Prostate Cancer 212 143 
 
 This selection process is extremely important for the results of the analysis. If the 
above criteria do accurately capture the set of drugs eligible for the specialty tier, then 
the analyses will accurately reflect utilization likelihood, switching behavior, and 
expenditures as a result of tier placement decisions by these plans. However, if plans 
also placed other drugs on the specialty tier, because that plan negotiated a higher 
monthly price sufficient for eligibility for the specialty tier, the average total price criteria 
would not be sufficient to capture all drugs eligible for the specialty tier. Therefore, a 
sensitivity analysis was conducted (which is described in Chapters 6 and 7) that ran the 
same empirical analyses described in those chapters, but used a broader definition of 
specialty tier eligibility that included drugs for which the maximum price across all plans 
was greater than the threshold eligibility price. The results do change from one analysis 
to the other, but the magnitudes remain largely the same, suggesting the more restrictive 
definition is appropriate. 
 Once the drugs eligible for the specialty tier were identified, they were saved 
along with all potential substitutes (i.e., all other drugs used to treat the given condition). 
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This is due to the fact that beneficiaries may respond to tier placement or cost sharing 
incentives by using less expensive drugs for their condition. Chapter 6 also addresses 
analyses of the effects of substitution away from specialty tier eligible drugs and towards 
other drugs for the condition, covered under either Part D or Part B. 
A Proxy Variable for Tier Placement 
 One significant limitation in the claims data, which affects the empirical analyses, 
is the lack of information on the full plan formulary and tier placement strategy. Since the 
claims data only reflect actual utilization by beneficiaries, it is only possible to reconstruct 
the tier placement for a given drug or group of drugs used to treat a condition. This 
means that only drugs that have been used in a given year can be used to reconstruct 
the plan’s formulary. Further, since the goal is to measure the effect of specialty tier 
placement on utilization and switching, low utilization of drugs actually placed on the 
specialty tier result in very low percentages of specialty tier drugs, as shown in Table 
5.6. Of those plans with at least one eligible drug placed on the specialty tier, the  
Table 5.6: Percent of Eligible Drugs Placed on the Specialty Tier, for Plans with at 
Least One Drug Placed on Specialty Tier. 
  n Mean SD Median Min.  Max. 
2007 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 509 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Multiple Sclerosis 395 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.01 1.00 
Colorectal Cancer 470 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Lung Cancer 535 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Breast Cancer 508 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Prostate Cancer 443 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 1.00 
2008 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 568 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Multiple Sclerosis 432 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.01 1.00 
Colorectal Cancer 469 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.82 
Lung Cancer 552 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Breast Cancer 554 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Prostate Cancer 470 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.00 1.00 
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average percent of drugs placed on the specialty tier is still very low compared to the 
overall plan statistics in Chapter 4. Therefore, using the percent of eligible drugs placed 
on the specialty tier for the beneficiary’s condition as the independent variable of interest 
would be an inappropriate measure.23  
The solution to this problem is to find a proxy variable designed to accurately 
capture the tier placement imposed by the Part D plan for drugs eligible for the specialty 
tier and used to treat the given condition. To be a valid proxy, the variable should reflect 
differences across drugs placed on the specialty tier, compared to drugs not placed on 
the specialty tier. The variable should also reflect differences in the out-of-pocket 
spending required of beneficiaries for different drugs. This latter is important because 
simply using the percentage cost sharing for drugs used to treat a given condition does 
not incorporate the overall higher cost of specialty drugs into the independent variable of 
interest. It is precisely the higher cost of specialty drugs that makes placement on the 
specialty tier, with coinsurance rates as high as 33%, such a significant difference to the 
beneficiary when compared with, for example, cost sharing on the preferred brand tier of 
$40-50. 
 The variable chosen as a proxy for specialty tier placement is the average out-of-
pocket spending required by plans of beneficiaries for drugs eligible for the specialty tier. 
The average out-of-pocket cost imposed by a given plan for drugs both eligible for the 
specialty tier and used to treat a given condition is calculated as the average of all costs 
that could be expected to be borne by the beneficiary. Since other payments are 
sometimes made on behalf of beneficiaries in Part D, most commonly via the low-
income subsidy cost sharing amounts, but also via payments made by secondary 
                                               
23 Researchers are restricted from matching the plan-level formulary data to the beneficiary claims data, due 
to privacy restrictions. 
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payers, the out-of-pocket cost imposed by the plan is calculated as the sum of all 
variables for cost sharing that might be imposed on the beneficiary, if the beneficiary did 
not have a secondary benefit.  
The average out-of-pocket variable captures the variation in out-of-pocket 
spending across drugs used to treat each condition, as those drugs eligible for the  
Table 5.7: Average Monthly Out-of-Pocket Costs for Specialty Tier-Eligible Drugs, 
for Plans with Utilization of These Drugs. 
      n Mean SD Median  Min.  Max. 
Placed on Specialty Tier 
2007 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 328 376.15 126.19 371.71 14.08 1305.76 
Multiple Sclerosis 262 441.47 116.91 422.13 14.08 1098.09 
Colorectal Cancer 279 284.62 153.89 322.76 2.50 1305.76 
Lung Cancer 319 301.17 145.12 328.85 2.50 1305.76 
Breast Cancer 301 309.68 147.24 342.09 2.50 702.95 
Prostate Cancer 226 265.05 155.61 273.89 2.50 947.17 
2008 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 349 441.41 106.99 463.41 5.00 655.90 
Multiple Sclerosis 251 549.47 137.37 584.05 51.72 1829.49 
Colorectal Cancer 259 335.26 145.42 364.06 15.00 693.52 
Lung Cancer 334 357.20 130.77 370.61 15.00 666.77 
Breast Cancer 320 391.15 169.91 434.29 15.00 655.90 
Prostate Cancer 236 317.77 154.17 359.53 15.00 666.77 
      
Not Placed on Specialty Tier      
2007 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 522 72.60 102.29 30.00 0.00 886.83 
Multiple Sclerosis 191 124.49 203.35 9.66 0.00 901.33 
Colorectal Cancer 519 73.25 84.83 38.86 12.72 762.07 
Lung Cancer 527 76.34 87.26 40.00 12.72 762.07 
Breast Cancer 548 64.78 82.24 36.00 0.00 886.83 
Prostate Cancer 512 65.92 64.33 39.12 15.00 554.94 
2008 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 88 353.06 137.35 366.42 25.00 674.12 
Multiple Sclerosis 40 381.67 212.56 450.57 25.00 874.15 
Colorectal Cancer 157 210.24 158.14 161.35 4.00 629.02 
Lung Cancer 159 219.72 165.46 168.50 4.00 814.61 
Breast Cancer 122 188.88 169.59 130.43 4.00 814.61 
Prostate Cancer 125 156.46 136.72 107.00 4.00 629.02 
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specialty tier have much higher average out-of-pocket spending compared to drugs 
not eligible for the specialty tier (i.e., the substitutes). The variable also incorporates 
differences in cost sharing based on tier placement for specialty tier eligible drugs, as 
those drugs eligible for the specialty tier and placed on the specialty tier have much 
higher out-of-pocket amounts than those not placed on the specialty tier. Table 5.7 
shows the variation in average out-of-pocket requirements for eligible specialty drugs, 
separated by whether they were placed on the specialty tier or not. Of note, drugs not 
placed on the specialty tier in 2008 had much higher average cost sharing than those 
not placed on the specialty tier in 2007; this is likely due to the lower threshold price 
imposed by CMS for specialty tier eligibility in 2007. The average out-of-pocket cost for 
drugs imposed by the plan therefore serves as the independent variable of interest in the 
empirical analyses. 
5.5 Data Limitations 
 The claims data present some limitations in the ability to measure the effect of 
specialty tier placement on utilization, switching, and expenditures. The primary 
limitation is the fact that the data only contain utilization, and do not have the full 
formulary information behind each plan. This, as described above, required a 
reconstruction of the plan-level formularies using the observed utilization data, in order 
to estimate each plan’s out-of-pocket costs for beneficiaries enrolled in the plan. By 
being restricted solely to observed utilization, any effects of plan tier placement 
decisions on deterring beneficiary utilization will be reflected in the data itself. This 
means that, if the conceptual model holds and beneficiaries respond to higher cost 
sharing by reducing utilization, for some plans there may be no observed utilization. This 
means that potential users in plans with no utilization may not be included in the 
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regression analyses described in Chapters 6 and 7, due to a lack of ability to calculate 
the plan’s imposed cost sharing as a result of no utilization.  
 Given the complex nature of Part D, it is possible that other aspects of the 
benefit, other than the cost sharing, play a role in the utilization decision by beneficiaries 
as seen in the data. One such aspect of the benefit is the provision by Part D plans of 
coverage in the gap. The effect of such coverage, which can take the form of just 
generic, or generic and brand, or all formulary drugs, is to further reduce the 
beneficiary’s observed costs for his/her drugs. This in turn might induce additional 
utilization. However, a review of the association between gap coverage and out-of-
pocket costs shows that more plans that do offer gap coverage are missing observed 
utilization. More specifically, 19.08% of plans in 2007 (19.28% in 2008) offered gap 
coverage and were not missing out-of-pocket costs, while 34.83% of plans in 2007 
(26.95% in 2008) offered gap coverage and were missing costs. This suggests little 
association between offering gap coverage and additional utilization of specialty tier-
eligible drugs. 
 Table 5.8 describes the extent to which lack of observed utilization is a problem 
in reconstructing plan-imposed out-of-pocket cost sharing. The table separates 
beneficiaries with utilization and those without utilization, and details those with missing 
out-of-pocket costs. For beneficiaries who did not use a specialty tier-eligible drug in the 
MS/RA grouping, 11.4% in 2007 and 33.3% in 2008 had missing out-of-pocket costs. 
For those with cancer, 10.5% in 2007 and 37.0% in 2008 had missing out-of-pocket 
costs. If beneficiaries in plans with missing out-of-pocket costs are in fact responding to 
higher cost sharing by reducing (eliminating) utilization of these drugs, then the analyses 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 would underestimate the effects of tier placement by not 
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including observations of beneficiaries with no utilization, who are enrolled in plans 
that have imposed higher cost sharing on their medications. 
 There are two main implications of this limitation: first, as stated above, that 
estimates of utilization, number of fills, switching, and expenditures, are underestimates 
due to a lack of observed out-of-pocket costs for a large proportion of those with no 
utilization; and second, that it is not possible to calculate an accurate estimate of the 
elasticity of demand for beneficiaries for specialty drugs in Part D, because of the extent 
to which the data are missing. However, these estimates do provide some initial 
conclusions as to the effects of specialty tier placement on utilization, switching, and 
expenditures. Chapter 8, which concludes the dissertation, discusses some future 
extensions for this work that may be able to address the problem of missing data in the 
claims data. 
Table 5.8: Beneficiaries with Missing Out-of-Pocket  Costs at the Plan Level. 24 
    
Beneficiaries with 
Utilization 
Beneficiaries without 
Utilization 
  Total  Number 
With 
Missing 
OOP Costs Number 
With 
Missing 
OOP Costs 
2007 
MS / RA 14614 1160 80 13454 1531 
Cancers 44718 1985 124 42733 4489 
2008 
MS / RA 15651 1014 290 14637 4881 
Cancers 46883 654 182 46229 17117 
 
                                               
24 Beneficiaries with utilization may have missing plan-level out-of-pocket costs due to the fact that only 
those costs in the initial phase of the Part D benefit were counted in averaging the out-of-pocket costs. 
Some drugs are so expensive that beneficiaries would cross from the deductible into the initial coverage 
phase with one prescription; or from the deductible to the coverage gap. These costs are not included in the 
estimate. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 The empirical analyses examining the effect of tier placement on beneficiary 
demand for specialty drugs use claims data that required significant backwards 
engineering in order to generate the variables of interest. This chapter explained the 
rationale behind certain decisions made in order to calculate these variables, given the 
limitations inherent in the data. The primary limitation, that the data only provide 
utilization and do not give a broader understanding of the benefit design at the plan 
level, required the calculation of alternative variables in order to proxy for specialty tier 
placement for drugs used to treat the six conditions of interest. The following chapters 
describe the empirical analyses and results associated with the different measures of 
beneficiary response to plan tier placement for specialty drugs. 
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CHAPTER 6: BENEFICIARY UTILIZATION AND SWITCHING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the results of the beneficiary utilization and switching 
analyses. Part D plan tier placement decisions, as presented in Chapter 3, anticipate the 
potential effects of increased utilization and enrollment by beneficiaries who are more 
likely to use specialty drugs. As a result, Part D plans may choose to place specialty tier-
eligible drugs on a higher cost-sharing (specialty) tier in order to deter beneficiaries who 
are higher risk from either enrolling in the plan or utilizing these medications. Of note, the 
utilization of interest to the plan is either any utilization of the specialty tier-eligible drugs 
(compared to no utilization at all), or switching to another substitute drug, both of which 
are tested in this chapter. Part D plans also likely impose additional utilization 
management tools, especially prior authorization and quantity limits, in order to control to 
some extent their enrollees’ utilization patterns for more expensive medications. 
 Three specific hypotheses are tested in this chapter. The first hypothesis posits 
that beneficiaries who have been diagnosed with one of the specific conditions of 
interest will reduce their utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs in response to higher 
cost sharing as imposed by the plan. Thus, the expectation is that higher out-of-pockets 
costs as imposed by the plan would be negatively associated with the likelihood of 
utilization. The second hypothesis is that beneficiaries who use these medications 
respond to higher cost sharing by reducing the total number of medications they fill in a 
given year. This means that as out-of-pocket costs rise, the total number of 30-day 
normalized fills for a beneficiary declines.  
 Both of these two initial hypotheses test the elasticity of demand for specialty tier-
eligible drugs. If elasticity of demand is relatively high, and the beneficiary response is 
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negative as expected, the likelihood of utilization of specialty drugs would substantially 
decrease the higher the out-of-pocket costs for these drugs. However, in the absence of 
therapeutic substitutes, and in the case where beneficiaries need these medications to 
manage chronic illness, the elasticity of demand may be relatively low (i.e., inelastic). 
While under some assumptions this might imply that Part D plans should impose no cost 
sharing for these drugs, in the presence of adverse selection and the inaccuracy of the 
risk adjustment model, plans likely impose higher cost sharing in an effort to avoid moral 
hazard or adverse selection. As stated at the end of Chapter 5, the data limitations make 
it difficult to draw concrete conclusions as to the elasticity of demand associated with 
these medications; however, the initial results are presented below. 
 The third hypothesis is that beneficiaries diagnosed with one of these conditions 
will be more likely to change plans in response to higher cost sharing for specialty tier-
eligible drugs. This hypothesis assumes that beneficiaries may be able to access lower 
cost sharing for their medications by enrolling in another plan, which may not be the 
case. However, in general, beneficiaries would be expected to change plans to the 
extent they seek lower cost sharing for their medications. 
 The next section presents the empirical approach to the utilization and switching 
analyses. The third section describes the instrumental variables approach, which is 
designed to address the endogeneity problem. The third and fourth sections present and 
discuss the descriptive statistics and results, and the subsequent sections present 
additional analyses designed to test, first, alternative sources for medications (Part D 
and Part B), second, the effect of such cost sharing on beneficiaries eligible for the LIS, 
and third, the effect of changing the definition of specialty tier-eligible drug on the results. 
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6.2 Empirical Approach 
Utilization 
 The beneficiary utilization analysis was conducted in two parts. The first part 
addresses whether or not a beneficiary is less likely to initiate treatment with a specialty 
drug if his/her plan has placed the drug on the specialty tier. The analysis separates 
beneficiaries diagnosed with one of the six conditions into two groups: those diagnosed 
with RA or MS, and those diagnosed with cancer. This is due to the fact that RA and MS 
may be considered substantially different from cancer in terms of treatment timeframe 
and length; RA and MS are chronic conditions and cancer is often treated over a few to 
several month period and then treatment is stopped until such time as the cancer returns 
(if it returns). Therefore, it might be expected that patients with RA or MS might have a 
different demand profile compared to those beneficiaries diagnosed with cancer, and in 
fact, the results bear out this theory. 
 The utilization analyses test the likelihood of initiating treatment with a specialty 
drug as a function of the average out-of-pocket cost sharing amount charged by the plan 
for specialty tier-eligible drugs used to treat the beneficiary’s condition, controlling for 
other covariates. Utilization is measured by year (2007 and 2008) to determine whether 
beneficiaries in the sample filled a prescription for a specialty tier-eligible drugs while 
enrolled in a given plan. 
 The likelihood of any use of a specialty drug is measured via logistic regression, 
where the dependent variable of interest measures whether or not the beneficiary filled 
at least one prescription for any specialty tier-eligible drug (used to treat any of the six 
conditions) during the year. The equation for the logistic regression model for any 
utilization is as follows: 
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where the dependent variable of interest takes on a value of 1 if beneficiary i had any 
utilization of a specialty medication during time t, and 0 if the beneficiary did not have 
any utilization. The independent variable of interest is *)'!-+, which is the overall 
average out-of-pocket cost sharing imposed by the beneficiary’s plan for drugs eligible 
for the specialty tier that are used to treat the beneficiary’s condition. This average out-
of-pocket cost is calculated regardless as to the tier placement decision made by the 
plan, and is used as a proxy variable for specialty tier placement as described in Chapter 
5. In addition, the analysis controls for the average plan out-of-pocket costs for Part D 
substitutes, in order to account for the availability of an alternative option. The vector 
/+0 . is a vector of controls representing characteristics for the plan in which the 
beneficiary is enrolled. These controls are: plan total premium, deductible, whether the 
plan offers gap coverage, whether the plan is offered nationally, whether the plan is 
eligible for auto-enrollment in the region, and three specific controls representing the 
percent of eligible specialty drugs for which the plan imposed prior authorization, step 
therapy edits, and/or quantity limits. 
 The vector 1+0 . represents a vector of controls for beneficiary-specific 
characteristics, including age range (in 5-year increments), gender, race, and three 
lagged measures of beneficiary risk. The first two risk measures are the number of 
outpatient and inpatient visits each beneficiary had in the previous year, regardless of 
the reason for the visit (i.e., whether the visit was associated with the RA or MS 
diagnosis), and the last is the Part D risk score for each beneficiary. The Part D risk 
score was calculated based on the 2012 Part D risk score model, accessible on the 
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CMS web site,25 using inpatient and outpatient Medicare claims data for 2006 through 
2008. In addition, a dummy variable was included to control for whether or not a 
beneficiary received cost sharing assistance outside the Part D benefit (this variable was 
solely applied to non-LIS beneficiary analyses).  
The last vector 29+0 . represents a measure of plan competition in the region in the 
given year. Variables included in this vector are average regional premium, average 
percent of specialty tier-eligible drugs placed on the specialty tier within the region, 
average deductible, percent of plans below the LIS benchmark premium, and the 
percent of plans offered nationally. Since beneficiaries have the option to change plans 
each year, it is important to control for the diversity of options available in a given region. 
 Taken together, all plan-related variables serve to control for other factors 
contributing to the beneficiary’s choice to utilize a given specialty tier-eligible medication. 
Beneficiary controls account for additional risk factors such as age, gender, and specific 
measures of risk in order to further ensure an appropriate measure of the association 
between utilization and out-of-pocket cost sharing for a given drug. The hypothesis is 
that higher cost sharing imposed by the plan for drugs eligible for the specialty tier and 
used to treat the beneficiary’s condition is associated with lower likelihood of utilization of 
specialty drugs. 
Number of Fills 
 The second utilization analysis addresses whether or not the overall number of 
specialty tier-eligible prescriptions filled by beneficiaries in a given year is affected by tier 
placement. While previous preliminary work (Danzon and Taylor, 2010) found that total 
                                               
25 The risk score model used for this analysis is the 2012 model, which takes into account whether or not a 
beneficiary is eligible for the LIS, and whether the beneficiary is institutionalized. The details and a 
downloadable version of the risk score model are available at: http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-
Plans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Risk_adjustment.html, accessed on 1 March 2013. 
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overall annual spending by beneficiaries did not differ substantially when comparing 
plan tier placement decisions, beneficiaries may not be aware of this and may therefore 
vary utilization based not only on tier placement (cost sharing) but also upon entering the 
coverage gap of the benefit. Given the potential variation in overall utilization, the second 
analysis estimates a count data model designed to show whether or not the overall 
number of high-cost prescriptions filled by beneficiaries varies by cost sharing, given that 
a beneficiary has utilized at least one specialty tier-eligible drug. The equation for 
estimating this model is as follows: 
:7;)  <!!5+  .6  *)'!-+.  *75+.8  /+0 .  1+0 .  29+0 .  3 
where the dependent variable is the total number of specialty drug prescriptions filled by 
the beneficiary, normalized to a 30-day supply, and the independent variables are the 
same as those for the utilization analysis, as described above. This model is estimated 
using a Poisson model, as beneficiaries are only included in the estimation if they have 
any utilization during the year and as a result there is no need to account for an 
excessive amount of zeros in the data. The coefficient on the specialty out-of-pocket 
variable is expected to be negatively associated with increased numbers of prescriptions 
filled, as the higher cost sharing is hypothesized to reduce the overall number of 
prescriptions filled by beneficiaries over the course of the year. 
 In order to account for the potential confounding effects of the coverage gap and 
catastrophic phase of the Part D benefit on the association between the number of fills 
and out-of-pocket costs in the initial coverage phase, an alternative specification was run 
that solely uses the number of (30-day normalized) fills per beneficiary in the initial 
coverage phase of the benefit. The results of this analysis are presented in Section A.1 
of the Appendix. 
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Switching 
 The switching analysis examines the effect of cost sharing for specialty tier 
eligible drugs on the likelihood that a beneficiary switches plans. The analysis is still 
separated into two groups, one for beneficiaries with RA or MS, and the other for those 
with cancer. A logistic regression model used the following equation: 
*#+  .6  *)'!-+.  /+0 .  1+0 .  29+0 .  3 
where the dependent variable takes on a 1 if the beneficiary switched plans from 2007 to 
2008, and a zero if not. The independent variables are the same as those described 
above for the utilization analyses. 
 Of note, the Part D claims data do have a limitation with how they track plans 
across years of data. Since a given insurer can offer different numbers of plans in 
different years, the plan ID (the identifier for a given plan in a given region, in 
combination with the contract ID) might change from year to year, even though the plan 
is essentially the same plan. In order to account for the potential for higher numbers of 
switching in the data than actually occurred in reality, due to the way the plans are 
assigned the ID, the above equation is run for both plan-level and contract-level 
switching. This measures, first, whether a beneficiary switched to another plan (which 
could be within the same contract), and second, whether the beneficiary stayed with the 
same contract (insurer) but possibly switched to a different plan within that contract. The 
results of the switching analysis conducted at the contract level show no significant 
effects of mean out-of-pocket costs on switching, suggesting that the overall effects at 
the plan-level are overstated. 
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6.3 Addressing the Endogeneity Problem 
 The above analyses take as their primary objective the determination of the 
association between the plan’s tier placement decision and a variety of beneficiary 
decisions resulting from that decision. One potential concern with these analyses is that, 
given the assumptions surrounding the manner by which the plan determines tier 
placement for specialty drugs, there may be endogeneity in the plan’s tier placement 
decision and the beneficiary’s reaction to tier placement. This arises due to the fact that 
the plan takes into account potential enrollees’ reactions to the tier placement in 
establishing the formulary, and as a result the formulary design anticipates the specific 
beneficiary response that is the key dependent variable in the analysis. Thus, the tier 
placement as represented in the empirical analyses is correlated with utilization and 
enrollment decisions made by the beneficiary. 
 In order to address this concern, an instrumental variables approach is applied. 
The key to finding an appropriate instrument lies in finding one that is correlated with the 
plan’s specialty tier placement decision (in this case, the average out-of-pocket cost for 
eligible drugs), but not correlated with the beneficiary’s utilization and enrollment 
decisions. As such, one can imagine that the plan might consider all specialty drugs in a 
similar manner when deciding on specialty tier placement, possibly due to the high 
negotiated monthly price for these drugs. This means that the decision by the plan to 
place cancer drugs, MS drugs, and RA drugs on the specialty tier may be highly 
correlated. This is plausible in light of the conceptual model, which finds that the cost of 
the specialty drug contributes a great deal to the tier placement decision (plan 
contribution decision).  
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 However, to the extent that there is little overlap in utilization of medications for 
each condition, beneficiaries would likely make their utilization decision solely based on 
tier placement for the specialty drugs used to treat their specific condition. As such, the 
instrumental variable used in this analysis is the plan’s out-of-pocket spending 
requirement for beneficiaries for eligible drugs that are not in the class of drugs of 
interest. More specifically, average RA out-of-pocket costs are used to instrument for 
cancer drug costs, and cancer drug average costs are used to instrument for both RA 
and MS costs. 
 The decision by the plan is plausibly correlated with the decision to place 
specialty drugs used to treat other conditions on the specialty tier at the plan level, but is 
not associated with a beneficiary’s decision, because the condition for which the 
beneficiary has been diagnosed does not imply utilization of the majority of drugs in that 
other class. One important question is the extent to which treatments overlap across 
these conditions. The most significant overlaps do appear to occur across the four types 
of cancer (not surprisingly); as a result, the four cancers were groups together into one 
cancer category for the calculation of the instrumental variable for RA and MS. The 
extent to which treatments overlap across the three large categories (RA, MS, and 
cancer) appears to be restricted to a minority of treatments; thus, the instrumental 
variable approach used here appears to be valid. 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for utilization and switching behavior are presented in Table 
6.1. Relatively small proportions of beneficiaries diagnosed with one of the conditions of 
interest actually had any utilization of at least one eligible drug in both years. The highest 
percentage utilization was observed in MS patients, with about 14% of those diagnosed 
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with MS using specialty tier-eligible drugs in each year (non-LIS). The lowest 
utilization rates were for non-LIS breast cancer patients, with fewer than 1% of patients 
using eligible drugs in each year. Rates for those patients eligible for the LIS were 
somewhat higher, which is to be expected given that LIS patients are charged 
significantly lower cost sharing for their medications than non-LIS beneficiaries. 
 Also presented in Table 6.1 are descriptive statistics related to enrollees’ 
utilization of drugs that can be considered substitutes for the eligible drugs. These drugs 
are either lower-priced therapeutic alternatives covered under Part D, or drugs that can 
be administered in a physician’s office and are therefore covered under Part B. 
Utilization (for non-LIS beneficiaries) for Part D substitutes is much higher than for 
eligible drugs, ranging from 38.53% (2007) for prostate cancer patients, to 84.37% 
(2007) for RA patients. Utilization for Part B drugs, however, is lower than for Part D 
substitutes, with rates of about 6.6-8.3% for RA and MS, up to 13.96% for lung cancer 
patients.26  
 The final descriptive statistic in Table 6.1 presents results for beneficiary 
switching from 2007 to 2008. The table presents the percent of beneficiaries, both LIS 
and non-LIS, who switched plans from 2007 to 2008. Of note, these switching statistics 
are for changing plans, not contracts. Switching rates are much lower for non-LIS 
beneficiaries compared to LIS beneficiaries, which is to be expected since dually eligible 
beneficiaries (a large subset of beneficiaries receiving the LIS) are allowed to change 
plans every month if they choose. Switching for non-LIS beneficiaries ranges from 
11.10% (lung cancer patients) to 14.86% (breast cancer patients).  
                                               
26 Low utilization of Part B drugs for these groups is in general surprising, as most cancer drugs are 
dispensed and/or administered in an outpatient setting covered under Part B of Medicare. It may be that 
there is a problem with the data making it more difficult to identify utilization of Part B drugs. 
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6.5 Results 
Any Utilization 
 Table 6.2 presents the results of the analysis estimating the effect of cost sharing 
on any utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs. The coefficients are marginal effects; 
because the marginal effects for average out-of-pocket costs for the specialty tier-eligible 
drugs were so small, each coefficient is multiplied by 100 in the table to show the effect 
of a $100 increase in the average out-of-pocket cost. Out-of-pocket costs are significant 
predictors of utilization for cancer drugs in both years; for 2007, a $100 increase in the 
out-of-pocket cost would lead to a 0.9% reduction in the likelihood of utilization; for 2008, 
a $100 increase would lead to a 0.1% reduction in the likelihood of utilization. The 
coefficients for mean out-of-pocket costs for RA and MS are positive and significant in 
2007, indicating that an increase of $100 in cost sharing leads to an increase of 0.5% in 
the likelihood of utilization. This is counterintuitive and likely the result of data limitations 
discussed earlier, as well as the fact that the normalized deductible is highly correlated 
with cost sharing for specialty drugs (specifically, those placed on the specialty tier).  
Of note, the average out-of-pocket costs for Part D substitutes are a positive and 
significant predictor of utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs for MS and RA 
beneficiaries in both years, and for cancer patients in 2007. This means that an increase 
of $10 in the average out-of-pocket cost for Part D substitutes increases the likelihood of 
utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs by 2% in each year for RA/MS patients, 
respectively.  
Of the demographic variables, age and race are significant predictors, but not 
consistently across condition groupings and years. Outpatient visits are a significant 
positive predictor of utilization for cancer patients in both years, and for MS/RA patients 
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in 2007, but the magnitude is very small. Risk score is a significant positive predictor 
of utilization for MS and RA (both years), and a significant negative predictor for cancer 
patients in 2007.  
Table 6.2: Logistic Regression Results for Any Util ization by Non-LIS Beneficiaries 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.005** 0.000 -0.009*** -0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Average Subs OOP 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Any Other Costs 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.007** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Race 0.000 0.007 0.013*** 0.004*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) 
Inpatient Visits -0.008** -0.003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Outpatient Visits 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk Score 0.03*** 0.042*** -0.023*** 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) 
Plan Deductible / Region Ded. 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
National PDP 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region Average OOP -0.005 -0.005 -0.004** 0.002 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
n 7569  6304  29119 29164 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Table 6.3 presents the results for the instrumental variables regression for any 
utilization. A probit model was used for the instrumental variables regression. The 
marginal effects are presented, with the marginal effects for the mean out-of-pocket 
costs multiplied again by 100. Results for cancer utilization show a significant negative 
relationship between out-of-pocket costs for eligible drugs and the likelihood of 
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utilization, for both years; an increase of $100 in the out-of-pocket cost for eligible 
specialty drugs results in an 16.2% reduction in the likelihood of utilization in 2007, and a 
Table 6.3: Instrumental Variables Results for Any U tilization by Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.047* 0.16** -0.162*** -0.351*** 
 (0.025) (0.063) (0.039) (0.092) 
Average Subs OOP -0.123*** -0.15*** 0.054*** -0.021 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.01) (0.018) 
Any Other Costs 0.007 0.088 0.192*** 0.111* 
 (0.068) (0.077) (0.034) (0.062) 
Age -0.079** -0.035 0.001 -0.029 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.02) (0.033) 
Race 0.004*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inpatient Visits 0.263*** 0.454*** -0.342*** 0.044 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.059) (0.094) 
Outpatient Visits 0.014*** 0.013* 0.018*** 0.014 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) 
Risk Score -0.003 0.003 0.019 0.287*** 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.061) (0.087) 
Plan Deductible / Region Ded. 0.025 0.077** 0.010 -0.088*** 
 (0.019) (0.03) (0.012) (0.033) 
National PDP 0.025 0.077** 0.01 -0.088*** 
 (0.019) (0.03) (0.012) (0.033) 
Region Average OOP -0.040 -0.184* -0.05* 0.205** 
(0.048) (0.096) (0.029) (0.1) 
n 7560  6284  28812 21071 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
35.1% reduction in utilization likelihood in 2008. This suggests that beneficiaries 
diagnosed with cancer are responding to plan tier placement decisions by reducing 
utilization. However, by contrast, patients diagnosed with RA and MS show a significant 
positive effect of mean out-of-pocket costs on the likelihood of utilization for both years; 
this is counterintuitive and likely is due to both the limitations in the data and the fact that 
the normalized deductible is highly correlated with the cost sharing for the specialty tier. 
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 Also of note in the instrumental variables results, the average out-of-pocket 
charge for substitutes is a significant positive predictor of utilization for eligible drugs for 
cancer patients in 2007; and a significant negative predictor of utilization for RA and MS 
patients in both years. Also, cost sharing assistance by other parties, which served to 
reduce the patients’ out-of-pocket payments, was a positive, significant predictor of 
utilization for cancer patients in both years. Cost sharing assistance increased the 
likelihood of utilization by 19.2% (2007) and 11.1% (2008) for those who received 
assistance, compared to those who did not. There was no significant effect for RA and 
MS patients. 
Number of Fills 
 Table 6.4 presents the results for the Poisson regression of number of fills, for 
those with any utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs. Again, the coefficients for mean 
out-of-pocket costs were very low, so they have been multiplied by 100 in order to give a 
sense of the magnitude of marginal effects when out-of-pocket costs increase by $100. 
Results indicate no significant association between mean out-of-pocket costs charged by 
the plan, and the total number of fills for a beneficiary. Of the other variables in the 
analysis, risk score is consistently positive and usually significant, especially in the case  
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Table 6.4: Poisson Regression Results for Number of  Fills by Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
  Number of Fills 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.062 -0.199 -0.034 -0.048 
 (0.158) (0.224) (0.126) (0.271) 
Average Subs OOP 0.061** 0.021 -0.01 -0.168 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.039) (0.154) 
Any Other Costs -1.108 -0.885 1.001* 0.099 
 (0.893) (1.015) (0.601) (0.878) 
Age -0.462*** -0.29 0.061 -0.257 
 (0.174) (0.216) (0.074) (0.208) 
Race 0.022 0.17 0.092 -0.532 
 (0.576) (0.524) (0.224) (0.69) 
Inpatient Visits -0.357 -0.279 -0.202 -0.079 
 (0.286) (0.384) (0.15) (0.247) 
Outpatient Visits -0.017* -0.007 0.001 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.008) 
Risk Score 1.348* 0.835 1.368*** 1.707*** 
 (0.727) (0.723) (0.348) (0.461) 
Prior Authorization 0.747 -1.994 -5.457 18.411 
 (2.837) (3.299) (5.698) (13.922) 
Premium -0.001 0.002 0.022*** 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.01) (0.007) (0.017) 
National PDP 0.176 -0.316 -0.093 -0.348 
 (0.423) (0.744) (0.238) (1.022) 
Regional Deductible 0.012 -0.019 0.01 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.02) (0.012) (0.025) 
Region Average OOP 0.001 -0.001 0.008** 0.004 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
n 501  344  1045  210  
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Table 6.5 presents the marginal effects for the instrumental variables regression 
for number of fills. This regression was conducted as a two-stage analysis in Stata; the 
first stage was an OLS regression predicting the mean out-of-pocket costs at the plan 
level for each condition, using the instrumental variable. This stage used bootstrap 
standard errors to calculate the predictions. The second stage ran a Poisson regression 
for the count data model, using the predictions from the first stage.  
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Table 6.5: Instrumental Variable Results for Number  of Fills by Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
  Number of Fills 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.187 0.031 0.057 -1.59 
 (0.2) (0.389) (0.138) (1.198) 
Average Subs OOP 0.044* 0.013 -0.045 0.016 
 (0.026) (0.036) (0.037) (0.199) 
Any Other Costs -1.045 -0.731 1.044* -0.361 
 (0.895) (1.024) (0.603) (0.774) 
Age -0.444*** -0.223 0.053 -0.209 
 (0.175) (0.212) (0.075) (0.232) 
Race 0.008 0.032 0.108 -1.189 
 (0.591) (0.555) (0.225) (0.76) 
Inpatient Visits -0.281 -0.289 -0.256* -0.215 
 (0.3) (0.385) (0.153) (0.283) 
Outpatient Visits -0.018* -0.01 0.001 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008) 
Risk Score 1.294* 0.853 1.409*** 1.373*** 
 (0.736) (0.712) (0.363) (0.524) 
Prior Authorization 1.373 -3.387 -5.508 16.366 
 (2.798) (3.1) (5.753) (13.911) 
Premium -0.001 0.001 0.026*** 0.038** 
 (0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.018) 
National PDP 0.043 -0.155 -0.105 1.034 
 (0.43) (0.783) (0.238) (1.021) 
Regional Deductible 0.015 -0.019 0.011 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.02) (0.012) (0.027) 
Region Average OOP 0.001 -0.003 0.008* 0.014 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) 
n 514 351 1049 214 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 The results with the instrumental variable approach are not significant for any 
group or year of the data. These results suggest that patients do not respond to out-of-
pocket cost sharing in determining the number of fills. These results are surprising, as 
the expectation would be that patients would reduce the number of fills in response to 
higher cost sharing. However, it may be that the structure of the Part D benefit, with the 
coverage gap and catastrophic cost sharing, plays a role in determining patient 
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utilization levels.27 Perhaps patients do not alter the number of prescriptions they fill 
if they know they will exceed the catastrophic threshold and thereby reduce significantly 
their cost sharing for the rest of the year. The separate analysis looking solely at the 
number of prescriptions filled in the initial coverage period looks at this effect and is 
presented in the Appendix. 
 Since the instrumental variables approach for the number of fills analysis 
involved a two-stage regression in Stata, which might result in standard errors that do 
not sufficiently account for the two-stage approach, bootstrapped confidence intervals 
were calculated. They are presented in Table 6.6, and reflect the same results as seen 
above: no condition/year combination is significant for mean out-of-pocket costs. 
Table 6.6: Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals for th e Instrumental Variables 
Estimation of Number of Fills, for Non-LIS Benefici aries. 
  MS / RA Cancers 
 Mean OOP Costs Lower Upper Lower Upper 
2007 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.003 
2008 -0.008 0.008 -0.097 0.012 
 
Switching 
 Table 6.7 presents the results of the switching analysis, with the marginal effects 
for average out-of-pocket costs again multiplied by 100 due to very small coefficients. 
The results indicate a significant positive effect of average out-of-pocket costs for eligible 
drugs on the likelihood of switching, but for different groups and in different years only.  
For MS and RA patients, an increase of $100 in the out-of-pocket cost for drugs leads to 
no significant increase in the likelihood of switching plans from 2007 to 2008, while a 
$100 increase in the out-of-pocket cost leads to a 0.8% increase in the likelihood of 
switching for cancer patients.  
                                               
27 Among non-LIS beneficiaries who used at least one specialty tier-eligible drug, 65.75% entered 
catastrophic (MS/RA patients) in 2007; 76.68% in 2008. For non-LIS cancer patients with utilization, 31.17% 
(2007) and 73.03% (2008) entered catastrophic 
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Table 6.7: Logistic Regression Results for Switchin g Plans, Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
  MS/RA Cancers 
Mean OOP Costs 0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Average Subs OOP -0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Any Other Costs 0.214*** 0.24*** 
 (0.023) (0.013) 
Age -0.004* -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Race -0.021* 0.009* 
 (0.011) (0.005) 
Inpatient Visits -0.01*** -0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Outpatient Visits 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk Score 0.031*** 0.013** 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
Prior Authorization 0.142*** 0.505*** 
 (0.046) (0.087) 
Premium 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
National PDP 0.013** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Regional Deductible 0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Region Average OOP 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
n 7569 29119 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Also of note, having another source of assistance for cost sharing significantly 
increases the likelihood of switching, with beneficiaries diagnosed with RA or MS 21.4% 
more likely to switch plans if they have cost sharing assistance from another source; 
those with cancer are 24% more likely to switch. In addition, having a higher risk score 
increases the likelihood of switching, as does the presence of prior authorization for 
drugs eligible for the specialty tier, and a higher premium. All of this suggests that a 
variety of factors contribute to a beneficiary’s likelihood of switching plans. 
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Table 6.8 presents the results for switching using the instrumental variable 
approach. This approach uses a probit model to estimate the second-stage regression; 
again, the coefficients for average out-of-pocket cost are very small, so they have been 
multiplied by 100. Results still show a significant positive relationship between average 
out-of-pocket cost and the likelihood of switching for cancer patients, with an increase of 
$100 in out-of-pocket costs increasing the likelihood of switching by 8.5% for cancer 
patients. The risk score still positively and significantly increases the likelihood of  
Table 6.8: Instrumental Variables Results for Switc hing, Non-LIS Beneficiaries 
  MS/RA Cancers 
Mean OOP Costs 0.010 0.085*** 
 (0.025) (0.02) 
Age -0.032** -0.041*** 
 (0.016) (0.008) 
Race -0.135* 0.091*** 
 (0.081) (0.034) 
Inpatient Visits -0.081*** -0.068*** 
 (0.031) (0.019) 
Outpatient Visits 0.003*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Risk Score 0.252*** 0.096** 
 (0.079) (0.041) 
Substitutes OOP -0.025*** -0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Any Other Costs 0.945*** 1.008*** 
 (0.071) (0.037) 
Prior Authorization 1.003*** 3.641*** 
 (0.365) (0.629) 
Premium 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
National PDP 0.126*** 0.258*** 
 (0.045) (0.023) 
Regional Deductible 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Region Average OOP 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
n 7560 28812 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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switching, and the presence of cost sharing assistance is still a positive and 
significant predictor of switching for both groups. 
 6.6 Testing the Instrumental Variable 
 The primary means for testing the instrumental variable is the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity (see for example Wooldridge, 2002). This test was run 
using OLS in Stata for each of the instrumental variable analyses presented above. The 
results of the test are presented in Table 6.9. As the table shows, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is rejected at the 0.10 level for all 2008 MS/RA analyses, and not for the 
2007 analyses. This suggests that the instrumental variable used in the MS/RA analyses 
is appropriate for one year of the data. The results are somewhat more mixed for the 
cancer analyses, with only the switching analysis significant at the 0.01 level, and the 
2007 any utilization analysis significant at the 0.1 level. This suggests that using MS and 
RA out-of-pocket costs as an instrument for cancer costs is an inappropriate method, 
while the reverse (using cancer for MS/RA) is valid. 
Table 6.9: Results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test of  the Instrumental Variables 
Approach, for Non-LIS Beneficiaries. 1 
  Any Utilization Number of Fills Switch Plan  
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
RA/MS 2.35 3.25 3.79 6.36 0.42 9.29 
(0.125) (0.072) (0.052) (0.012) (0.518) (0.002) 
Cancers 2.8 1.4 2.19 0.96 7.85 31.29 
  (0.094) (0.237) (0.139) (0.327) (0.005) (0.000) 
1 Test statistic presented with the p-value in parentheses. 
 
6.7 Substitution Effects 
 The effects described above may be affected to the extent that Medicare Part D 
beneficiaries have lower-cost alternatives available. The most likely lower-cost 
alternatives are other, less-expensive Part D drugs, or drugs covered under the Part B 
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benefit and therefore administered in a physician’s office. Substitutes under Part D 
may be placed on a lower cost-sharing tier, which provide beneficiaries with access to 
drugs used to treat their condition at a lower out-of-pocket price. On average, substitutes 
(i.e., those drugs not deemed eligible for the specialty tier, using the above definition) 
within Part D are less expensive and have lower copayments than those drugs eligible 
for the specialty tier. For Part B drugs, Medicare beneficiaries are charged 20% 
coinsurance with no catastrophic limit on spending, but many have supplementary 
insurance (Medicaid or private). As such, these two sources of substitutes may impact 
Medicare Part D beneficiary utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs. 
 This analysis examines the likelihood of Medicare beneficiaries within the sample 
to use substitutes, first within Part D, and second, within Part B. The two analyses use a 
logistic regression approach, with the following equation: 
*757)5 45)+  .6  *)'!-+.  *75+.8  /+0 .  1+0 .  29+0 .  3 
where the dependent variable takes on a 1 if the beneficiary used a substitute within Part 
D (or Part B, for the second analysis), and a 0 if not. The independent variables are the 
same as described in the any utilization analysis, above. Utilization for Part B is 
determined using the Part B outpatient claims, which are matched to J-Codes obtained 
from the Lexicon data for drugs used to treat each condition. 
Results 
 Table 6.10 presents the results of the substitution analysis for Part D alternatives. 
As before, the marginal effects for mean out-of-pocket costs are multiplied by 100 due to 
their small magnitudes. The results indicate that an increase in the mean out-of-pocket 
cost for specialty tier-eligible drugs significantly reduces the likelihood of utilization of 
Part D substitutes for MS and RA patients, but significantly increases the likelihood of 
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utilization for cancer patients. The latter result is as expected, as it can be 
hypothesized that an increase in cost sharing of the alternative would increase the 
likelihood of use of less-expensive substitutes. However, the former result is 
counterintuitive, as it suggests that an increase in the out-of-pocket costs for specialty 
tier-eligible drugs decreases the likelihood of utilization of alternatives. It is unclear why  
Table 6.10: Logistic Regression Results for Substit ution within Part D, Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs -0.008* -0.014** 0.018*** 0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Average Subs OOP -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.003** (0.000) 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Any Other Costs -0.036* -0.013 0.072*** 0.069*** 
 (0.019) (0.02) (0.013) (0.014) 
Age -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.005** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Race -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) 
Inpatient Visits -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.028*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Outpatient Visits 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk Score -0.011 0.012 0.063*** 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) 
Prior Authorization -0.031 -0.042 0.117 -0.003 
 (0.069) (0.086) (0.158) (0.189) 
Premium 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
National PDP -0.010 0.047** -0.002 -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.02) (0.006) (0.012) 
Regional Deductible 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region Average OOP 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 7569  6304  29119 21964 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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this is the case. Also of note, the average cost of substitutes generally reduces the 
likelihood of utilization of those same substitutes, but is only significant for MS and RA 
patients and cancer patients (2007). 
 Table 6.11 presents the results of the substitution analysis for Part B drugs. The 
marginal effects coefficients for mean out-of-pocket costs were also multiplied by 100, 
similar to previous analyses. All marginal effects, except for 2008 MS/RA patients, are  
Table 6.11: Logistic Regression Results for Substit ution to Part B Drugs, for Non-
LIS Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Average Subs OOP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Any Other Costs 0.005 -0.001 0.026*** 0.008 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age -0.008*** -0.005* -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Race -0.001 -0.011 0.008** -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inpatient Visits -0.012*** -0.005 0.005*** 0.004** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Outpatient Visits 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk Score -0.025** -0.005 -0.045*** -0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) 
Prior Authorization -0.092** -0.032 -0.133* 0.119 
 (0.046) (0.06) (0.077) (0.093) 
Premium 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
National PDP 0.015** 0.006 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.006) 
Regional Deductible 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Region Average OOP 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 7569  6304  29119 21964 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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positive, but they are only significant for cancer patients in 2008. For these patients, 
a $100 increase in the out-of-pocket charge for specialty tier-eligible drugs increased the 
likelihood of utilization of Part B substitutes by 0.2%. In addition, assistance with cost 
sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs in Part D increased the likelihood of Part B 
utilization for cancer patients, though only 2007 is significant. Additional assistance with 
Part D costs did not affect the likelihood of Part B utilization for MS and RA patients. The 
first result (an increase in the likelihood of Part B use for cancer patients in 2008) is 
surprising, as cost reductions for patients for Part D specialty tier-eligible drugs would be 
expected to increase the likelihood of utilization of those drugs. It might be possible that 
for cancer drugs, even additional cost-sharing assistance does not reduce the out-of-
pocket costs for patients in Part D sufficiently to encourage utilization of Part B drugs. 
Taken together, the analyses of the substitution effects for Part D and Part B do 
suggest that cancer patients respond to cost sharing for eligible specialty tier drugs in 
Part D by substituting away from those drugs to others in either Part D or Part B. 
However, the responses differ by condition, suggesting that the structure of drug cost 
sharing by condition, and the availability of substitutes across the different Parts of 
Medicare, may be sufficiently different so as to encourage different utilization responses.  
6.8 Sensitivity Analyses 
Low-Income Subsidy Beneficiaries 
 The first set of sensitivity analyses were designed to test the model on low-
income subsidy (LIS) beneficiaries. These beneficiaries are expected to have no 
significant response to changes in cost sharing for specialty drugs, since they are not 
subject to the same cost sharing as those beneficiaries not eligible for the LIS. Thus, one 
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way to test if the model is appropriate is to run the same model with LIS 
beneficiaries.28 Thus, Table 6.12 presents the marginal effects for average out-of-pocket 
costs for each of the above analyses: any utilization, number of fills, and switching, for 
LIS beneficiaries. The marginal effects were multiplied by 100, as they were very small. 
 The results show that LIS beneficiaries with RA or MS did have a significant 
response to higher cost sharing for the non-IV model in 2007. LIS beneficiaries with 
cancer did change their overall number of fills in response to higher specialty tier cost 
sharing in 2008, and also significantly reduced their utilization in response to higher cost 
sharing in both years (non-IV) and in 2007 (IV model). The IV model suggests that 
cancer patients eligible for the LIS reduced the likelihood of utilization by 10.4% in 
response to an increase of $100 in the out-of-pocket cost imposed by the plan.  
Table 6.12: Logistic Regression Results for Any Uti lization of Specialty Tier-
Eligible Drugs by Low-Income Subsidy Eligible Benef iciaries. 
  RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
2007 2008 2007 2008 
No IV     
         Any Utilization 0.006** 0.000 -0.017*** -0.005*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
         Number of Fills 0.099 -0.246 -0.264 -0.480* 
(0.169) (0.208) (0.31) (0.256) 
         Switching 0.016*** 0.006  
(0.005) (0.005)  
IV     
         Any Utilization 0.032 0.014 -0.104*** 0.131 
(0.024) (0.064) (0.037) (0.532) 
         Number of Fills 0.024 -0.813 -0.46 -4.611 
(0.225) (0.501) (0.446) (6.077) 
         Switching 0.057*** 0.094***  
  (0.021)   (0.026)   
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
                                               
28 The models are the same for both LIS and non-LIS beneficiaries, except that the variable indicating 
whether or not beneficiaries had additional cost sharing assistance is excluded from the LIS model, as all of 
these beneficiaries would be expected to have such cost sharing assistance from the government. 
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This is unexpected. The switching results, however, were positive and significant, 
suggesting that beneficiaries with the LIS did respond to higher cost sharing by switching 
plans, which is counterintuitive and suggests other, unmeasured factors may be 
contributing to the results. 
Expanded Definition for Specialty Tier Eligibility 
 The second sensitivity analysis tests the extent to which the results change with 
a more expanded definition of specialty tier eligibility. This analysis includes all drugs in 
the category of drugs eligible for the specialty tier if at least one plan charged a total 
drug cost above the threshold price for eligibility. This therefore takes into account the 
variation in Part D plans’ negotiation for the final price of the drug, by including any drug 
that could possibly have a price above the threshold in each year.  
Table 6.13: Results for Mean Out-of-Pocket Costs Us ing the Expanded Drug 
Eligibility Definition, for Non-LIS Beneficiaries. 29 
  RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
No IV     
         Any Utilization -0.052*** 0.004* -0.051*** -0.029*** 
(0.018) (0.002) (0.013) (0.008) 
         Number of Fills 0.171 0.249 -0.343 0.479 
(0.284) (0.181) (0.237) (0.346) 
         Switching 0.011*  0.002  
(0.006)  (0.006)  
IV     
         Any Utilization 0.065 0.093** 0.000 -0.423*** 
(0.061) (0.038) (0.097) (0.092) 
         Number of Fills 0.507 0.145 0.815* 0.694 
(0.394) (0.357) (0.422) (0.619) 
         Switching 0.23***  0.257**  
  (0.073)   (0.119)   
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
                                               
29 N.B.: The any utilization analyses for the expanded definition use the same explanatory variables as the 
number of fills and switching analyses, and are therefore somewhat different from the utilization analyses 
presented earlier. 
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 The analyses are the same as those for the more restrictive definition of 
drugs. Table 6.13 presents the results of the analyses for the mean out-of-pocket cost 
coefficient. The table presents marginal effects with robust standard errors for the 
independent variable of interest, with the marginal effects multiplied again by 100 due to 
their very small magnitude. Results for any utilization are larger in magnitude and 
significant compared to those results obtained when using the more restrictive definition 
of eligibility, although the results when applying the IV are significant and positive for 
MS/RA patients in 2008, which is counterintuitive. The switching results are now positive 
and significant for RA/MS in both cases, whereas these were insignificant with the more 
restricted approach. This may be due to the fact that more plans were included in the 
analysis as a result of additional drugs being considered eligible.  
6.9 Conclusions 
 The results for beneficiary utilization and switching responses to plan tier 
placement decisions are somewhat mixed in their support of the three main hypotheses. 
For cancer patients, an increased out-of-pocket cost for specialty tier-eligible drugs does 
significantly reduce the likelihood of utilization; however, for patients with RA or MS, 
there is no significant effect. However, these results are very small in magnitude overall 
(reflecting an increase of $100 in the out-of-pocket cost, which is very large), suggesting 
that the overall elasticity of demand is relatively small. It is surprising, however, that for 
RA and MS patients, the association is positive (though insignificant). This may be due 
to the fact that beneficiaries taking specialty tier-eligible medications, who are enrolled in 
Part D and diagnosed with RA or MS, have few alternatives because they cannot return 
to previous treatments once they have moved to the next option (in terms of severity). 
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 For the number of fills for beneficiaries with any utilization, the results are 
insignificant, which may be that this is the result of the structure of the Part D benefit. If 
these beneficiaries know they will move through the coverage gap and into the 
catastrophic phase of the benefit relatively quickly, and a fairly large proportion do (see 
footnote 27) they may be more likely to take their medications in order to enter the phase 
where they are only responsible for 5% of the cost of their medications. The switching 
results matched the hypothesis, in that beneficiaries who are more likely to take these 
medications are also more likely to switch out of their plans the higher the cost sharing 
for specialty tier-eligible drugs.  
 Taken together, the results across all utilization analyses begin to present a 
picture of the manner by which Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D respond to the 
cost sharing imposed by their plans. Cancer patients, who take their medications on a 
shorter-term basis compared to RA and MS patients, appear to be more likely to 
respond to higher cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs by reducing the likelihood 
of any utilization. Cancer patients are also more likely to substitute over to Medicare Part 
B drugs, in response to higher cost sharing in Part D. This is somewhat counterintuitive, 
as elasticities for cancer, which is generally a shorter-term illness requiring intense 
treatment, might be expected to be lower than those for RA and MS, which are treated 
over a much longer period of time and may involve more patient involvement in the 
treatment decision. It is important to emphasize that these results are somewhat limited 
due to the missing data and resulting inability to ascribe a cost-sharing amount to all 
non-utilizers in the benefit. Thus, the results might be much larger in magnitude if non-
utilizers of specialty drugs are enrolled in plans with much higher cost sharing. This may 
also explain the counterintuitive results seen with prior authorization, as those who go 
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through the prior authorization process do not have to undergo it again for the same 
drug for the rest of the year.  
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CHAPTER 7: BENEFICIARY AND PLAN EXPENDITURES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the empirical approach and results associated with 
beneficiary response to plan tier placement in terms of overall expenditures, as well as 
the effect of tier placement on plan expenditures. The hypotheses for expenditures stem 
from the conceptual model, which posits that plans that place specialty drugs on a higher 
cost-sharing tier shift the direct cost of more expensive drugs to beneficiaries in order to 
deter enrollment of potential users (the adverse selection effect). Therefore, beneficiary 
expenditures will be expected to be higher the higher the cost sharing for specialty tier-
eligible drugs, and plan expenditures will be negatively associated with higher cost 
sharing. The next section presents the empirical approach, followed by descriptive 
statistics and the results. 
7.2 Empirical Approach 
 The analysis of beneficiary and plan expenditures resulting from the specialty tier 
placement decision will determine whether specialty tier placement affects expenditures 
for beneficiaries and plans, relative to placement on a lower cost-sharing tier. Beneficiary 
expenditures are calculated as the sum of all out-of-pocket amounts appearing on the 
claim for a beneficiary for a given year. Total plan payments per beneficiary are 
calculated as the sum of the Part D plan covered payment as it appears on the claim.  
 In order to estimate the effect of specialty tier placement on expenditures, the 
empirical approach will include all beneficiaries diagnosed with one of the six conditions 
(still separated by RA and MS diagnosis, and cancer diagnosis), and will measure the 
beneficiary and plan payments as the dependent variable in the following equation: 
=>)" 7)5+  .6  *)'!-+.  *75+.8  /+0 .  1+0 .  29+0 .  3 
 
 
 
118
where “Expenditures” are either beneficiary or plan expenditures, depending on the 
specification. All of the independent variables are the same as those described in the 
Chapter 6 empirical analyses, where the independent variable of interest is the average 
out-of-pocket costs imposed by a plan on drugs eligible for the specialty tier that are 
used to treat a given condition. The other independent variables control for beneficiary 
risk, plan benefit design aspects that may affect spending, and region-level competition, 
which affects the beneficiary’s enrollment decision and the Part D plan’s benefit design. 
 These analyses are run using a GLM approach, which takes into account the 
non-linearity of the Part D benefit design. This non-linearity is important, as it might 
affect beneficiary and plan spending throughout the course of the year in a way that 
cannot be captured by a simple OLS regression approach. The generalized linear 
models (GLM) approach has been used in order to more accurately estimate the effects 
of non-linear benefit designs on different types of health care costs (see for example: 
Doshi and Glick, 23 October 2011). 
 The expenditures approach also incorporates the instrumental variables method 
described in Chapter 6, due to the fact that beneficiary spending is dependent on the 
beneficiary decision to utilize, which in turn is dependent on the plan’s tier placement 
decision for specialty drugs. The instrumental variable results are calculated using a two-
step approach in Stata, where the first step is a simple OLS regression designed to 
predict the out-of-pocket costs using the average out-of-pocket costs for other 
conditions. The standard errors are bootstrapped, and the results are used to predict 
average out-of-pocket costs for a given plan for the eligible drugs. The second stage 
runs a GLM model using a log-link function. In addition, a bootstrap approach to 
estimate the model was also used, in order to better estimate the standard error for the 
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mean out-of-pocket costs. The bootstrapped confidence intervals from this approach 
are also presented. 
 In addition, similar to the discussion of the potential for the design of the Part D 
benefit to confound the results for the number of fills, it is possible that inclusion of all 
Part D spending throughout the entire benefit (year) may reduce the likelihood of finding 
an effect of out-of-pocket costs applied solely to one portion of the benefit on spending. 
Therefore, Section A.1 of the Appendix presents the results of these analyses when 
conducted using just the portion of beneficiary and plan spending incurred in the initial 
coverage phase of the benefit. 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Expenditures 
 Tables 7.1 and 7.2 present descriptive statistics for beneficiary spending, solely 
for those beneficiaries who had any utilization of a specialty drug in each year. These 
statistics are presented because otherwise the spending averages are extremely low 
and it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Each table shows the difference in spending 
for beneficiaries enrolled in a plan that had a specialty tier, compared to those utilizers 
enrolled in a plan with no specialty tier. Table 7.1 shows these statistics for beneficiaries  
Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics for Beneficiary S pending, MS and RA 
  RA MS 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Beneficiary Spending (Utilizers):*   
   
Specialty Tier Plans   
   
         Never LIS 3259.71  3856.32  3942.78  4526.62  
 
(1568.40) (1426.39) (1132.16) (1115.13) 
         LIS 161.12  113.35  108.65  129.57  
 
(439.15) (263.04) (240.72) (348.87) 
Non-Specialty Tier Plans   
   
         Never LIS 2308.74  2290.73  3021.95  3461.80  
 
(1688.64) (1820.32) (1642.97) (1858.70) 
         LIS 110.55  96.91  125.28  252.29  
  (179.30) (142.30) (490.38) 1153.29  
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses 
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with RA or MS. Non-LIS beneficiaries enrolled in a plan with a specialty tier have 
higher out-of-pocket spending for their medications, for both RA and MS and across both 
years. This suggests that plans that choose to have specialty tiers do in fact shift more of 
the costs of these drugs to beneficiaries via the use of the higher cost sharing they are 
allowed to impose by placing the drug on the specialty tier. 
 Table 7.2 shows the same statistics for beneficiaries with cancer. In general, the 
same relationship applies – non-LIS beneficiaries enrolled in specialty tier plans have 
higher spending than those enrolled in plans with no specialty tier, with the exception of 
breast cancer patients in 2008. Both tables illustrate the relatively low spending by LIS 
patients, though it is not zero and does vary across specialty tier and non-specialty tier 
plans. For example, RA patients who were LIS eligible had higher spending in plans that 
had a specialty tier, compared to those with no specialty tier, while MS patients eligible 
for the LIS had higher spending in non-specialty tier plans. This might be due to the fact 
that more MS patients are eligible for the LIS than patients with one of the five other 
conditions. 
Table 7.3 shows descriptive statistics for plan spending for MS and RA patients, 
and Table 7.4 shows the same for cancer patients. Plan total spending for RA patients is 
actually somewhat lower for patients in non-specialty tier plans, compared to patients in 
specialty tier plans (for non-LIS patients), while for MS patients it is very similar for 2007, 
and plan spending is higher for MS patients in non-specialty tier plans, compared to 
specialty tier plans, in 2008. The statistics for RA patients are surprising, as the shift in 
cost sharing towards a higher specialty tier would be expected to reduce plan costs, 
relative to not placing the drugs on the higher tier. However, for beneficiaries who used 
at least one specialty tier-eligible drug in each year, plan expenditures for those enrolled  
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in specialty tier plans are lower than expenditures for beneficiaries in non-specialty 
tier plans, supporting the theory that plans reduce their costs via specialty tier 
placement. 
Total plan expenditures for beneficiaries with cancer show a similar pattern to 
those for MS and RA patients. That is, expenditures for all beneficiaries in the sample 
tend to be higher for those enrolled in specialty tier plans than those enrolled in plans 
with no specialty tier. However, when the sample is restricted to utilizers, plan 
expenditures are slightly less for patients enrolled in specialty tier plans, compared to  
Table 7.3: Descriptive Statistics for Plan Spending  for Beneficiaries Diagnosed 
with RA or MS. 
  RA MS 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Specialty Tier Plans    
   
         Never LIS 1564.06  1514.80  2695.63  3069.07  
 
(3152.88) (3233.96) (4639.18) (6162.61) 
         LIS 2675.25  2878.47  4175.93  4816.00  
 
(4427.83) (4550.05) (6846.23) (7736.31) 
Non-Specialty Tier Plans   
   
         Never LIS 1325.86  1347.67  2658.54  3684.47  
 
(2356.08) (2652.88) (4663.23) (6501.82) 
         LIS 2981.42  2998.41  4008.32  4866.46  
 (4437.48) (4474.75) (6042.66) (7443.33) 
Utilizers in Specialty Tier Plans   
   
         Never LIS 8669.86  11127.61  12420.05  18022.32  
 
(7889.43) (8430.97) (6281.00) (7058.60) 
         LIS 10459.89  12392.88  15413.66  17238.59  
 
(8189.42) (7751.93) (6594.53) (8032.98) 
Utilizers in Non-Specialty Tier Plans    
   
         Never LIS 6370.54  6430.09  10319.11  12680.34  
 
(6831.39) (6662.35) (7301.33) (8677.80) 
         LIS 10570.36  12532.45  14505.64  19591.83  
  (8620.89) (7597.70) (7938.07) (8682.22) 
* Mean presented with standard deviation in parentheses 
 
those enrolled in non-specialty tier plans. Again, this suggests that plans do make 
successful use of the specialty tier in order to reduce their costs, for those beneficiaries 
that end up using at least one specialty tier-eligible drug. 
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7.4 Results 
Beneficiary Spending 
 Table 7.5 presents the results for beneficiary spending for non-LIS beneficiaries 
only, prior to applying the instrumental variable. The results show a positive, significant 
effect of average out-of-pocket costs on beneficiary expenditures for cancer patients in 
2008. However, an increase in average out-of-pocket costs is significantly negatively 
associated with beneficiary spending for RA and MS in 2008, which is a surprising result. 
These results suggest that increases in the average out-of-pocket cost do in some cases 
shift the costs over to beneficiaries, although the magnitude of the increase in spending 
is fairly small.  
Also of note, higher costs for Part D substitutes significantly increase beneficiary 
out-of-pocket costs for RA and MS patients and cancer patients in 2008, and out-of-
pocket spending support from other sources (the “Any Other Costs” variable in the table) 
significantly reduces beneficiary spending, with the coefficients significant at the 0.01 
level and very large across all years and conditions. In addition, the percentage of 
specialty tier-eligible drugs with prior authorization requirements is a significant positive 
predictor of beneficiary spending for both groups and across both years, which is 
counterintuitive. Finally, risk score is also a significant positive predictor of spending, 
further illustrating that the risk adjustment model for Part D does seem to accurately 
predict beneficiary spending.  
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Table 7.5: GLM Results for Beneficiary Total Expend itures by Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.198 -0.506*** 0.066 0.194*** 
 (0.138) (0.18) (0.084) (0.052) 
Average Subs OOP 18.076*** 32.935*** 5.711** 27.338*** 
 (3.553) (4.8) (2.251) (3.164) 
Any Other Costs -142.562*** -238.308*** -99.378*** -207.175*** 
 (46.833) (51.214) (21.238) (23.668) 
Age 26.207*** 9.474 36.379*** 46.193*** 
 (9.093) (10.665) (3.947) (4.822) 
Race -121.443*** -41.007 -49.46*** -12.343 
 (32.957) (47.03) (15.029) (19.756) 
Inpatient Visits 49.201** 67.846*** 49.605*** 40.085*** 
 (20.852) (25.557) (10.825) (13.013) 
Outpatient Visits 3.634*** 3.213*** 2.08*** 2.442*** 
 (0.734) (0.868) (0.304) (0.366) 
Risk Score 272.565*** 229.726*** 420.085*** 246.785*** 
 (57.031) (55.763) (24.956) (26.348) 
Prior Authorization 417.323** 872.923*** 1733.394*** 2042.494*** 
 (194.052) (297.726) (262.546) (377.388) 
Premium 10.823*** 11.311*** 9.028*** 8.003*** 
 (0.904) (1.081) (0.467) (0.564) 
National PDP 21.381 -60.841 21.529* -39.271* 
 (26.718) (58.293) (11.216) (22.243) 
Regional Deductible -5.106*** -3.857** -2.346*** -1.024 
 (1.265) (1.618) (0.515) (0.721) 
Region Average OOP -1.456*** -0.401 -1.653*** -0.114 
 (0.342) (0.42) (0.185) (0.137) 
_cons 905.976*** 707.042*** 435.366*** -143.836 
(145.204) (275.97) (60.772) (107.406) 
n 7569 6304 29119 21964 
1 Coefficients from GLM presented with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Table 7.6 shows the results for beneficiary expenditures after applying the IV 
approach. The results are switched for 2008 in comparison to the results that did not use 
the instrumental variable. Using the instrumental variable, beneficiary costs are 
positively and significantly associated with higher average out-of-pocket costs for 2008 
for RA/MS patients. However, for 2008, the coefficient for average out-of-pocket costs 
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for cancer patients is negative and significant. Results for other control variables are 
similar to those achieved without an instrumental variable. 
Table 7.6: Instrumental Variable GLM Results for Be neficiary Spending, Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.175 0.725*** 0.103 -0.825*** 
 (0.153) (0.281) (0.103) (0.249) 
Average Subs OOP 17.117*** 19.395*** 6.043*** 28.901*** 
 (3.35) (4.634) (2.177) (3.029) 
Any Other Costs -133.52*** -215.421*** -102.092*** -205.27*** 
 (47.033) (49.964) (21.025) (23.362) 
Age 25.121*** 14.826 37.255*** 42.081*** 
 (9.072) (10.427) (3.899) (4.611) 
Race -115.232*** -49.422 -50.181*** -32.867* 
 (33.245) (44.564) (14.767) (18.549) 
Inpatient Visits 44.05** 66.24*** 45.345*** 19.266 
 (20.485) (24.532) (10.667) (11.983) 
Outpatient Visits 3.637*** 3.302*** 2.088*** 2.665*** 
 (0.718) (0.839) (0.301) (0.341) 
Risk Score 271.651*** 229.292*** 423.349*** 247.378*** 
 (55.924) (53.848) (24.517) (24.546) 
Prior Authorization 420.68** 1068.046*** 1820.933*** 1523.809*** 
 (191.032) (280.061) (260.726) (423.434) 
Premium 10.884*** 9.423*** 8.873*** 10.067*** 
 (0.893) (1.052) (0.453) (0.649) 
National PDP 22.84 -194.282*** 16.239 61.027* 
 (26.544) (63.422) (11.251) (31.581) 
Regional Deductible -4.889*** -4.233*** -2.2*** -2.187*** 
 (1.247) (1.557) (0.511) (0.727) 
Region Average OOP -1.437*** -0.987** -1.62*** 0.649*** 
 (0.341) (0.411) (0.185) (0.24) 
_cons 891.762*** 770.964*** 408.027*** -109.015 
(143.809) (263.792) (60.459) (111.185) 
n 7736 6628 29627 25083 
1 Coefficients from GLM presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Plan Expenditures 
 Table 7.7 presents the results of the GLM regression of plan costs on average 
out-of-pocket costs for all non-LIS beneficiaries in the sample, controlling for other 
covariates. The results for plan spending are unexpected, as the sign for the effect of 
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average out-of-pocket costs on plan total expenditures are the opposite of what was 
expected based on theory (except for 2008 RA/MS patients). More specifically, mean 
out-of-pocket costs are positively and significantly associated with plan spending for RA 
and MS patients in 2007, and cancer patients in both years.  
Table 7.7: GLM Results for Plan Expenditures, Non-L IS Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 1.581*** -1.014* 0.626*** 0.228* 
 (0.458) (0.581) (0.223) (0.131) 
Average Subs OOP 42.096*** 82.669*** -6.794 -1.369 
 (12.734) (16.954) (5.181) (7.816) 
Any Other Costs 310.254** 372.113* 382.054*** 479.769*** 
 (146.433) (203.696) (58.202) (92.812) 
Age -104.278*** -163.682*** 4.519 1.236 
 (26.957) (28.424) (9.184) (11.949) 
Race -152.088* 185.713 53.267 41.397 
 (85.624) (183.369) (47.972) (55.924) 
Inpatient Visits -2.611 104.211 -16.175 27.253 
 (46.835) (98.225) (31.783) (32.316) 
Outpatient Visits 4.798* 4.404 6.073*** 5.637*** 
 (2.798) (3.342) (1.067) (1.373) 
Risk Score 661.037*** 695.999*** 498.547*** 336.266*** 
 (202.212) (184.178) (97.781) (106.672) 
Prior Authorization 307.952 1580.847 1359.671** 2800.825*** 
 (559.982) (1076.831) (621.806) (972.148) 
Premium 18.207*** 21.941*** 11.882*** 7.774*** 
 (2.818) (3.677) (1.275) (1.432) 
National PDP 120.597 -70.428 -47.795 -2.636 
 (81.52) (185.322) (29.718) (60.524) 
Regional Deductible -7.916** -10.681** -2.35** -0.513 
 (3.858) (5.129) (1.11) (1.575) 
Region Average OOP -2.244* -0.988 -1.952*** -0.267 
 (1.19) (1.252) (0.511) (0.354) 
_cons 1210.037** 1337.324 576.711*** 300.424 
(547.906) (838.285) (173.863) (254.938) 
n 7569 6304 29119 21964 
1 Coefficients from GLM presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
In addition, the average out-of-pocket costs for substitutes is positively and significantly 
associated with plan spending for both years for RA and MS patients, suggesting that 
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the model may not fully explain the impacts on plan costs. However, the coefficients 
for risk score still indicate that a beneficiary’s risk score is a positive, significant, and 
substantial predictor of plan costs, which is to be expected. It is important to note that 
these results may also be biased due to exclusion of beneficiaries in plans where no 
utilization was observed. 
 Table 7.8 presents the results of the effect of average out-of-pocket costs on plan 
spending, making use of the instrumental variable approach. The results are different 
from those without the instrumental variables approach, in that mean out-of-pocket costs 
for eligible drugs are not a positive and significant predictor of plan spending in 2007 for 
both condition groups, and a negative significant predictor in 2008 for cancer patients. Of 
note, for both the instrumental variables analysis and the analysis without the 
instrumental variable, when beneficiaries have other out-of-pocket spending support in 
addition to their Part D coverage, plan costs increase significantly. This suggests that 
beneficiaries increase their utilization in the presence of additional cost sharing 
assistance, which holds with previous theory. Prior authorization is also a significant 
predictor of plan spending for cancer patients in 2007, though the association is strange: 
the results imply that higher prior authorization increases plan spending. This 
association is not the case for 2007 for RA and MS beneficiaries, and for either year for 
cancer patients. 
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Table 7.8: Instrumental Variable GLM Results for Pl an Expenditures, Non-LIS 
Beneficiaries. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 1.351*** 0.744 0.489* -1.588** 
 (0.523) (1.059) (0.26) (0.778) 
Average Subs OOP 34.51*** 55.756*** -4.807 10.745 
 (11.604) (16.622) (4.856) (8.864) 
Any Other Costs 313.548** 374.045* 381.265*** 561.673*** 
 (145.614) (199.534) (57.658) (102.489) 
Age -107.793*** -153.79*** 6.021 -16.661 
 (26.607) (28.067) (9.049) (12.298) 
Race -145.636* 145.783 43.325 -12.574 
 (84.874) (173.768) (46.648) (49.831) 
Inpatient Visits -17.502 103.586 -20.655 -33.458 
 (45.231) (93.631) (31.043) (34.109) 
Outpatient Visits 4.85* 3.815 6.265*** 7.221*** 
 (2.716) (3.248) (1.053) (1.422) 
Risk Score 647.875*** 699.706*** 472.632*** 303.176*** 
 (196.664) (183.776) (94.003) (98.475) 
Prior Authorization 485.919 1685.329 1542.245** 1914.925 
 (549.449) (1044.158) (618.157) (1205.861) 
Premium 18.465*** 18.255*** 11.615*** 13.076*** 
 (2.725) (3.624) (1.244) (2.087) 
National PDP 91.547 -224.829 -52.848* 179.289* 
 (78.937) (237.427) (29.828) (94.542) 
Regional Deductible -7.086* -9.844** -1.996* -2.19 
 (3.795) (4.841) (1.105) (1.8) 
Region Average OOP -2.173* -2.523** -1.831*** 1.196 
 (1.174) (1.202) (0.497) (0.767) 
_cons 1231.65** 1732.141** 540.55*** 172.29 
(540.158) (810.893) (170.728) (308.794) 
n 7736 6628 29627 25083 
1 Coefficients from GLM presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Bootstrapped confidence intervals for the mean out-of-pocket costs variable were 
also calculated for the instrumental variables estimates for both beneficiary and plan 
spending. The results are presented in Table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9: Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals for th e Instrumental Variables 
Estimates of Beneficiary and Plan Spending, for Non -LIS Beneficiaries. 
  MS / RA Cancers 
  Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Beneficiary Spending 
2007 -0.113 0.498 -0.097 0.301 
2008 0.128 1.297 -1.284 -0.321 
Plan Spending 
2007 0.376 2.437 -0.013 1.031 
2008 -1.215 2.755 -3.123 -0.118 
 
7.5 Testing the Instrumental Variable 
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity was also used to test the 
instrumental variable used in the spending analyses. The null hypothesis is that the 
model is exogenous. The results of the test are presented in Table 7.10. The 
instrumental variable appears to be an appropriate approach for all of the models and 
groups, except for beneficiary costs in 2007. 
Table 7.10: Results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test of En dogeneity, for Non-LIS 
Spending Models. 
Beneficiary Costs Plan Costs 
2007 2008 2007 2008 
RA / MS 1.9 22.13 7.23 5.86 
(0.168) (0.000) (0.007) (0.016) 
Cancer 0.28 17.22 6.42 5.77 
(0.599) (0.000) (0.011) (0.016) 
 
7.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
Low-Income Subsidy Beneficiaries 
 The first sensitivity analysis, similar to the analyses for utilization and switching, 
examines whether or not LIS beneficiary and plan spending reflected no significant 
response to cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs. As such, Table 7.11 presents 
the marginal effects for the average out-of-pocket costs for beneficiary and plan 
spending for LIS beneficiaries. The prediction for this analysis would be that beneficiary 
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expenditures would not respond to higher cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible 
drugs, due to the fact that LIS beneficiaries do not pay those higher out-of-pocket 
amounts. Plan expenditures, on the other hand, might be expected to decline, as the 
government pays the portion of the cost sharing not paid for by the LIS beneficiary. 
 The results for beneficiary costs (IV) are the opposite of expectations, in that for 
two of the four analyses (for 2007), beneficiary spending declined significantly the higher 
the out-of-pocket cost sharing imposed by the plan. In addition, plan spending 
responded in varying and inconsistent ways in the IV analysis to an increase in the out-
of-pocket costs, with a negative sign in 2008 for MS and RA patients, and in 2008 for 
cancer patients, but a positive sign in 2007 for MS/RA and cancer patients.  
Table 7.11: Beneficiary and Plan Expenditure Result s for Beneficiaries Eligible for 
the Low-Income Subsidy. 
  RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
2007 2008 2007 2008 
No IV     
         Beneficiary Costs -0.171*** -0.07* -0.147*** -0.006 
(0.03) (0.037) (0.025) (0.026) 
         Plan Costs 1.553*** -1.113 0.289 -0.597** 
(0.573) (0.8) (0.342) (0.286) 
IV     
         Beneficiary Costs -0.163*** -0.085 -0.277*** -0.186 
(0.037) (0.055) (0.04) (0.15) 
         Plan Costs 1.12* -1.226 0.147 -0.567 
  (0.617) (1.195) (0.57) (1.418) 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 Thus, the sensitivity analysis testing whether LIS beneficiary spending, and plan 
spending for LIS beneficiaries, does not respond to higher cost sharing for specialty tier-
eligible drugs as imposed by the plan for the general population, show mixed results.  
Expanded Specialty Tier Eligibility Definition 
 The second sensitivity analysis examines whether beneficiary and plan spending 
varies depending on the definition of eligibility for the specialty tier. As in Chapter 6, the 
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expanded drug definition encompasses drugs for which the maximum price (offered 
by any plan) was greater than the threshold established by CMS. The analysis is run 
using the GLM model, as described above; the results are presented in Table 7.12. 
Results are different from those obtained with the more restricted drug definition, in that 
beneficiary costs with the expanded definition are consistently positive, and are 
significant for 3 out of the 4 analyses; this is not the case for the more restricted 
definition. The results for the analyses of plan spending, for both the IV and basic 
models, suggests that plan costs increase in association with higher cost sharing. These 
results are less mixed (in sign) than those for the more restricted definition, but are still 
counterintuitive for plan spending. This suggests that the expanded definition does not 
fully capture the variations in beneficiary and plan spending by being more inclusive of 
the drugs eligible for the specialty tier. 
Table 7.12: Beneficiary and Plan Expenditure Result s for the Expanded Definition 
of Eligibility for the Specialty Tier, for Non-LIS Beneficiaries. 
  RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
No IV     
         Beneficiary Costs 1.426*** 0.17 0.392* 0.766*** 
(0.455) (0.128) (0.211) (0.221) 
         Plan Costs 7.22*** 0.856* 0.432 0.925 
(2.318) (0.444) (0.442) (0.814) 
IV     
         Beneficiary Costs 0.820 0.622** 0.167 0.074 
(0.605) (0.286) (0.595) (0.496) 
         Plan Costs 3.912** 2.393*** -0.546 0.336 
  (1.598) (0.882) (1.088) (1.026) 
1 Coefficients presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 The results for beneficiary and plan expenditures show that specialty tier 
placement alone does not sufficiently explain the effect on spending. While beneficiary 
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spending does increase the higher the cost sharing for specialty tier-eligible drugs, 
plan costs also increase with cost sharing. The first result is as hypothesized, but the 
second suggests that plans are spending additional amounts on medications / coverage 
for beneficiaries in spite of placing them on a higher cost sharing tier. It may be that 
these beneficiaries are higher risk, and the risk score does not completely capture 
expected spending for very high-risk beneficiaries. In addition, the high number of 
missing values, due to lack of information as to plan cost sharing, may affect the results 
in that those who did not utilize these drugs may have costs that are not taken into 
account. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Specialty tiers present insurers with an additional tool in order to design benefits, 
which can potentially reduce adverse selection in competitive markets and also reduce 
moral hazard via an increase in the coinsurance rate. Medicare Part D was designed to 
protect both plans and beneficiaries from significant financial risk, via the use of risk 
adjustment and other tools. However, to the extent that the risk adjuster is inaccurate, 
and that moral hazard for these medications does exist, Part D plans do face an 
incentive to place specialty drugs on a specialty tier, and to increase the cost sharing for 
those drugs above the actuarial amount as determined in the Part D legislation. 
This dissertation presents both a supply-side and demand-side approach to 
understanding specialty tier placement. The supply-side conceptual model, which 
examines the decision on the part of the Part D plan as to whether or not to place drugs 
on the specialty tier, illustrates the complexity associated with the decision given the 
numerous trade-offs in plan design that may occur. For example, a higher premium can 
result in a lower deductible, but a lower deductible also results from increasing the 
specialty tier cost share. In addition, increasing the specialty tier cost sharing, or simply 
increasing the cost sharing for some subset of drugs, must be offset by lower cost 
sharing for other drugs in order to meet the 25% actuarial equivalence requirement for 
cost sharing. As a result of these complexities, the effects of specialty tier placement can 
be difficult to determine.  
The demand-side approach addresses the results of the plan’s tier placement 
decision in terms of beneficiary response to the tier placement. Empirical analysis of the 
effect of specialty tier placement on plan market share indicates no significant effect, 
though plan market share is in some cases significantly and negatively associated with 
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the premium charged by the plan in relation to the regional premium. This supports 
previous analyses that have shown that premium is the single most important 
determinant of beneficiary plan choice (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011), and further 
emphasizes that plan formulary design for very expensive drugs does not play a 
significant role in the enrollment decision.  
The descriptive statistics for beneficiaries diagnosed with conditions often 
requiring the use of specialty drugs present a compelling picture that suggests high 
elasticity associated with cost sharing for these drugs. Table 6.1 shows the rates of 
utilization of specialty tier-eligible drugs for beneficiaries diagnosed with each condition. 
When comparing the non-LIS rates to LIS rates, it can be observed that LIS 
beneficiaries, who are not subject to the same high cost sharing rates as non-LIS 
beneficiaries, have much higher rates of utilization compared to non-LIS beneficiaries. 
This provides some evidence that beneficiaries subject to higher cost sharing are 
reducing their utilization in response to that cost sharing; this result is tempered, 
however, by the fact that average risk scores for LIS and non-LIS beneficiaries are 
somewhat different. In addition, an analysis designed to tease out the effects of LIS and 
non-LIS utilization, controlling for risk score, found no significant effects for RA and MS 
patients, but did find a significantly higher likelihood of utilization for LIS beneficiaries 
compared to non-LIS beneficiaries (LIS beneficiaries with cancer are 2.1% more likely to 
utilize in 2007 and 0.63% more likely to utilize in 2008). Further work may be able to 
obtain more concrete results. 
The empirical analyses that focus on these specific subgroups of beneficiaries 
show somewhat different results, however. An analysis of the likelihood of switching 
plans in response to higher cost sharing (which is strongly associated with specialty tier 
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placement) shows that non-LIS and LIS beneficiaries were both significantly more 
likely to change plans from 2007 to 2008 in response to higher cost sharing for specialty 
drugs used to treat their condition. These results suggest that patients do respond to 
higher cost sharing by changing plans when it directly affects them. 
In terms of the effect of cost sharing for specialty drugs on utilization, the basic 
models indicate that higher cost sharing has a significant positive effect on utilization for 
RA and MS patients, and a significant negative effect on utilization for cancer patients. 
While the latter results fit with the hypotheses, the former are likely due to data 
limitations and high correlations among the independent variable of interest and other 
parts of the benefit design package, especially the normalized deductible. In addition, 
results presented in the Appendix show that higher cost sharing does significantly 
reduce the number of prescriptions filled prior to hitting the coverage gap, when the 
specialty cost share is in effect. Higher cost sharing is also shown to increase 
beneficiary spending. After using an instrumental variable to control for endogeneity, 
higher cost sharing still has a significant negative effect on utilization for cancer patients. 
Results also indicate counterintuitive effects on plan spending which may be attributable 
to other, unmeasured but correlated benefit changes, e.g. the lower deductible.  
 The data used in this dissertation have some limitations. The first limitation is the 
difficulty in determining a plan’s formulary design using the Part D claims data. The only 
way to identify whether a plan covers a drug, and on which tier that drug is placed, is via 
the claims data, meaning that drugs not utilized in a given plan are not represented. This 
problem then flows through to missing observations in the empirical analyses, as 
beneficiaries with no utilization in a given plan will fall out of the model. The lack of data 
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means that any estimates presented in this dissertation are underestimates of the 
overall effect of tier placement on utilization, switching, and spending. 
 The second limitation relates to the structure of the Part D claims data as relates 
to identifying individual plans across years. The manner by which CMS assigns contract 
and plan identifiers to individual plans implies that the same plan, with the same benefit 
design, may have a different plan identifier in a subsequent year. The result of this is that 
the switching analysis may overestimate the effect of cost sharing on switching; a 
separate analysis conducted solely on whether beneficiaries switched contracts (i.e., the 
insurer) sought to establish a lower bound of the estimate of the effects of switching. The 
results for switching contracts were insignificant, suggesting that beneficiaries may not in 
fact switch plans in response to cost sharing. 
 The third limitation is the effect of the non-linear benefit structure inherent to Part 
D. The presence of gaps in coverage for beneficiaries, and the structure of the 
catastrophic benefit, which only imposes 15% of the risk of drug costs on plans, presents 
significant challenges to accurately estimating the effects of cost sharing imposed during 
a portion of the benefit. This dissertation assumes that beneficiaries do not take into 
account the coverage gap and catastrophic phase of the benefit when making decisions 
regarding utilization in the initial coverage period cost. However, to try to address the 
effects associated with later portions of the benefit, additional analyses were conducted, 
and are presented in the Appendix.  
 The work presented here can be expanded in a number of ways via future 
research. Future work can incorporate full formulary data into the claims data in order to 
estimate utilization and cost sharing for all plans and beneficiaries, not just for those 
plans that had utilization. In addition, future work exploring the effects of substitution in 
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association with Part D specialty drugs could shed further light on the question of 
whether or not the tiered formularies are encouraging switching to preferred, lower-tier 
drugs, or whether they are simply discouraging use entirely. And finally, further 
exploration of the effects of the overall Part D benefit design on utilization of these drugs 
will enable researchers to better tease apart the effects due to various stages of the Part 
D benefit.  
 Subject to the limitations describe above, this dissertation provides estimates that 
begin to address both adverse selection effects (via the market share and switching 
analyses) and moral hazard, via the utilization analyses. It provides estimates of the 
effect of tier placement and associated cost sharing for a newer, more expensive 
technology (specialty drugs) on these key aspects of health insurance design, and 
considers these effects from both the supply- and demand-side perspectives. The 
results provide evidence that higher cost sharing may have an adverse effect on 
utilization for cancer patients in Medicare Part D, but not for MS and RA patients. Since 
these estimates can be considered underestimates of the overall effect, due to data 
limitations, it may be posited that the overall effects are larger and more significant. As a 
result, it may be worthwhile for CMS to revisit the specialty tiers policy allowing a higher 
cost share for specialty drugs on that tier. 
 Medicare Part D presents an important opportunity to examine the effects of 
specialty tiers on beneficiaries diagnosed with conditions requiring use of expensive 
specialty drugs. The nature of Part D as a government benefit administered by 
competing private plans suggests opportunities for plans to explore ways to attract and 
retain beneficiary enrollment under the umbrella of government regulations and 
requirements. While a significant number of plans now use the specialty tier, the earlier 
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years of the benefit shed light on the effect of such tiers on beneficiary utilization and 
expenditures. The results suggest that utilization response varies by type of condition, 
and that plans are successfully shifting costs to beneficiaries by increasing the cost 
sharing. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: ICD-9 Codes Associated with Each Conditi on 
Condition ICD-9 Codes 
RA 714.0, 714.1, 714.2, 714.30, 714.31, 714.32, 714.38 
MS 340 
Colorectal Cancer 153.0, 153.1, 153.2, 153.3, 153.4, 153.5, 153.6, 153.7, 153.8, 
153.9, 154.0, 154.1, 230.3, 230.4 
Breast Cancer 174.0, 174.1, 174.2, 174.3, 174.4, 174.5, 174.6, 174.8, 174.9, 
233.0 
Lung Cancer 162.0, 162.2, 162.3, 162.4, 162.5, 162.8, 162.9, 231.2 
Prostate Cancer 185, 233.4 
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Section A.1: Additional Analyses to Estimate Effects in the Initial Coverage Period 
 As discussed in Chapters 5-7, the effect of mean out-of-pocket costs for specialty 
tier-eligible drugs on beneficiary utilization (specifically, number of fills) and spending by 
both plans and beneficiaries could be confounded by the non-linear nature of the Part D 
benefit. That is, the presence of the coverage gap, during which beneficiaries pay 100% 
of the price of their drugs, and the catastrophic phase, during which beneficiaries are 
subject to a maximum of 5% of their drugs’ prices, may wash out any effects associated 
with cost sharing imposed during a relatively small portion of the benefit. This section 
presents the results of analyses conducted using solely the number of fills and 
beneficiary and plan spending incurred during the initial coverage phase of the benefit, 
when the specialty tier cost sharing rates apply. The same empirical approaches for the 
original models, as described in Chapters 6 and 7, are used here. 
Table A.3 presents the results for number of fills in the pre-coverage gap phase. 
These results do in fact suggest a significant association between mean out-of-pocket 
costs and the number of fills in the initial coverage period of the benefit. For RA and MS 
patients in 2007, and for cancer patients in both years, the negative association is 
significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests, for example, that a $100 increase in the 
mean out-of-pocket cost leads to a decrease of 0.17 in the number of fills for RA / MS 
patients in 2007. While the magnitude of the effect is small, it does suggest that 
beneficiaries do respond to the effects of cost sharing by reducing the number of fills – 
for that portion of the benefit for which the cost sharing applies. Future work might 
explore the effects based on where beneficiaries were in the benefit at the end of the 
year, to better construct analyses of the effects associated with the application of cost 
sharing in specific sections of the benefit. 
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Table A.2: Poisson Results for Number of Fills in t he Pre-Coverage Gap Phase, 
for Non-LIS Beneficiaries 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs -0.167*** -0.048 -0.169** -0.166*** 
 (0.062) (0.033) (0.085) (0.051) 
Average Subs OOP 0.015 -0.004 0.015 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.006) (0.02) (0.022) 
Any Other Costs 0.171 -0.137 0.041 -0.182 
 (0.5) (0.127) (0.277) (0.148) 
Age -0.123** -0.014 0.066* 0.122** 
 (0.056) (0.028) (0.038) (0.051) 
Race 0.049 -0.092 0.134 0.006 
 (0.308) (0.094) (0.12) (0.162) 
Inpatient Visits 0.002 -0.055 -0.034 0.013 
 (0.101) (0.062) (0.071) (0.051) 
Outpatient Visits 0.002 0 -0.005** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Risk Score -0.569** -0.035 -0.335* -0.16 
 (0.226) (0.107) (0.196) (0.109) 
Prior Authorization -1.852* -0.635 -7.007** -0.365 
 (1.116) (0.48) (3.069) (2.747) 
Premium 0.019*** 0.001 0.013*** 5.00E-03 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
National PDP -0.055 0.096 -0.057 0.174 
 (0.166) (0.121) (0.117) (0.229) 
Regional Deductible 0.014** 0.001 0.012** 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Region Average OOP -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
n 504  344  1045 210 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 Table A.4 presents the results of the analysis of beneficiary spending, and Table 
A.5 presents the results for plan spending. The results for beneficiary spending also 
support the hypotheses previously described, as the coefficients for mean out-of-pocket 
costs are positive and significant (except for RA / MS 2008) for beneficiary spending. 
The results for plan spending, however, are still counterintuitive, as for most years and 
groups they are positive and significant. 
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 Taken together, the results for these alternative analyses suggest that the 
non-linear nature of the Part D benefit poses difficulties in estimating the effects of cost-
sharing on utilization and spending. However, simply using the portion of the benefit in 
which the cost sharing applies likely does not fully address the problem. Further work 
may help to address these issues. 
Table A.3: GLM Results for Beneficiary Spending, fo r Non-LIS Beneficiary 
Spending in the Pre-Coverage Gap Phase. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.205*** -0.087 0.302*** 0.034** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.033) (0.017) 
Average Subs OOP 7.75*** 11.811*** 8.74*** 12.174*** 
 (1.563) (1.635) (0.945) (1.004) 
Any Other Costs -114.903*** -121.511*** -115.396*** -107.962*** 
 (14.114) (17.471) (6.565) (9.002) 
Age 13.328*** 12.175*** 17.061*** 20.675*** 
 (3.042) (3.384) (1.328) (1.534) 
Race -28.812** -12.412 -13.618** -0.273 
 (11.517) (16.08) (6.207) (6.756) 
Inpatient Visits -1.636 5.137 13.18*** 10.791*** 
 (6.441) (7.486) (3.282) (3.814) 
Outpatient Visits 1.191*** 0.878*** 0.52*** 0.786*** 
 (0.229) (0.267) (0.1) (0.116) 
Risk Score 37.733** 54.097*** 88.202*** 50.048*** 
 (17.232) (17.277) (8.167) (8.182) 
Prior Authorization 280.261*** 364.934*** 548.4*** 1142.782*** 
 (63.914) (99.673) (93.202) (128.307) 
Premium 6.059*** 2.358*** 3.409*** 1.692*** 
 (0.467) (0.313) (0.184) (0.146) 
National PDP -5.465 -47.895*** -1.607 -39.144*** 
 (9.168) (18.495) (3.817) (7.33) 
Regional Deductible -0.246 -1.905*** -0.283 -0.573** 
 (0.425) (0.504) (0.183) (0.236) 
Region Average OOP -0.32*** 0.001 -0.59*** 0.107** 
(0.114) (0.139) (0.066) (0.046) 
_cons 249.329*** 456.443*** 208.909*** 112.672*** 
(55.936) (89.316) (25.107) (35.229) 
n 7569  6304  29119 21964 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A.4: GLM Results for Plan Spending for Non-LI S Beneficiaries in the Pre-
Coverage Gap Phase. 
RA / MS1 Cancers 1 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 
Mean OOP Costs 0.386*** -0.169** 0.388*** 0.124*** 
 (0.069) (0.084) (0.051) (0.031) 
Average Subs OOP 6.276** 1.546 3.248** 3.037* 
 (2.766) (1.912) (1.547) (1.783) 
Any Other Costs 200.798*** 229.691*** 273.577*** 248.491*** 
 (26.761) (29.062) (15.31) (18.045) 
Age 15.117*** 10.787** 20.504*** 21.37*** 
 (4.81) (5.054) (2.413) (2.899) 
Race -56.751*** -7.938 -10.886 -8.574 
 (17.887) (22.349) (10.238) (12.792) 
Inpatient Visits 39.23*** 55.84*** 36.671*** 25.994*** 
 (11.451) (10.752) (5.451) (6.507) 
Outpatient Visits 1.897*** 1.817*** 0.848*** 1.405*** 
 (0.339) (0.346) (0.161) (0.183) 
Risk Score 83.689*** 58.372** 228.315*** 141.205*** 
 (25.325) (23.026) (13.624) (13.337) 
Prior Authorization 204.97** 247.537* 212.298 195.673 
 (101.449) (130.012) (167.047) (224.507) 
Premium 10.85*** 5.75*** 7.88*** 5.554*** 
 (0.877) (0.402) (0.292) (0.274) 
National PDP -11.515 21.093 -36.223*** 40.113*** 
 (13.986) (25.896) (6.941) (13.449) 
Regional Deductible -0.252 -1.29* -1.721*** -2.267*** 
 (0.685) (0.715) (0.334) (0.439) 
Region Average OOP -0.693*** 0.369* -1.289*** -0.133 
(0.173) (0.201) (0.118) (0.088) 
_cons 519.704*** 545.883*** 647.772*** 586.007*** 
(98.414) (128.176) (44.082) (68.283) 
n 7569  6304  29119 21964 
1 Marginal effects presented with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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